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The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity
Theory to Describe the Evolution of
Law and Society and Its Practical
Meaning for Democracy
J.B. Ruhl

49 Vand. L. Rev. 1407 (1996)

Why does law change, and how does that process unfold? In this
Article, Professor Ruhl examines those questions using tools from the
emergingfield of Complexity Theory. Complexity Theory involves the study of
change in dynamical systems. Its findings of unpredictable change in a
variety of natural and social settings have profoundly effected the theoretical
foundations of many fields of study. In particular,Complexity Theory has
revisited the Darwinist theory of biologicalevolution and used it as a platform
for developing a general theory of system evolution that focuses on the concept
of fitness landscapes. The fitness, or sustainability, of each system
component-in the case of biological evolution, each species-depends on the
possible combinations of variables that define the component (for example,
speed, weight, and strength). Those combinations and their associatedfitness
levels form a landscape of possibilities over which the system component can
move to attempt to improve its fitness. Moreover, because the fitness of each
combination will depend in part on the behavior of other system components,
the fitness landscapes of all system components are coupled such that as one
component evolves to different levels on its landscape, the landscapes of other
components may be altered. By developing and studying the model of coupled
fitness landscapes,Complexity Theory has provided new insights into the why
and how of evolution in a variety of contexts.
The history and process of change in law exhibits many of the traits of
coupled fitness landscapes. This Article begins by illustratinghow legal theory has embraced Darwinism as one of its models of legal change, and thus
how legal theory is ripe to integrate what Complexity Theory has to offer that
model. Using examples from environmental law, the Article unfolds the analogy between Complexity Theory's general fitness landscape model and the record of legal change. Finally, the Article develops the general principles of
what the fitness landscape model suggests will be the most fit sociolegal systems and compares them to the present condition of the modern
administrative state, concluding that significant and fundamental reforms
are necessary in order to take full advantage of the fitness traits our
constitutionalsystem offers.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Does law evolve? If so, why, how, and to where? The answer
to the first question seems self-evident given real-world experience:
law scarcely stands still; thus, it must be evolving. But not all change
necessarily fits our conception of evolution in the Darwinian, sense.
It may be, for example, that "law as law has no 'tendency' whatever,
any more than a quantity of bricks has a tendency to become a house.
Strictly it never changes, but is changed from without; it does not
develop, but it is developed."2 Whether law evolves through some
definable internal process or merely changes in response to events
1. Darwinism has been described as "much like Christianity and Marxism, in that everybody 'knows' what it means, and yet on not very close inspection it turns out that everybody's
meaning is slightly different" Michael Ruse, Darwinism,in Evelyn Fox Keller and Elisabeth A.
Lloyd, eds., Keywords of Evolutionary Biology 74 (Harvard U., 1992). I do not attempt in this
Article to explore all the nuances of Darwinism and the broader field of evolutionary biology.
Some refinements beyond the rudimentary lay notions of "natural selection" and "survival of
the fittest:' are provided, however, in order to evaluate the influence of evolutionary biology
theory on legal theory, see Part II, and to identify what significance the emergence of
Complexity Theory might have to both fields, see Parts III and IV. For an excellent survey of
the finer points and raging debates of present day evolutionary biology theory, see generally,
Ruse, Darwinism, in Keller and Lloyd, eds., Keywords (cited in this note).
2.
Edwin B. Gager, Book Review, 28 Yale L. J. 617, 617-18 (1919) (reviewing Albert
Kocurek and John H. Wigmore, Formative Influences of Legal Development (Little, Brown,
1918)).
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around it depends on our understanding of the why, how, and to
where of the changes that take place. Much of legal theory has been
3
devoted to the ambitious undertaking of answering those questions.
Answering the why part of the equation does not appear so
tricky at first-law changes because society changes, and thus no
matter how "perfect" law may seem at any instant, society will eventually change sufficiently to require changes in law. But we also can
sense from simple observation that society changes itself in response
to changes in law. Surely, for example, if changing social conditions
were to lead us to eliminate federal income taxes in the United States,
changes in society beyond those which prompted the tax law change
could be expected to occur as a result of those changes to the law,
some by design and some not. Hence, it seems intuitive that change
in society leads to change in law, and that change in law leads to
change in society.
Elsewhere I have used the analogy to the science of nonlinear
dynamical systems, 4 otherwise known as Complexity Theory, 5 to make
3.
As Professor Herbert Hovenkamp has pointed out, "[t]oday every theory of jurispruHerbert Hovenkamp,
dence worth contemplating incorporates a theory of change."
EvolutionaryModels in Jurisprudence,64 Tex. L. Rev. 645, 646 (1985). On the other hand, "not
every theory of jurisprudence that includes a theory of legal change qualifies as 'evolutionary,'"
and 'Darwin need not be an essential ingredient in evolutionary jurisprudence." Id. at 646-47.
It would be difficult to improve on Professor Hovenkamp's and several other commentators'
examinations of the late-nineteenth and twentieth century American legal theorists who have
expressly used Darwinian and other evolutionary models to explain the development of legal
rules. See also E. Donald Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence,85 Colum. L.
Rev. 38 (1985) (theorizing the evolution of legal rules); Donald L. Horowitz, The Qur'an and the
Common Law: Islamic Law Reform and the Theory of Legal Change, 42 Am. J. Comp. L. 233
(1994) (same); M.B.W. Sinclair, The Use of Evolution Theory in Law, 64 U. Detroit L. Rev. 451
(1987) (same). I do not attempt to do so here. Rather, the purpose of this Article is to explore
how legal theory has attempted to explain change in law through analogy to evolutionary
biology in general-that is, through pre-, neo-, and post-Darwinian models--so as to allow a
detailed explanation in this Article of the analogy to evolutionary dynamics offered by the
important new development of Complexity Theory.
A system exists whenever two or more phenomena interact. The system is dynamical
4.
if the interactive relationship changes over time, and the system is nonlinear if the relationship
of change is not strictly proportionate and thus cannot be graphed by a straight line. Peter
Coveney and Roger Highfield, The Arrow of Time" A Voyage through Science to Solve Time's
Greatest Mystery 184, 361 (Allen, 1990). Thus, the statement x = 1 does not describe a system
because only one component is described and it remains constant. The statement x = 2y does
define a system consisting of the components x and y, but the system is linear because any
change in x results in a proportional change in y according to a constant multiple. Nonlinear
systems are described by the dreaded differential equations.
Complexity Theory has been described as "the study of behavior of macroscopic
5.
collections of [interacting] units that are endowed with the potential to evolve over time." Peter
Coveney and Roger Highfield, Frontiersof Complexity: The Search for Order in a Chaotic World
7 (Faber, 1995). Complexity Theory embraces the more popularized branches of chaos theory
and catastrophe theory, and as such is an overarching field of mathematical analysis of the
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the case that law and society coexist interdependently and dynamically, approximating the behavior of nonlinear systems as they
exist in the physical world.6 My principal objective in that exercise
was to demonstrate that American legal theory and legal institutions
have been built upon premises which obscure the dynamical behavior
of the sociolegal system. The analogy to Complexity Theory demonstrates why dynamical forces will inevitably lead to unpredictable,
unanticipated behavior in a sociological system, and that such phenomena are necessary for the system to thrive and adapt in a dynamically fit manner.
Complexity Theory also reveals why communities in the physical world, such as ecosystems and the weather, possess varying degrees of dynamical fitness and sustainability. On the spectrum between rigid stasis and chaotically random change, some systems sit in
a dynamic region poised on the edge of chaos, but are kept from falling all the way into chaos by the reins of stability and simplicity.
These systems, in other words, maintain a balance between stasis and
change. Research suggests that such systems are the most successful
at holding themselves together for the long run, withstanding the
surprises their environments throw at them. Ironically, however,
such systems must maintain a chaotic, random component in order to
achieve this level of self-sustainability and hence they defy prediction
through the reductionist tenets of Classical Science. 7

behavior of nonlinear dynamical systems. Although the study of such systems can be quite
technical in substance, see, for example, Stuart A. Kauffnan, The Origins of Order: Self
Organization and Selection in Evolution (Oxford U., 1993), many of the recent and most
influential works in the field focus on the almost intuitive applications of the technical theory to
real world phenomena, including biological evolution.
See, for example, John L. Casti,
Complexification: Explaining the ParadoxicalWorld Through the Science of Surprise (Harper

Collins, 1994); Jack Cohen and Ian Stewart, The Collapse of Chaos: DiscoveringSimplicity in a
Complex World (Viking, 1994); Coveney and Highfield, Arrow of Time (cited in note 4); Coveney
and Highfield, Frontiersof Complexity (cited in this note); Murray Gell-Mann, The Quark and
the Jaguar: Adventures in the Simple and the Complex (Freeman, 1994); Brian Goodwin, How
the Leopard Changed Its Spots: The Evolution of Complexity (Orion, 1994); John H. Holland,
Hidden Order: How Adaptation Builds Complexity (Addison-Wesley, 1995); Stuart Kauffman,
At Home in the Universe: The Search for Laws of Self-Organization and Complexity (Oxford U.,
1995); George Cowan, David Pines, and David Meltzer, eds., Complexity: Metaphors, Models,
and Reality (Addison-Wesley, 1994).
6.
See J.B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigmfor the Dynamical Law-and-Society
System: A Wake-Up Call for Legal Reductionism and the ModernAdministrative State, 45 Duke
L. J. 849 (1996).
7.

By reductionist I mean the "doctrine according to which complex phenomena can be

explained in terms of something simpler." Coveney and Highfield, Frontiers of Complexity at
432 (cited in note 5). Reductionism leads to the belief that an observable, complex phenomenon
can be studied and fully understood by first reducing it to the simplest, indivisible
subcomponents in operation during the phenomenon, then studying each of those

subcomponents, and then reassembling them to gain a full understanding of the rules of
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I have posited that a similar stream of reductionism is evident
in American legal theory of all walks and in the foundations of
American legal institutions and that it also has prevented full illumination of the dynamical qualities of a healthy sociolegal community. 8
It is impossible to understand and manage the dynamical qualities of
law and society by dividing them into separate spheres, subdividing
those spheres into separate compartments, and so on. Doing so allows legal theory and legal institutions to divine sets of rules which
facilitate prediction and orderliness through rough approximation of
human sociolegal behavior, but which in the long run will cause us to
be surprised when the system departs from the purported rules, as it
surely will. As legal theories and institutions repeatedly have developed yet more reductionist-bred rules to address the system's surprises, they have become top-heavy in rules and short on explanations. Complexity Theory reveals why the surprises inevitably will
happen, why we will never be able always to predict them, and why
reductionism leads us in the wrong direction for responding to them.
A healthy sociolegal community must sit poised on the edge of chaos,
but in so doing will defy the predictivist goals of American legal theory and legal institutions in the long run.
Having made that argument at length elsewhere, s in this
Article I explore the next level of analysis offered by Complexity
operation of the whole phenomenon. That form of reductionism has long predominated as an
organizing principle for classical scientific inquiry. See id. at 11-13; Cohen and Stewart,
Collapse of Chaos at 33-34 (cited in note 5).
8. See Ruhl, 45 Duke L. J. at 893-916 (cited in note 6).
9.
I summarize the arguments basic foundations herein. See text accompanying notes
131-66. For additional descriptions of how Complexity Theory or branches of it help explain
why law evolves generally, see Thomas Earl Geu, The Too of Jurisprudence: Chaos, Brain
Science, Synchronicity, and the Law, 61 Tenn. L. Rev. 933 (1994) (discussing the potential
significance of chaos and emergence to legal theory); Andrew W. Hayes, An Introduction to
Chaosand the Law, 60 UMKC L. Rev. 751 (1992) (discussing chaos theory and its application to
judicial decision making); Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 Harv.
L. Rev. 641 (1996) (offering a theory of legal evolution); Robert E. Scott, Chaos Theory and the
JusticeParadox,35 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 329 (1993) (applying chaos theory to the legal dilemma
between "present justice" and "future justice"). Several other works discuss nonlinear
dynamical systems analysis, sometimes very briefly, in specific legal settings. See Lawrence A.
Cunningham, From Random Walks to Chaotic Crashes: The Linear Genealogy of the Efficient
Capital Market Hypothesis, 62 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 546 (1994); Lawrence A. Cunningham,
CapitalMarket Theory, Mandatory Disclosure,and PriceDiscovery, 51 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 843
(1994) (applying chaos theory to capital market regulation); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Essay,
Chaos and the Court, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 110 (1991) (explaining Supreme Court constitutional
jurisprudence using chaos theory); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional
Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 68 (1991) (explaining Supreme Court
constitutional jurisprudence using, among other mediums, a discussion of chaos theory);
William H. Rodgers, Jr., Where Environmental Law and Biology Meet. Of Pandas' Thumbs,
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Theory-describing how the community members coevolve towards
fitness. In other words, how do we get the sociolegal system to the
edge of chaos without falling all the way in? The answer is not as
simple as pointing out that legislatures pass new legislation, courts
decide new case principles, and agencies promulgate new regulations.
Those institutions could do that all day long every day and not move
the community one iota closer to fitness; indeed, regression into stasis
or chaos would be more likely. Evolution is not always a success story
in the jungle, nor is it so in the law.
Indeed, the very notion of law as evolving is borrowed largely
from biology,' 0 and in Part I of this Article I explore that intersection
of disciplines. Legal theory has found evolutionary biology an intoxicating paradigm for explaining why and how law changes. When
Darwin's theory of natural selection" shattered the Rational Morphologists' enlightenment age concept of fixed and unchanging species, 12 the door was opened to using the metaphor of evolution to exStatutory Sleepers, and Effective Law, 65 U. Colo. L. Rev. 25 (1993) (discussing chaos theory
surfacing in evolutionary biology commentary as a metaphor for evolution of environmental
law).
10. To be fair, it is also true that evolutionary biology has borrowed from other disciplines
in shaping its theory of change. For example, Charles Darwin was influenced profoundly by
Thomas Malthus's writings on population and food supply, see Hovenkamp, 64 Tex. L. Rev. at
651-52 (cited in note 3), and by Adam Smith's economic theory of laissez-faire, see Stephen Jay
Gould, Dinosaurin a Haystack 329 (1995).
11.
See Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection: Or the
Preservation of Favored Races in the Struggle for Life (Hurst, 1859). The central tenet of
Charles Darwin's theory, the concept of natural selection, has been described as being "that
certain hereditary types within a species (the 'favoured races') survive at the expense of others
and in so doing transform the makeup of the entire species across generations' Edward 0.
Wilson, The Diversity of Life 51 (Harvard U., 1992). The distinction between evolution and
natural selection is subtle: Evolution "is absolutely a phenomenon of populations. Individuals
and their offspring do not evolve." Id. at 75. Natural selection, which operates predominantly
or exclusively at the individual level, see note 44, is the mechanism by which populations
evolve. It has often been noted, therefore, that Darwin did not invent the notion of biological
evolution, but rather supplied the model of natural selection to explain the mechanics of what
several insightful biologists before him had observed. For commentators crediting Darwin's
predecessors in this regard, see Gould, Dinosaurat 430 (cited in note 10); Robert J. Richards,
Evolution, in Evelyn Fox Keller and Elisabeth A. Lloyd, eds., Keywords of Evolutionary Biology
95-105 (Harvard U., 1992); Ruse, Darwinism, in Keller and Lloyd, eds., Keywords of
EvolutionaryBiology at 77-78 (cited in note 1). Many other biologists helped Darwin reach that
discovery during the 20 years from the time he first observed finches and other species on the
Galapagos Islands to when he first published his theory of natural selection. See Jonathan
Wiener, The Beak of the Finch. A Story of Evolution in Our Time 17-36 (Knopf, 1994).
Nevertheless, Darwin is the overshadowing figure in the field, and it is no exaggeration to say
that "[t]he discipline of evolutionary biology can be defined to a large degree as the ongoing
attempt of Darwin's intellectual descendants to come to terms with his overwhelming
influence." John Horgan, The End of Scienca" Facingthe Limits of Knowledge in the Twilight of
the Scientific Age 114 (Addison-Wesley, 1996). For a thorough and enlightening biography of
Darwin, see Adrian Desmond and James Moore, Darwin (Warner, 1992).
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plain other systems of change, both physical and social, 13 and of both
individuals and groups.14 Legal theory wasted no time accepting that
invitation. 5 As the neo-Darwinian synthesis of natural selection and
12. For a description of the "laws of form" theory of Rational Morphology which predominated in eighteenth century biology, see Kauffman, Origins of Order at 3-5 (cited in note 5). See
also text accompanying notes 33-37.
13. For example, Darwinism spawned the rise of many of the social sciences during the
early 1900s, such as psychology, sociology, anthropology, and economics, each of which in turn
had a powerful influence on law and legal theory. See Hovenkamp, 64 Tex. L. Rev. at 653 (cited
in note 3). Darwin's theory was "modified in various ways to apply to economics and politics, to
the explanation of the origins and the significance of art, and even to the history of ideas
themselves." Goodwin, How the Leopard ChangedIts Spots at ix (cited in note 5).
14. There has been considerable debate as to whether natural selection transpires only at
the level of the individual or also at the population group level. Individual-centered, or "selfishgene," evolutionary theory argues that genes transmitted through generations help only
individual organisms adapt to be fittest, whereas genetic group selection theory-also known as
sociobiology-posits that natural selection sometimes preserves inherited physical and psychological traits that aid groups of organisms, even at the expense of individuals in those groups.
See Alexander Rosenberg, Altruism: Theoretical Contexts, in Evelyn Fox Keller and Elisabeth
A. Lloyd, eds., Keywords of Evolutionary Biology 19-33 (Harvard U., 1992); David Sloan Wilson,
Group Selection, in Evelyn Fox Keller and Elisabeth A. Lloyd, eds., Keywords of Evolutionary
Biology 145-48 (Harvard U., 1992); Bruce Bower, UltrasocialDarwinism, 148 Sci. News 366
(1995); Bruce Bower, Return of the Group, 148 Sci. News 328 (1995). Darwin clearly believed
that "natural selection is about advantages ...that accrue to individuals, explicitly not to
species." Gould, Dinosaurat 329 (cited in note 10). The species as a group may benefit only as
"side consequences of natural selection's causal mechanism: differential reproductive success of
individuals." Id. In either case, however, natural selection theory boils down to the process of
species transformation taking place through gradual selection of genes which offer the most
advantageous chances of survival and reproduction given environmental conditions. See John
A. Elder, Natural Selection: Current Usages, in Evelyn Fox Keller and Elisabeth A. Lloyd, eds.,
Keywords of EvolutionaryBiology 220-24 (Harvard U., 1992). The bigger debate in evolutionary
biology since Darwin has been over the extent to which natural selection processes explain all of
biological evolution, whether through individual or group mechanics. See Ruse, Darwinism, in
Keller and Lloyd, eds., Keywords at 77-80 (cited in note 1). See generally Parts II.B to D. For a
discussion of legal evolution through the eyes of sociobiology theory, a focus which I am
fundamentally not taking in this Article, see John H. Beckstrom, Evolutionary Jurisprudence:
Prospectsand Limitations on the Use of Modern Darwinism Throughout the Legal Process (U. of
Illinois, 1989); John H. Beckstrom, Sociobiology and the Law: The Biology of Altruism in the
Courtroom of the Future (U. of Illinois, 1985). Another important field of study is known as law
and biology, whose adherents examine the relationship between the biological evolution of
human behavior and legal rules and institutions. See, for example, Margaret Gruter, Law and
the Mind (Sage, 1991); William H. Rodgers, Jr., Deception, Self-Deception, and Mythology: The
Law of the Salmon in the PacificNorthwest, 26 Pac. L. J. 821 (1995). Although sociobiology, and
law and biology may have important insights to offer about evolutionary influences in law, the
focus of this Article is on the underlying mechanics of sociolegal evolution, whatever variables of
influence may be involved.
15. For reviews of the early works adopting the theme of evolutionary biology as a paradigm for legal theory, see Neil Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence25-32 (Oxford U.,
1995); Peter Stein, Legal Evolution: The Story of an Idea (Cambridge U., 1980); Robert Clark,
The InterdisciplinaryStudy of Legal Evolution, 91 Yale L. J. 1238 (1981); Elliott, 85 Colum. L.
Rev. at 38 (cited in note 3); Horowitz, 42 Am. J. Comp. L. at 233 (cited in note 3); Hovenkamp,
64 Tex. L. Rev. at 645 (cited in note 3); Sinclair, 64 U. Detroit L. Rev. at 451 (cited in note' 3).
See also text accompanying notes 38-43.
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its supporting cast of gene transmission theory, chromosomal germ
plasm theory, and population genetics theory progressed into a grand
theory of evolution, 16 legal theory continued to build upon biological
evolution as a paradigm for legal change.
But the neo-Darwinian synthesis has come under attack more
recently as allegedly failing to explain some very evident realities of
biology and history. For example, the Darwinian picture of evolution
as gradual and progressive departs from the evidence that some species-for example, the lowly cockroach-appear to have survived in
morphological stasis for eons while others appear to have sprung up
rapidly from out of nowhere. The historical record is that of successive orgies of evolution followed by long periods of minute species
variations interrupted by catastrophic episodes of extinction, what
many biologists call punctuated equilibrium. 17 On another front, the
normative implications often attributed to Darwinism-the notion of
survival of the fittest, thus leading species in a particular direction
towards higher quality, 8-have been challenged by the evidence that
species also evolve because of nonselective microevolutionary properties inherent in the organism, rather than solely as a result of external forces of natural selection. These so-called species selection processes suggest that macroevolution may emerge in part from a neutral
and, most significantly, random drift at genetic levels. 19 At the same
time, new views of ecosystem dynamics have surfaced indicating that
the concept of evolution of species-even the natural selection proc16. For a description of the neo-Darwinian synthesis of how natural selection operates at
these levels, see Kauffman, Origins of Order at 5-9 (cited in note 5). See generally text accompanying notes 47-51.
17. One of the leading proponents of the punctuated equilibrium model is the noted biologist Stephen Jay Gould. See, for example, Gould, Dinosaurat 127-29, 135-37 (cited in note 10).
See also text accompanying notes 86-90.
18. The description of the criteria used to define and measure evolutionary fitness "is
perhaps the most contentious concept in evolutionary biology." Diane Paul, Fitness: Historical
Perspectives, in Evelyn Fox Keller and Elisabeth A. Lloyd, eds., Keywords of Evolutionary
Biology 113 (Harvard U., 1992). See also John Beatty, Fitness: Theoretical Contexts, in Evelyn
Fox Keller and Elisabeth A. Lloyd, eds., Keywords of Evolutionary Biology 115 (Harvard U.,
1992) (The precise meaning of 'fitness' has yet to be settled, in spite of the fact--or perhaps
because of the fact-that the term is so central to evolutionary thought."). It was the Victorian
scientist and commentator Herbert Spencer, not Darwin, who coined the phrase "survival of the
fittest" to describe the principle of natural selection. See Paul, Fitness, in Keller and Lloyd,
eds., Keywords at 113 (cited in this note); Stephen Jay Gould, Ever Since Darwin 36-40 (Norton,
1977). See generally Herbert Spencer, Principles of Biology (Appleton, 1866). The criteria for
defining and measuring "fitness" are a continuing source of controversy in evolutionary biology
and a central focus of Complexity Theory. See text accompanying notes 167-72. Of course, one
point of this Article is to define what fitness means in the sociolegal system. See generally text
accompanying notes 173-78.
19. See Kauffman, Origins of Order at 10 (cited in note 5). See generally text accompanying notes 99-104.

1996]

COMPLEXITY THEORY

1415

ess-takes place in the context of complex, chaotic environments
fostering the horizontal splitting of species. Darwin's model, which
mainly focused on vertical transformation of a species to new forms,
does not provide complete insight to the macroevolutionary level of
such biodiversity dynamics.20 Hence, classical evolutionary biology is
being tested today by the demands to explain both the nongradual
phenological record and the nonequilibrium states found to be prevalent in the natural world as a result of species selection and ecosystem biology.
Similarly, legal theory has grappled with how to explain the
presence of both order and change in law and society, and thus has
challenged its neo-Darwinian paradigms as well. There is, of course,
no one-to-one correspondence between the theoretical developments of
evolutionary science and law. Indeed, many theories of legal change
make no explicit reference to Darwinism or biological evolution.
Nevertheless, where legal theory has progressed on the question of
evolution of law, this progression is in no small measure a remarkable
mirror image of the refinement of evolutionary biology from Darwin to
the Ecosystem Age. It is useful, therefore, to trace those parallels in
order to appreciate what Complexity Theory may add to the pot.
For example, many Legal Formalists21 fully embraced the ordered vision of natural selection and helped transfer it into the laissez-faire doctrines of Social Darwinism. 22 Legal Realism shattered
that view as effectively as the record of punctuated equilibriums made
it plainly obvious that gradual natural selection cannot explain everything in evolutionary biology.23 From there, the dichotomy between
order and indeterminacy in evolutionary biology provides a close
parallel to the reemergence of highly formalistic schools of legal theory, such as Law and Economics, versus those focusing on the inde-

20. One of the leading proponents of the ecosystem and biodiversity fields of science and
their importance to evolutionary biology is the noted biologist Edward 0. Wilson. See, for
example, Wilson, Diversity of Life (cited in note 11). See also Weiner, The Beak of the Finch at
224-303 (cited in note 11). See generally text accompanying notes 117-23.
21. I apologize up front for collapsing American legal theory into a few "major" schools of
thought-Formalism, Realism, Law and Economics, and Critical Legal Studies. I recognize that
doing so tends to overemphasize their differences and imply that they have "battled" one another for prominence and adoption. For a comprehensive history of American legal theory,
centered around the thesis that its story is not one simply of a revolt against the revolt against
the revolt against Formalism, see Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence(cited in note
15).
22. See text accompanying notes 52-85.
23. See text accompanying notes 91-98.
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terminacy factor, such as Critical Legal Studies. 24 And more recently,
the teachings of ecosystem biologists have been adopted explicitly by
several legal commentators as a model for legal structures. 25 To the
extent that biological evolution thus has served as a metaphor for
sociolegal evolution, Complexity Theory may have much to offer to the
extent it advances the analytical value of the metaphor.
Part II of this Article thus explores how Complexity Theory
offers a way of reconciling the order and chaos that appear to coexist
within the evolutionary biology model, 26 and what meaning that revelation may have for theories of how the sociolegal system evolves.
Complexity Theory's discovery that dynamical systems must experience randomness to maximize self-sustainability is essential to the
explanation of why the Darwinian concept of gradualism in natural
selection fails to explain the full dimension of biological evolution.
Complexity Theory demonstrates why and how gradual changes in
system structure can lead to large changes in system outcome and
why we ought to expect a record closer to punctuated equilibrium
than gradualism.
The real feat of Complexity Theory, however, is in accommodating the competing order and chaos themes of evolutionary biology
in one unified theory. The insight of Complexity Theory is to describe
how evolution occurs not as movement along a gradual, straight, uphill slope, but over a topography of fitness peaks, valleys, and
planes-a fitness landscape.27 Movement across the landscape takes
24. See text accompanying notes 105-16.
25. See text accompanying notes 124-29.
26. The most cogent and comprehensive application of Complexity Theory to evolutionary
biology, upon which the bulk of the description thereof provided in this Article is based, appears
in Kauffman, At Home in the Universe (cited in note 5). See also Cohen and Stewart, Collapse of
Chaos (cited in note 5); Coveney and Highfield, Frontiers of Complexity (cited in note 5);
Goodwin, How the Leopard Changed Its Spots (cited in note 5). For the more technical
counterpart to those works, see Kauffman, Origins of Order (cited in note 5). The fundamental
difference between neo-Darwinian theory and Complexity Theory is on the level of focus:
Darwin's theory works best for the small-scale, fine-tuning aspects of evolution, whereas
Complexity Theory focuses on large-scale mechanics. See Goodwin, How the Leopard Changed
Its Spots at x-xi (cited in note 5). Many of the evolutionary biologists associated with
Complexity Theory research thus agree with what neo-Darwinism has to say about evolution,
but consider the theory "incomplete" See Horgan, The End of Science at 135 (cited in note 11).
27. Kauffman describes "variations toward 'peaks' of high fitness on a fitness landscape.
And natural selection is thought of as 'pulling' an adapting population towards such peaks. We
can imagine a mountain range on which populations of organisms ...are feeling their way to
the summit." At Home in the Universe at 154 (cited in note 5). See also Coveney and Highfield,
Frontiersof Complexity at 108 (cited in note 5) (defining a fitness landscape as "[a] mountainous
terrain showing the locations of the global maximum (highest peak) and global minimum
(lowest valley) [and] [t]he height of a feature is a measure of its fitness"); Goodwin, How the
Leopard ChangedIts Spots at 156 (cited in note 5) C'[O]rganisms are constantly striving to climb
up to the higher peaks in the fitness landscape that represent the various possibilities for
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place in two forms: walking and jumping. Walking, the bulwark of
natural selection, allows certainty of direction up or down, but is
inefficient and slow. Jumping implies a more random, and thus more
risky movement pattern, but with risk comes the possibility of large
incremental movements up or down the fitness regime. The longer
the jump, moreover, the higher the chances of radically altering the
ruggedness of the nearby fitness landscape. Both forms of movement
are complicated by the fact that the landscape, despite the image
suggested by that metaphor, is not static. Rather, a fitness landscape
for any species is constantly reforming in response to changes in its
surrounding environment. The image, once time is added to the
picture, thus is more of a boat navigating a seascape of ever-undulating waves. Complexity Theory uses these concepts, demonstrated
through observed evolutionary patterns as well as modeled physical
environments, to assimilate the apparently competing streams of
evolutionary biology theory into a unified, consistent paradigm.
But Complexity Theory is not just about evolutionary biology;
it is about evolution of all dynamical systems, biological, physical, and
social. Indeed, the foundations of Complexity Theory were developed
by observation of physical and computer-modeled systems, not of
organisms and ecosystems. 28 The Complexity Theory fitness landscape paradigm is simply a powerful way of explaining dynamical
system evolution generally. Indeed, law and society being, as I analogize, in a dynamical system relationship, the concept of an evolving
fitness regime for the sociolegal system seems worth exploring.
Throughout the description of the fitness evolution model,
therefore, I use the development of environmental law to provide an
example of the explanatory power of the Complexity Theory paradigm
for the sociolegal system. Environmental law has long had to face the
challenge of providing ordered legal solutions to its chaotic subject,
survival."). The notion of such a terrain of adaptive fitness originated with evolutionary
biologist Sewall Wright in the 1930s and remains important to current research programs as a
way of describing the dispositive factors of natural selection processes. See Weiner, The Beak of
the Finch at 152, 192-94 (cited in note 11). Complexity Theory moves the concept of adaptive
landscapes beyond the descriptive purpose for which it has been used thus far in evolutionary
biology and towards a more explanatory role that the Complexity Theory model offers for
describing how a system evolves. See text accompanying notes 179-201.
28. For histories of the development of Complexity Theory, which has been brought about
largely through the efforts of the Santa Fe Institute, see generally James Gleik, Chaos (1987);
Roger Lewin, Complexity: Life at the Edge of Chaos (Macmillan, 1992); M. Mitchell Waldrop,
Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos (Simon & Schuster, 1992).
For an account of the figures who are at the forefront of Complexity Theory today, see Horgan,
The End of Science at 191-246 (cited in note 11).
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the environment, and has often witnessed results far off the intended
target. 9 The landscape of common law nuisance provided the early
realm of experimentation, but the challenges of environmental management were perceived to be too tall for the plodding evolutionary
march of nuisance law.30 Environmental law's extended period of
common law tradition thus was eclipsed by a long jump to federal
regulatory structures in the 1970s. 31 Since then, we have been exploring the landscape near the initial landing spot with ever finer adjustments of the regulatory model. All along, however, the rest of the
sociolegal system has been evolving in part as a response to environmental law's transformation, and in turn causing the landscape of
environmental law to alter as well. Indeed, it appears that the regulatory approach of environmental law is beginning to suffer a fitness
"catastrophe" of sorts, just as nuisance law did.32 New themes such as
market economics, private property rights, environmental justice,
risk-benefit analysis, and local control are challenging the entrenched
federal regulatory apparatus. The nearby landscape of regulatory
structures, however, does not compete well against those themes. We
may need another long jump for environmental law to test and adapt
to these new approaches.
Part III of this Article then offers several observations for the
practical operation of democracy which appear to emerge from the
theoretical model of evolving fitness landscapes and the example of its
application to legal issues provided by environmental law. The principal difference between biological evolution and sociolegal evolution
is that the actors in the sociolegal system have the power to make
long or short jumps across fitness landscapes at will. Sex and accidents are the most expedient ways biological organisms have of doing
so. Human society, on the other hand, has everything from resolutions to revolutions at its disposal. The capacity to make long jumps
is desirable, but there is high risk inherent in doing so whimsically.
In other words, we come right back to the theme of order and chaos,
and the revelation that the edge of chaos is where a system performs
best.
Based on Complexity Theory's research into what characterizes the most adaptive system for navigating rugged, correlated,
changing fitness landscapes, sociolegal regimes that favor less hierarchical, flatter, and more decentralized power structures will tend to
29.
30.
31.
32.

See
See
See
See

text accompanying
text accompanying
text accompanying
text accompanying

notes 152-66.
notes 185-91.
notes 202-12.
notes 222-26.
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outperform competing models in that respect. It is uncanny how close
the common law and the American constitutional form of government
as originally conceived come to that model. A cause for concern,
therefore, is how far the modern federal regulatory state has pulled us
away from those conceptions through such mechanisms as the nondelegation doctrine, the expansive commerce power, administrative
discretion, and similar power-centralizing, reductionist-bred legal
structures which have swelled the federal administrative creature to
ungainly proportions. The centralized federal regulatory state, in
other words, is taking the "sex" out of democracy and thus impeding
the adaptiveness of the American sociolegal system. With Complexity
Theory as a foundation, I make the case that it may be time for a long
jump out of those outmoded structures and towards a more adaptive
system which may be realized through greater reliance on common
law and other nonfederal initiatives.
II. EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY AND THE SEDUCTION OF LEGAL
THEORY-FROM DARWIN TO THE ECOSYSTEM AGE IN SCIENCE AND LAW
Charles Darwin's publication of The Origin of Species in 1859
has left such a permanent bookmark on the pages of science and law
that little is remembered today about what preceded Darwin in either
field in the way of an explanation of the why, how, and to where of
system change. 33 In science, for example, it is no exaggeration to say
that "the serious purposes of pre-Darwinian biologists have receded
from our collective scientific mind, not merely by passage of time but
also by passage from relevance."34 Yet serious they were, as lateeighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century biology sought to develop a
teleological theory of fixed, unchanging species brought about by a
rational Creator.35 The research program of the so-called Rational
33. As Professor Hovenkamp observes, Darwinism "was a model.., that infected
everything." Hovenkamp, 64 Tex. L. Rev. at 645 (cited in note 3). Others have described
Darwinism as the "quintessential theory of change within Western science." Gould, Dinosaurat
134 (cited in note 10). To be sure, Darwinism was not instantly accepted by the entire scientific
community as the only theory of evolutionary change. Indeed, natural selection theory was
being criticized by preeminent biologists well into the 1900s as being either too scientific
because of its nonteleological message, or too unscientific because it was incapable (at the time)
of being observed at work. See Weiner, The Beak of the Finch at 129-31 (cited in note 11); Ruse,
Darwinism, in Keller and Lloyd, eds., Keywords at 78-79 (cited in note 1).
34. See Kauffman, Origins of Orderat 3-4 (cited in note 5).
35. Id. A leading figure in this effort was the Swedish botanist Karl von Linn6, writing
under the name Carolous Linnaeus, who "tried, as a monumental act of religious devotion, to
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Morphologists, which focused on comparative anatomy and systematic
taxonomy, was based on the logic that the apparent similarity and
groupings of organisms was built upon combinations of a small number of naturally ordered principles waiting to be decoded. 36 The reductionist premise of that search thus was consistent with the coherent philosophical tradition of Newtonian scientific method and of the
Enlightenment in general. And just as Newton was able to advance
scientific understanding of physics tremendously, so too were the
Rational Morphologists able to make great strides in the comprehen37
sion of the living world.
Meanwhile, the natural law tradition of eighteenth century
English legal theory "used man's rational and social nature everywhere as the basis on which it founded both his moral and his legal
obligations."38 Thus, much as the Rational Morphologists were doing
for biology at the time, English natural law theorists "were seeking to
prove the existence of certain general principles which bound every
39
man by his nature, and which were themselves unchanging."
During this period only Scottish legal theorists, most notably Adam
Smith and his student John Millar, 40 and German historical law theowork out the relationships of all the living forms on earth. By doing so, Linn6 had hoped to
glimpse the plan of the Creator... " Weiner, The Beak of the Finchat 23 (cited in note 11).
36. For example, Karl von Linn6 did so by "designating species as basic units and
establishing principles for their uniform definition and naming... [and] by arranging species
into a wider taxonomic system based on a search for natural order rather than human
preference or convenience." Gould, Dinosaurat 421 (cited in note 10). Linn 's system "divided
life on earth into kingdoms, kingdoms into classes, classes into orders, orders into genera, and
genera into species." Weiner, The Beak of the Finch at 23 (cited in note 11).
37. Indeed, far from being irrelevant to today's science, Rational Morphology laid the
foundation for modem taxonomic classification of species. Linn6's taxonomic method, first
published in 1758, has been used ever since as the official method of naming organisms.
Modern science has simply added two levels: phylum below kingdom, and family below order.
Weiner, The Beak of the Finch at 23 (cited in note 11).
38. See Stein, Legal Evolution at ix (cited in note 15).
39. Id. at 5.
40. Adam Smith and John Millar were members of a "salon" of Scottish legal thinkers,
which included Henry Home (Lord Kames) and David Hume, who during the late eighteenth
century distinguished sharply between morality and law and pursued the theory, the
foundations for which were laid by Montesquieu and Machiavelli, that "legal development is
related to the mode of subsistence of society, which passes through certain well-defined stages."
Id. at 29. The focus of Smith in particular was on property law, based on the premise that
property plays different roles in the sociolegal system according to the state of progress a society
has reached. Id. at 29-38. Whereas "writers in the natural law tradition ... stressed the will of
the individuals involved in a transaction, and set it against the good of the community as a
whole," id. at 39, Smith and his group held that "[n]atural liberty implies... a set of laws and
institutions designed to make the self-interested actions of individual men work to the
advantage of all. The appropriate analogy for such laws is no longer mathematics, as it was for
the rationalist natural law theorists. It is rather the rules of grammar, established by a slow
process of social consensus, and subject to human alteration." Id. at 46. See also Knut
Wolfgang Norr, Technique and Substance Remarks on the Role of Roman Law at the End of the
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rists such as Gustav Hugo and Friedrich Karl von Savigny, 41 were
giving serious attention to the question of change in law as a reflectheir theories postulated only a detion of change in society, though
42
terministic form of evolution.
At the dawn of the nineteenth century, therefore, the search
for ahistorical, teleologically derived laws of form, both biological and
legal, dominated scientific and legal theories. 43 Many of the important
names and developments of that era have been largely forgotten outside of history studies. Nevertheless, the tradition they laid down
was critical to the emergence and definition of evolutionism in both
20th Century, 20 Syracuse J. Intl. L. & Comm. 33, 34 (1994) (explaining the importance of
property law to the Scottish school).
41. Friedrich Karl von Savigny's and Gustav Hugo's theories, like those of the Scottish
school, echoed the earlier writings of Montesquieu, as well as of the Irishman, Edmund Burke.
See Stein, Legal Evolution at 54-60 (cited in note 15). Hugo's fascination was with Roman law,
which he regarded as evidencing a strong "power... to adapt itself to changes in Roman
society." Id. at 55. For Savigny, who also focused on Roman law as the model of evolution in
law, the Roman experience demonstrated that "[]aw at first is not formulated in abstract rules;
rather it is manifested through special forms, symbolic acts, which create or extinguish rights
and duties .... People consider them as part of their special way of life." Id. at 60. Savigny
thus posited that this "organic connection of law with the character of the people is preserved as
societies develop... [and] is an inseparable part of the nation's life." Id. Savigny's "organic
connection" became the dominant model of the German historical school. Id. at 63. See also
Elliott, 85 Colum. L. Rev. at 41-43 (cited in note 3) (discussing the influence of Savigny's
German historical school on late nineteenth century English theorists); Mathias Rimann,
Nineteenth Century German Legal Science, 31 B.C. L. Rev. 837, 858 (1990) (reviewing Savigny's
theories and noting that "[a]ll German legal thinkers after Savigny built on his work").
42. In his thorough examination of the Scottish and German historical evolution theories,
Peter Stein concludes that they claimed "to explain legal change not merely in historical terms
but as proceeding according to certain determinative stages, or in a certain pre-determined
manner .... They were produced by thinkers who were, on the whole, satisfied with the state
of the law as it was." Stein, Legal Evolution at 122 (cited in note 15). See also Norr, 20
Syracuse J. Intl. L & Comm. at 34 (cited in note 40) (noting that the Scottish "theory of
stages ... took on deterministic traits"); M.H. Hoeflich, Law & Geometry, Legal Science from
Leibniz to Langdell, 30 Am. J. Legal Hist. 95, 106-07 (1986) (describing Savigny as fitting a
.geometric" paradigm of law, in that he portrayed laws as derived from history and society
rather than from natural law truths, but also that "[ojnce so derived.., they could function as
mathematical axioms in the hands of the jurists"); Horowitz, 42 Am. J. Comp. L. at 246-47 (cited
in note 3) (concluding that Savigny's and others' "evolutionary and developmental
thinking... conduces to fixed ideas about where the law must be headed and vague ideas about
General outcomes are foreordained, methods
how it moves from one point to another.
underspecified").
43. Stein, Legal Evolution at 69 (cited in note 15). To be sure, the tide started to turn in
this regard before Darwin, largely through the efforts of Jeremy Bentham, who argued the
decidedly un-British view that "law was what the legislator commanded in statutes" and that
"legal change... should be made expressly and rationally by legislators who had been
trained.., for the purpose." Id. at 69-70. Both Bentham and his disciple, John Austin, were
influenced largely by the natural law theory of Roman law espoused by the German Pandectist
scholarship, which was anathema to Savigny, and, though their efforts led to tremendous leaps
of law codification reform in England, they did not produce a distinct theory of legal evolution.
See id. at 70-72. See also Hoeflich, 30 Am. J. Legal Hist. at 110-11 (cited in note 42).
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fields. And, as we can see through Complexity Theory, ultimately the
message of a natural system of order beyond the chance and necessity
of natural selection may not be as much total nonsense as we have
smugly come to believe. To come to that revelation, however, requires
a brief recounting of the historical unfolding of scientific and legal
evolutionism from Darwin to the Ecosystem Age.
A. NaturalSelection and Gradualism-Foundations
for
Legal Formalism
Proponents of the common theme of order-the rationally,
naturally, and ahistorically derived order which drove Rational
Morphology and English natural law theory in the eighteenth
century-must have felt threatened by Darwin's works. Darwin's
innovation, and the threat it posed to natural order theory, was
twofold. First, he used the concept of natural selection to explain how
a species evolves into another species as a result of variants of
individual members of the first.4 Second, he developed the picture of
branching speciation, or "descent with modification," to describe the
vertical evolution of a population and the proliferation of different
species under a common phylum. 45 Thus, "[s]pecies, genera, families,

44. It is important to emphasize that Darwin's theory of natural selection "is a theory of
ultimate individualism. Darwin's mechanism works through the differential reproductive
success of individuals who, by fortuitous possession of features rendering them more successful
in changing local environments, leave more surviving offspring." Gould, Dinosaurat 329 (cited
in note 10). See also Ruse, Darwinism, in Keller and Lloyd, eds., Keywords at 78 (cited in note
1) ("Darwin ...believed ardently that selection works solely for the benefit of the individual.").
Because of the important role reproductive success plays in the mechanism of transferring
individual survival advantages to the species, most Darwinians, including Darwin, also accept
as a subsidiary mechanism that of sexual selection-the struggle to reproduce as opposed to
natural selection's struggle to survive. See Helena Cronin, Sexual Selection: Historical
Perspectives, in Evelyn Fox Keller and Elisabeth A. Lloyd, eds., Keywords of Evolutionary
Biology 286 (Harvard U., 1992); Hamish G. Spencer and Judith C. Masters, Sexual Selection:
ContemporaryDebates, in Evelyn Fox Keller and Elisabeth A. Lloyd, Keywords of Evolutionary
Biology 294 (Harvard U., 1992). See generally Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man, and
Selection in Relation to Sex (Appleton, 1871). Although many Darwinians lump sexual selection
into natural selection, see Ruse, Darwinism, in Keller and Lloyd, eds., Keywords at 78 (cited in
note 1), the existence of traits which offer sexual reproduction advantages while at the same
time reducing the chances of survival-for example, the male peacock's tail feathers and the
mail guppy's tail colors attract both females and predators-suggests that sexual selection can
be a powerful independent factor in evolution. See Weiner, The Beak of the Finch at 85-93, 15972 (cited in note 11).
45. See Richard M. Burian, Adaptation: HistoricalPerspectives, in Evelyn Fox Keller and
Elisabeth A. Lloyd, eds., Keywords of Evolutionary Biology 8 (Harvard U., 1992); John A.
Endler, NaturalSelection: Current Usages, in Evelyn Fox Keller and Elisabeth A. Lloyd, eds.,
Keywords of Evolutionary Biology 220-24 (Harvard U., 1992). As Edward 0. Wilson explains,
"[tihe two patterns of evolution are vertical change in the original population and speciation,
which is vertical change plus the splitting of the original population into multiple races or
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order, and the other higher taxa cluster hierarchically because they
not because they reflect a
express the pattern of branching speciation,
46
Creation."
of
Plan
universal
and
timeless
Darwin thus provided the first leg of the modern, though far
from universally accepted, concept that natural selection is the single
explanatory force of biological evolution. Three other essential legs
were needed to support that contemporary neo-Darwinian view.
First, the rediscovery in the early 1900s of Mendelian genetics
explained how "some form of steady state is reached in which each47
organism has a constant number of the hoped-for hereditary atoms"

and led to an understanding of the distinction between the description
of an organism based on internal hereditary factors, genotype, versus
its observable physical qualities, phenotype.48 Second, research in
organism development helped bond the concept of a history of the
species' lineages, phylogeny, to the process of the species individual's
growth, ontogeny. This refinement led to a better understanding of
the germ plasm, which is passed from parent to offspring and
contains both the hereditary atoms and the blueprint for organism
development. 49 Finally, advancements in understanding of population
biology and genetics have helped explain how a mutant gene arising
in a single individual and conferring only a slight selective advantage
over the normal gene could spread throughout a population by virtue
of the selective advantage it offered. 50
The convergence of these four legs of theory, when "united with
paleontological evidence and the experimental transmission and
developmental genetics, forms the core of the contemporary neo-

species .... Speciation requires vertical evolution, but vertical evolution does not require
speciation." Wilson, Diversity of Life at 51 (cited in note 11). Darwin's focus was on vertical
change, see id. at 51-52, though his theory of natural selection is critical to an understanding of
how speciation occurs, for speciation is "simply the evolution of some difference-any difference
at all-that prevents the production of fertile hybrids between populations under natural
conditions." Id. at 56.
46. Kauffnan, Origins of Order at 6 (cited in note 5).
47. Id. at 7.
48. See Lindley Darden, Character: Historical Perspectives, in Evelyn Fox Keller and
Elisabeth A. Lloyd, eds., Keywords of Evolutionary Biology 40-44 (Harvard U., 1992); Richard C.
Lewontin, Genotype and Phenotype, in Evelyn Fox Keller and Elisabeth A. Lloyd, eds., Keywords
of Evolutionary Biology 137-44 (Harvard U., 1992).
49. See Kauffnan, Origins of Order at 7 (cited in note 5); Peter Bowler, Lamarckism, in
Evelyn Fox Keller and Elisabeth A. Lloyd, eds., Keywords of Evolutionary Biology 188, 191
(Harvard U., 1992).
50. Kauffman, Origins of Order at 9 (cited in note 5). See also Burian, Adaptation:
HistoricalPerspectives, in Keller and Lloyd, eds., Keywords at 10 (cited in note 45).
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Darwinian Synthesis." 51 Needless to say, as this theory unfolded it
left no place in biology for the "laws of form" premise of Rational
Morphology, and it posed a serious assault on the search for natural,
teleologically-derived order which formed the foundation of
Enlightenment philosophy, including that of natural law theory.
This is not to say, of course, that there were none in science
and other disciplines who were ready to accept Darwinism with open
arms. Indeed, many did so for the very reason that it offered a way
out of the entrenched enlightenment dogma. The springboard for that
infusion of new blood into Anglo-American legal theory can be traced
to Henry Maine's 1861 publication of Ancient Law. 52 Maine presented
his influential study of Roman Law much more in the tradition of the
German historical school, particularly of Friedrich Karl von Savigny,
than was the custom of English natural law theory. 53 Ancient Law
thus provided the first English version of the notion that "the law of
civilised societies was the product of a development through a series
of identifiable stages related to, but distinct from, the development of
society itself."'
Although Maine was not at that time greatly
influenced by Darwin, 55 and Ancient Law contained no overtly
Darwinian themes, English readers readily saw the parallel as did
Maine himself eventually. 56 The stage thus was set for Darwinism to
provide the vehicle for jettisoning natural law theory's melding of law
and morality, a process which unfolded in the United States largely
through the works of the Legal Formalists.
Legal Formalists looked to experimental science as a tool for
divining the imperishable truths of "legal science." 57 Accordingly, they
51. Kauffman, Origins of Order at 9 (cited in note 5). Similarly, Edward 0. Wilson
describes neo-Darwinism as "[tihe modern study of the evolutionary process that assigns a
central role to natural selection.., now informed by substantial new knowledge from genetics,
ecology, and other modern disciplines of biology." Diversity of Life at 403 (cited in note 11).
52. Henry Sumner Maine, Ancient Law: Its Connection with the Early History of Society,
and Its Relation to Modern Ideas (Beacon ed. 1963).
53. Stein, Legal Evolution at 89 (cited in note 15) (noting that Maine was "concerned with
the history of legal institutions in the manner of Savigny, whose influence on him is clear");
Elliott, 85 Colum. L. Rev. at 43 (cited in note 3) ("Savigny's historical approach to the evolution
of legal systems was extended and refined by... Maine.").
54. Stein, Legal Evolution at 99 (cited in note 15). In this sense, Maine perpetuated the
German historical schoors depiction of legal evolution as a progression through pre-determined
stages of development. See Elliott, 85 Colum. L. Rev. at 43-44 (cited in note 3) C(Maine
identifies successive stages through which all 'progressive societies' must pass").
55. The prevailing view today is that "[t]he science which provided the model for Maine
was geology." Stein, Legal Evolution at 88 (cited in note 15). See also Elliott, 85 Colum. L. Rev.
at 43 (cited in note 3) (stating that Maine's ideas were only "mildly evolutionary" in the
Darwinian sense).

56.
57.

Stein, Legal Evolution at 100 (cited in note 15).
Hoeflich, 30 Am. J. Legal Hist. at 96 (cited in note 42).
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portrayed law as "a structure of positivised, objective, formally
58
The central precepts of this "legal science"
defined rights.."
approach, which was pursued to its highest form in Langdell's case
study method at Harvard, 59 were that laws are commands, legal
decisions can be deduced logically from predetermined rules, and the
law as it is actually laid down is separate from the law as it should
Although "[t]he flesh is arranged differently by different
be. 60
positivists... [d]ifferent versions differ chiefly in their descriptions of
the fundamental test of pedigree a rule must meet to count as a rule
of law."61
Professor Herbert Hovenkamp describes how different Legal
Formalists, in pursuit of their science of legal rules, embraced Darwin
through three different schools of thought: (1) Apolitical Darwinism;
Apolitical
(2) Social Darwinism; and (3) Reform Darwinism.6 2
Darwinism was characterized by the giants of the Langdellian "legal
science" brand of jurisprudence, such as John Henry Wigmore 63 and
Arthur Corbin.6 4 In general, however, their discourses on the subject
tended, like much Formalist writing, "to lapse into dry, complicated,
and endless classification schemes"65 and to be "concerned with
largely historical, and thoroughly academic questions about how the
law evolves."6s Their influence in developing a broadly followed theory
of legal evolution thus was not tremendous outside the academic

58. Scott, 35 Win. & Mary L. Rev. at 337 (cited in note 9) (quoting Elizabeth Mensch, The
History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in David Kairys, ed., The Politicsof Law: A Progressive
Critique18, 23 (Pantheon, 1982)).
59. See Duxbury, PatternsofAmerican Jurisprudenceat 9-64 (cited in note 15).
60. H. L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separationof Law and Morals, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593,
601-02 n.25 (1958). For a concise discussion of the different versions of legal positivism advanced by the leading figures in the school of what is now called Legal Formalism, see Joseph
Raz, The Concept of a Legal System: An Introductionto the Theory of the Legal System (Oxford
U., 2d ed. 1980).
61. Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 14, 18 (1967). See also
Duxbury, Patternsof American Jurisprudenceat 22 (cited in note 15) (describing Formalism as
fundamentally reductionist in approach); id. at 79 ("The Langdellian legal scientist had a clear
objective: to reduce legal doctrines to their core elements and thereby remove from the law all
unnecessary complexity.").
62. See Hovenkamp, 64 Tex. L. Rev. at 656 (cited in note 3).
63. See Elliott, 85 Colum. L. Rev. at 46-50 (cited in note 3). See generally Albert Kocourek
and John H. Wigmore, eds., Evolution of Law: Select Readings on the Origin and Development
of Legal Institutions (Little, Brown, 1915).
64. See Elliott, 85 Colum. L. Rev. at 55-59 (cited in note 3). See generally Arthur L.
Corbin, The Law and the Judges, 3 Yale L. J. 234, 249 (1914) C'[Tihe growth of the law is an
evolutionary process.").
65. Hovenkamp, 64 Tex. L. Rev. at 662 (cited in note 3).
66. Id. at 663.
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world. 67 Indeed, the fascination of the Apolitical Darwinists with
evolutionary theory led many of their pronouncements to appear antiFormalist and almost "proto-realist."68
As much as the Apolitical Darwinists may have bred interest
in the field of academic jurisprudence, of far more excitement to the
day was the debate between Social and Reform Darwinists. Social
Darwinism was the brainchild of the English commentator Herbert
Spencer, who blended the evolutionary theory of cultural development
espoused in August Comte's Course of Positive Philosophy69 with
Darwinian evolutionary theory and thus "wrote the concept of rights
based on natural law out of existence." 0 Spencer's thesis replaced
natural law with the highly individualist "belief[s] that every person
may expect nature to take its course free from unreasonable private
or state interference" and that legal rights thus "were the products of
evolutionary development from economic necessity."' 1 His views were
trumpeted in the United States most vocally by William Graham
Sumner, who advanced the notion of "rights as rules of the game of
social competition"72 and described the role of jurisprudence as "to
develop a legal theory of the state that would permit natural selection

67. One influential writer who Professor Hovenkamp includes in the Apolitical Darwinism
category is Oliver Wendell Holmes, see id., but Justice Holmes may be harder to classify in this
regard. Justice Holmes "had a lifelong interest in the theory of evolution as applied to law," id.,
and was the first in the United States to systematically advance the notion that law adapts to
the times, as characterized by his observation that "legislation... like every other device of
man or beast, must tend in the long run to aid the survival of the fittest." Duxbury, Patternsof
American Jurisprudenceat 43 (cited in note 15) (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Summary
of Events: The Gas Stokers'Strike, 7 Am. L. Rev. 582, 583 (1873) (unsigned)). Justice Holmes's
work in the field, exemplified by his masterpiece The Common Law, thus is seen as having
"strong evolutionary undercurrent" Elliott, 85 Colum. L. Rev. at 51 (cited in note 3). But
although Justice Holmes speaks often of or about evolution of law, Darwin's name and
Darwinism seldom are mentioned. Indeed, in many important respects Justice Holmes can be
viewed more as a positivist who subscribed to August Comte's theory of evolution of thought,
which is in no sense Darwinian. See Patrick J. Kelley, Was Holmes a Pragmatist?: Reflections
on a New Twist to an Old Argument, 14 So. Ill. L. J. 427, 453 (1990).
68. For example, Professor Corbin held firm to the Langdellian tradition, but his focus on
legal evolution through judicial creativity won him an anti-Formalist following. See Duxbury,
Patterns of American Jurisprudenceat 140-41 (cited in note 15).
69. August Comte, Cours de PhilosophiePositive (Hermann, 1975). Hovenkamp explains
how Spencer used Comte's work to develop his own pre-Darwinian theory of cultural evolution.
See Hovenkamp, 64 Tex. L. Rev. at 664-67 (cited in note 3).
70. Hovenkamp, 64 Tex. L. Rev. at 667 (cited in note 3). One commentator observed not
long after Spencer published his theories that "[s]o deeply did Spencer impress his stamp upon
the social thought of his age that to most students of social phenomena evolution means
Spencerian evolution." A.G.Keller, Law In Evolution, 28 Yale L. J. 769, 772 (1919).
71. Hovenkamp, 64 Tex. L. Rev. at 669 (cited in note 3).
72. Id. at 670 (quoting William Graham Sumner, Rights, in 1 Essays of William Graham
Sumner 362 (1934)).
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The Social Darwinist focus on the rational, egotis-

tic, autonomous, acquisitive individual as a moral and economic ideal
to be promoted through a laissez-faire economy 4 certainly corresponded to Darwin's description of natural selection as a mechanism
at work on the individual rather than species level. 75 The unmistak-

able bottom line message of the Social Darwinists, however, was decidedly un-Darwinian in its normative focus-that allowing sociolegal
evolution to proceed by natural selection, that is, unfettered by state
intervention designed to convert "natural" rights into 7 state-enforced
6
rights, would produce progressively "superior" societies.
By contrast, the Reform Darwinists embraced Darwin's normfree depiction of evolution to develop a theory of a more active state
than the one conceived by the Social Darwinists. 77 In his 1901 publication of Social Control,7s for example, Edward Ross explained how
legal rules evolve in order to identify the means of controlling this
evolutionary mechanism to produce desired social outcomes. 79 For
Roscoe Pound, therefore, the reason to understand a law's evolutionary development was to use it as a tool for social control.8o
By the early 1900s, Reform Darwinism, with its emphasis on
developing working theories in social science and jurisprudence, was

73. Id. at 671. For the Social Darwinists, this meant that "[w]hile everyone will share an
equal right to compete in the market under a system of laissez-faire, not everyone will in fact
compete equally' Duxbury, Patternsof American Jurisprudenceat 27-28 (cited in note 15).
74. Duxbury, PatternsofAmerican Jurisprudenceat 26 (cited in note 15).
75. See note 44.
76. See Hovenkamp, 64 Tex. L. Rev. at 671 (cited in note 3). Natural selection theory has
been used to advocate normative models of directional change based on "the unstated belief that
evolution is always going somewhere and that we would especially like to know where such a
universal process will lead." Gould, Dinosaurat 136 (cited in note 10). Darwin insisted "that
organic change led only to increasing adaptation between organisms and their own environment
and not to an abstract ideal progress defined by structural complexity or increasing heterogeneity." Gould, Ever Since Darwin at 37 (cited in note 18). Ironically, however, natural selection
theory was easily melded into Victorian Age notions of progress to a higher ideal, epitomized by
Spencer's brand of Social Darwinism and taken to insidious extremes in some racist theories of
human evolution. See id. at 36-38, 214-21.
77. Hovenkamp, 64 Tex. L. Rev. at 671 (cited in note 3).
78. Edward Alsworth Ross, Social ControL- A Survey of the Foundations of Order
(Macmillan, 1922).
79. Hovenkamp, 64 Tex. L. Rev. at 674 (cited in note 3).
80. Id. at 679. Roscoe Pound observed, for example, that "[i]n constitutional law... [i]t is
felt that a law cannot be constitutional now if it would have been unconstitutional one hundred
years ago. In fact it might have been an unreasonable deprivation of liberty as things were even
50 years ago, and yet be a reasonable regulation as things are now." Roscoe Pound, Liberty of
Contract, 18 Yale L. J. 454, 469 (1909). See generally Duxbury, Patterns of American
Jurisprudenceat 54-59 (cited in note 15).
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firmly entrenched in the universities. 81 In contrast, Social
Darwinism's emphasis on laissez-faire economics had become a creature of the courts.8 2 In his Lochner v. New York dissent, Oliver
Wendell Holmes may have started the death of Social Darwinism
with his observation that the "Fourteenth Amendment does not enact
Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics."83 This view later became the
sword that brought down the Supreme Court's flirtation with substantive due process to make room for the New Deal.84 And the case
can be made that the rise of Reform Darwinism in the academy,
which turned out lawyers who believed in the importance of state
control, provided the bridge out of Formalism as the prevailing jurisprudence and into the New Deal-era emergence of Legal Realism. 85
Nevertheless, it was the Formalist school that first put Darwinism
firmly on the jurisprudential map, leaving it for later schools of jurisprudence to figure out what to make of the role of natural selection in
sociolegal evolution.
B. PunctuatedEquilibriums-LegalRealism Challenges
Social Darwinism
The role of natural selection became a topic in science as well.
The neo-Darwinian model suggests, or at least allows the suggestion,
that evolution through natural selection should occur at a uniform
rate in a continuous, gradual manner. 86 The fossil records can be interpreted to suggest, however, "that the evolution of individual species takes place in well-defined steps (the punctuation marks) separated by long periods of stability (equilibria or stasis)."87 The founda81. See Hovenkamp, 64 Tex. L. Rev. at 673-74 (cited in note 3).
82. See Duxbury, Patternsof American Jurisprudenceat 3, 25-32 (cited in note 15).
83. 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
84. See Duxbury, Patternsof American Jurisprudenceat 30-32 (cited in note 15).
85. See id. at 149-59.
86. Stuart Kauffman explains that "[the classical neo-Darwinist position favors phyletic
gradualism, in which small phenotypic changes accumulate slowly in a species." Origins of
Order at 19 (cited in note 5) (citation omitted). See also Weiner, The Beak of the Finch at 181
(cited in note 11) ("Darwin was emphatic that all complex adaptations arise by the gradual
agency of natural selection."); Gould, Dinosaur at 149-50 (cited in note 10) ("arwin's own
preferences for gradualism were... extreme."). The case for gradualism is made most forcefully
today by Richard Dawkins. See generally Richard Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker (Norton,
1986).
87. Coveney and Highfield, Frontiersof Complexity at 232-33 (cited in note 5). The most

significant gap in this respect, and the one which most vexed Darwin, was the lack of sufficient
evidence of a flourishing diversity and abundance of life forms prior to the diversification of life
during the Cambrian Era to support the theory that the Cambrian Era represented simply
another stage of a smooth evolutionary transition. See Stephen Jay Gould, Wonderful Life: The
Burgess Shale and the Nature of History 55-60 (Norton, 1989).
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tions of neo-Darwinian theory are left explaining that observed record
of so-called punctuated equilibrium by positing either the existence of
undiscovered fossil records that would close the gaps in data,88 or the
existence of maximally fit life forms existing in a dominantly stable
environment upset by occasional happenstance events-for example,
meteors.8 9 In other words, in response to those who proclaimed or
implied that conventional Darwinism could not explain the
historically aberrational record, neo-Darwinism has had to describe
more and increasingly complicated refinements of its theory to accommodate the observed exceptions. 90
Similarly, though it transpired well before the emergence of
punctuated equilibrium theory in science, Legal Realism laid the
observed record of legal decisions on the Formalists' laps and demanded an explanation. Indeed, Professor Donald Elliott comments
88. For example, the explanation Darwin offered was that the pre-Cambrian fossil records
are incomplete and would fulfill the gradualist theory once discovered, a notion that may have
been plausible in Darwin's time but no longer is so given advancements in paleontology. See
Gould, Wonderful Life at 57-58 (cited in note 87). Jay Gould argues that the genotypic stasis
found in the fossil records is evidence of stability in individual species one would expect as an
indicia of success in the species' evolution. Gould, Dinosaur at 136-37 (cited in note 10).
Accordingly, "stasis should be an expected and interesting norm (not an embarrassing failure to
detect change), and ... evolution should be concentrated in brief episodes of branching
speciation." Id. at 128. This is not to say, of course, that natural selection, which operates at
the individual level, see note 44, is not always at work. Rather, "natural selection is daily and
hourly scrutinizing." Weiner, The Beak of the Finch at 37 (cited in note 11). Indeed, current
research provides strong evidence of a phenomenon known as stabilizing selection: the
operation of natural selection forces leading to minor, short-lived evolutionary swings in species
composition which rapidly balance out over observable time and thus would not be expected to
appear in fossil records. See id. at 103-11. Thus, ironically, we can observe evolution
happening, but may not see its imprint as evidence of gross species transformation in the fossil
records. As Jonathan Weiner puts it: "[Tihe closer you look at life, the more rapid and intense
the rate of evolutionary change. The farther back in time you stand, the less you see." Id. at
111.
89. See Kauffman, Origins of Order at 20 (cited in note 5). This explanation is difficult to
accept given the relative scarcity of steady-state environments in nature. In the present, for
example, among the only environments approaching the kind of equilibrium that might force
long-term genotypic stasis are hot sulfur springs and deep ocean hot vents, where organisms
known as extremophiles appear metabolically similar to those found from the same environments over three billion years ago. See Gell-Mann, The Quark and the Jaguarat 236-37 (cited
in note 5).
90. See Coveney and Highfield, Frontiersof Complexity at 400 n.109 (cited in note 5). The
debate between the gradualism and punctuated equilibrium theories is by no means over in the
scientific community. See Ruse, Darwinism, in Keller and Lloyd, eds., Keywords at 79-80 (cited
in note 1) (describing competing theories); Weiner, The Beak of the Finch at 181 (cited in note
11) (same). The debate has captured popular attention as well. See, for example, J. Madeline
Nash, When Life Exploded, Time Magazine 66, 71-72 (Dec. 4, 1995). Some evolutionary
biologists take issue with the very existence of the debate, as a unified theory of alternating
rapid and slow evolution is perfectly consistent with neo-Darwinian models and the punctuated
fossil record. See text accompanying notes 197-200.
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that "[f]or reasons that remain somewhat mysterious, references to
evolution in Anglo-American jurisprudence are few and far between
during the half-century from the middle 1920s to the middle 1970s."91
The reason is Legal Realism.
Legal Realism "challenged Social Darwinism in the courts just
as it challenged Langdellian legal science in the law schools."92 Legal
Realists were the paleontologists of law. They ostensibly rejected the
formal deductive method of Formalism and replaced it with the inductive search for rules "that existed in the real world of every day transactions."93 The Legal Realists may thereby have challenged the
Langdellian legal science tradition of the Legal Formalists. In so
doing, however, Legal Realism gradually developed into just another
branch of empiricist social science. 94 Always "with an eye to increasing the predictability of judicial decisions," 95 its central focus became
analysis of the "inherent ... patterns of relationships that one could

observe and record in the commercial world."96
Ironically, the heroes of the early Legal Realists were the
Apolitical Darwinists, who could be called Formalists as much as
anything else, 97 and the Reform Darwinists, who focused jurisprudential attention on the social sciences. 98 The abhorrence Legal Realists
held for Social Darwinism, however, led them to abandon natural
selection as a metaphor for their predictivist social science mission.
Thus, as Professor Elliott observes, references to Darwin and natural
selection all but disappeared from jurisprudence during the middle
decades of the twentieth century-Legal Realists were interested in
uncovering the "paleontological" reality of law, not in describing the
mechanism of legal change.
91. Elliott, 85 Colum. L. Rev. at 59 (cited in note 3).
92. Duxbury, Patternsof American Jurisprudenceat 32 (cited in note 15).
93. Scott, 35 Win. & Mary L. Rev. at 338 (cited in note 9).
94. Legal Realism attempted "to create a 'responsible law' on the basis of empirical data
gathered and interpreted with a little help from the social sciences." Gunter Frankenberg,
Down By Law: Irony, Seriousness, and Reason, 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. 360, 385 (1989).
95. Theodore M. Benditt, Law as Rule and Principle Problems of Legal Philosophy 16
(Stanford U., 1978). Neil Duxbury is more direct, concluding that "[tihe prediction theory of law
was to become a cornerstone of realist jurisprudence," Patternsof American Jurisprudenceat 37
(cited in note 15), and that "[tihe essential purpose behind the realist stress on predictivism was
the promotion of certainty in law." Id. at 130. Hence "realism, certainly in its predictive guise,

appears to attempt to discredit one formalist conception of law only to replace it with another."
Id. at 131.
96. Scott, 35 Win. & Mary L. Rev. at 341 (cited in note 9). Thus, "Ilor all that realism
constituted a general sense of unease concerning legal formalism... it could not be described as
an outright distaste for scientific methods." Duxbury, Patternsof American Jurisprudenceat 79
(cited in note 15).
97. Id. at 44-47.
98. See text accompanying notes 77-85.
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C. Random Drift Through Species Selection-A Role for
Indeterminacyin Law?
Neo-Darwinism's natural selection theme has been used to
imply that there is some normative quality to evolution-that is, that
evolutionary change is driven by selective advantages."9 Studies in
population genetics have shown, however, that selectively neutral
genes with low frequency in a species can nonetheless develop a high
frequency in breeding populations isolated from other populations of
the species by sheer chance, and then in turn appear within the entire
species after reintroduction of the population isolate.100
This "random drift" of gene composition results in a "tendency
of genomes to change gradually with time in ways that do not profoundly affect the viability of the phenotype."101 This so-called neutral
theory of species selection thus demonstrates how, even in large populations, evolution at the molecular level is due largely to random drift
of non-selective gene variants. 10 2 It is entirely possible, moreover, that
through such random drift the genotypes defining a species may reach
an unstable situation in which small genetic changes can lead to large
phenotype changes for better or worse. 0 3 The chance occurrences of
genetic transmission, in other words, do not always support evolution
of a phenotype into the normatively fittest species through exploitation of selective differences, nor do they necessarily have anything to
do with environmental pressures. Some component of evolution is
"pure chance."14

99. See Kauffian, Origins of Order at 10 (cited in note 5). This normative quality led to
the emergence of Social Darwinism. See text accompanying notes 69-76.
100. See Kauffman, Origins of Order at 10 (cited in note 5).
101. Gell-Mann, The Quark and the Jaguarat 239 (cited in note 5). For a detailed explanation of random drift theory, see John Beatty, Random Drift, in Evelyn Fox Keller and
Elisabeth A. Lloyd, eds., Keywords of Evolutionary Biology 273-81 (Harvard U., 1992); Motoo
Kimura, Neutralism, in Evelyn Fox Keller and Elisabeth A.-Lloyd, eds., Keywords of
EvolutionaryBiology 225-30 (Harvard U., 1992); Wilson, Diversity of Life at 81-84 (cited in note
11).
102. Kauffman, Originsof Order at 10 (cited in note 5).
103. Gell-Mann, The Quark and the Jaguarat 239 (cited in note 5). For example, Edward
0. Wilson explains that the genetic differences brought about in populations by random drift,
"combined with geographical isolation and the exigencies of a new and different environment,
can propel populations into new ways of life, new adaptive zones. It can also lead them more
quickly to the formation of reproductive barriers and full species status." Diversity of Life at 84
(cited in note 11).
104. Wilson, Diversity of Life at 81 (cited in note 11). Thus, genetic drift can be thought of
as "[e]volution in the genetic constitution of a population by chance processes alone." Id. at 399.
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The indeterminacy of evolution suggested by the neutral species selection theory exposes dichotomies between order and randomness and between normative and nonnormative processes which have
dominated debate in legal theory as well. Nothing could illustrate
this more than the emergence of Critical Legal Studies ("CLS") as a
purportedly coherent school of jurisprudence. Adherents to CLS
expose the contradictions in law and legal institutions in order to
promote leftist political ideology. 10 5 And yet, as much as criticism of
formalism and objectivism is central to CLS, their method involves
purely instrumental use of legal practice and legal doctrine. 0 6 Hence,
what appears nonlinear on its surface in CLS theory is, at bottom, "as
doggedly deterministic and 'scientific' in the old sense as any thinking
to come out of the nineteenth century."'' 0 In other words, CLS is legal
science with a normative twist.
Although there is little attention given in CLS literature to
evolution of law in the Darwinian sense, the CLS themes of legal
indeterminacy and equality of rights raise strong parallels to evolutionary biology. The obsessive deconstructionist focus on indeterminacy in law which is central to all variants of CLS "is an attempt to
disassemble rationalistic constructions into their individual parts, in
order to bring into light fissures, tensions, hidden components, buried
tools, and compulsively simplifying antitheses."108 And just as random
drift theory focuses evolutionary biology away from the individual
level and towards population dynamics, one of the central objectives of
CLS is structuring legal rights to protect communities rather than
individuals. 0 9 Thus, CLS challenges the very underpinnings of Legal
Realism, with its focus on prediction, and of Formalism, which found
its roots in individualist natural selection theory. In so doing,

105. Scott, 35 Win. & Mary L. Rev. at 345 (cited in note 9).
106. Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement 3-4 (Harvard U.,
1986).
107. Reynolds, 91 Colum. L. Rev. at 113 (cited in note 9).
108. Frankenberg, 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 372 (cited in note 94). To the Crits, in other words,
"[i]ndeterminacy infects the legal system." Duxbury, Patternsof American Jurisprudenceat 459
(cited in note 15) (emphasis added). In fairness, the Legal Realists "discovered" indeterminacy
in the law, using it as the means of breaking down the Formalists' view of the judge as merely
applying rules of law in a scientific, deductive manner. See John Hasnas, Back to the Future"

From Critical Legal Studies Forward to Legal Realism, or How Not to Miss the Point of the
Indeterminacy Argument, 45 Duke L. J. 84, 86-95 (1995) (providing a brief history of the
indeterminacy argument). The CLS school reintroduced the indeterminacy principle as a more
far-reaching element of their political assault on the legal system-that is, that rampant
indeterminacy in law "reveals that the social structure generated by the legal system is not the
embodiment of justice it purports to be, but an illegitimate hierarchy." Id. at 98.
109. Hasnas, 45 Duke L. J. at 99-103 (cited in note 108).
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however, CLS raises important questions, though perhaps not
explicitly in its literature, about sociolegal evolution.
The parallel between the unfolding histories of jurisprudence
and of evolutionary biology takes yet another step in the development
of one of the dominant modern schools of jurisprudence, Law and
Economics, which can be viewed as the neo-Formalist counterpart to
the current-day neo-Darwinian defenses of natural selection. Law
and Economics was founded on the notion that "one can determine the
legal implications of any choice or action by looking at the consequences, and then measuring those consequences against some normative criteria-usually efficiency or the aggregation of total social
welfare."110 Hence, the dominant theme of Law and Economics is the
"repair" of market failure."' In terms not surprisingly reminiscent of
Adam Smith's historical theory of legal evolution,112 Law and
Economics thus portrays the common law as an attempt to achieve
economic efficiency"1 and posits that efficient rules will be reached
regardless of the underlying bases for judicial decisions.114
Individuals, in the Law and Economics view, will simply continue to
relitigate inefficient rules until the rules are eventually changed by
the courts.115 The individual drive towards rational efficiency savings,
in other words, produces an evolutionary process driving law towards
economically efficient rules despite judicial motivations.1 6 The Law
110. Scott, 35 Win. & Mary L. Rev. at 343 (cited in note 9). Contrary to CLS, therefore,
"modern law and economics, '[l]ike the old-fashioned formalism ... reestablishes the lawyer as
scientist with a norm-free calculus.'" Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence at 303
(cited in note 15) (quoting David Gray Carlson, Reforming the Efficiency Criterion: Comments
on Some Recent Suggestions,8 Cardozo L. Rev. 39, 39 (1986)).
111. Jules Coleman and Jeffrey Lange, 1 Law and Economics xii (New York U., 1992). It
has been said of Law and Economics and other postrealist schools of American legal theory that
[a]ny halfway scientific means was good enough for [them], as long as it promised to
guarantee, more or less, the determinacy of judicial decisions and the autonomy of the
law. To this end, the postrealists engaged in an unrestrained plundering of neighboring
disciplines, where they discovered the policymaking model for jurists and the economic
analysis of the law for judicial decisions.
Frankenberg, 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 385 (cited in note 94).
112. See note 40.
113. Paul Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. Legal Stud. 51, 51 (1977). For a
thorough discussion of the legal evolution theories of major Law and Economics writers, including Professors Paul Rubin, George L. Priest, and Judge Richard Posner. See Elliott, 85 Colum.
L. Rev. at 62-71 (cited in note 3).
114. Rubin, 6 J. Legal Stud. at 55 (cited in note 113).
115. Elliott, 85 Colum. L. Rev. at 65 (cited in note 3).
116. Id. In this sense, the Law and Economics evolutionary theory has been criticized as a
reversion to the teleological foundations of eighteenth century thinkers such as Friedrich Karl
von Savigny. See notes 40-42. Donald Horowitz, for example, explains that "there has been
much criticism of the telos of efficiency, on the ground, among others, that ideology and
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and Economics view of sociolegal evolution thus is expressed in words
that could have been written a century ago by the most ardent
Darwinian Formalist, with an increased dose of economics to help
ground the theory in "real world" experience.
D. Ecosystem Nonequilibrium-RecognizingDynamical
Legal Systems
Despite what Law and Economics has to say about rational
individual choices, to many of us it seems that getting ahead in life is
all timing and location. Nowhere could that be more true than in
biological evolution. For example, the lion is the king of the jungle,
but put one in Antarctica and the penguins will have him for lunch.
The lion would also not be very successful if transported back to a
time when only plant species existed. Whether a species is fit, in
other words, depends on where the species is, what other species are
there with it, and when it got there relative to the other species.
Darwinian models have never ignored the importance of environment to evolution. In Darwin's theory, the actions of environ7
mental forces on individuals are the engine of natural selection.11
However, the emergence in environmental biology of the concept of
unpredictable, dynamically changing ecosystems 18 has injected a
heightened awareness of the role of indeterminacy and randomness
into evolutionary theory. As Edward 0. Wilson has put it, "whether a
particular species occurs in a given suitable habitat is largely due to
chance, but for most organisms the chance is strongly affected-the
interests apart from efficiency cannot be written out of the process of legal change." Horowitz,
42 Am. J. Comp. L. at 248 (cited in note 3).
117. Many modern biologists credit Darwin with helping to establish the science of ecology
through his recognition that a "'web of complex relations' binds all of the living things in any
region...." Weiner, The Beak of the Finch at 225 (cited in note 11). See also Peter Taylor,
Community, in Evelyn Fox Keller and Elisabeth A. Lloyd, eds., Keywords of Evolutionary
Biology 52 (Harvard U., 1992) (describing Darwin's acknowledgment of the importance of
ecological contexts).
118. Geneticist John Holland has observed that "[elcosystems are continually in flux and
exhibit a wondrous panoply of interactions such as mutualism, parasitism, biological arms
races, and mimicry .... Matter, energy, and information are shunted around in complex cycles.
Once again, the whole is more than the sum of its parts. Even when we have a catalog of the
activities of most of the participating species, we are far from understanding the effect of
changes in the ecosystem." Holland, Hidden Order at 3 (cited in note 5). See also Cohen and
Stewart, Collapse of Chaos at 366-89 (cited in note 5). The past thirty years of research in
biology have spawned this "new paradigm of ecology, mothballing the old notion of a 'balance of
nature' and unveiling a vibrant new replacement focusing on flux." William Stolzenburg,
Building a Better Refuge, Nature Conservancy 18, 21 (Jan.IFeb. 1996). The new focus on
dynamic change has led scientists to reevaluate the premises upon which many legal and policy
decisions have been based. See generally Judy L. Meyer, The Dance of Nature: New Concepts
in Ecology, 69 Chi. Kent L. Rev. 875 (1994).
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dice are loaded-by the identity of the species already present." 11
Thus we see examples of the spread of species of common ancestry
into different niches of the same ecosystem, known as adaptive radiation, 120 and examples of the occupation of the same niche in different
12
ecosystems by different species, known as evolutionary convergence, '
all based on timing and location. Evolutionary biologists call these
phenomena the assembly rules of an ecosystem. 22 Ecological science,
particularly the study of biological diversity, thus leaves little question that ecosystem dynamics and pure chance have much to do with
the fitness of species. Unfortunately, "[w]hat we understand best
about evolution is mostly genetic, and what we understand least is
2
mostly ecological."'

3

Unlike Realist and other post-Realist schools of jurisprudence,
which have largely eschewed explicit mention of evolutionary biology
as a metaphorical reference point, the legal commentary flowing from
the emergence of ecology dynamics fully embraces the message of
evolution. This jurisprudential development is taking place at two
levels. First, many commentators are calling attention to the need for
environmental law to accept the dynamic nature of its subject-the
environment. 124 For example, Professors Dan Tarlock and Fred
119. Wilson, Diversityof Life at 164 (cited in note 11). The importance of ecological context
to evolutionary processes had been developed beyond Darwin's intuitive observations as early as
the 1940s, principally by G. Evelyn Hutchinson. See Taylor, Community, in Keller and Lloyd,
eds., Keywords at 55 (cited in note 117).
120. Classic examples of adaptive radiation include the variety of finch species on the
Galapagos Islands and the cichlids of Lake Victoria. In these cases one or very few ancestral
species that originally colonized the habitat have since radiated into many species that now fill
almost all the usual niches of birds, in the case of the Galapagos finches, or freshwater fish, in
the case of the cichlds. Had those niches already been filled by other species, evolution would
have taken a different course. See Wilson, Diversity of Life at 94-130 (cited in note 11); Weiner,
The Beak of the Finch at 207-10 (cited in note 11).
121. Convergent evolution is "the increasing similarity during evolution of two or more
unrelated species." See Wilson, Diversity of Life at 395 (cited in note 11). For example, in
ecosystems around the world that lack true woodpeckers, such as some recently (in geological
time) formed islands, adaptive radiations of the bird species which originally colonized the
ecosystems have led to evolutionary convergence of different new species towards the woodpecker niche. Id. at 98-101.
122. Wilson explains that "[a]ssembly rules determine which species can coexist in a community of organisms (such as bird species occupying a forest patch). The rules also determine
the sequence in which species are able to colonize the habitat." Id. at 171 (cited in note 11).
123. Id. at 93 (cited in note 11). See also Taylor, Community, in Keller and Lloyd, eds.,
Keywords at 52 (cited in note 117) ('At present... the structure and dynamics of this ecological
context have not been well integrated into evolutionary theory.").
124. See, for example, Fred P. Bosselman and A. Dan Tarlock, The Influence of Ecological
Science on American Law: An Introduction, 69 Chi. Kent L. Rev. 847 (1994) (analogizing to
ecological evolution in the progress of the law); William H. Rodgers, Jr., Adaptation of
Environmental Law to the Ecologists'Discoveryof Disequilibria,69 Chi. Kent L. Rev. 887 (1994)
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Bosselman observe that "[clurrent environmental law.., rests on a
simple ecological paradigm which the science has now rejected and
replaced with a more complex, open-ended model." 125 Thus, posits
Professor Jonathan Wiener, "[e]nvironmental laws based on a distinction between 'natural order' and any change in that order are clearly
in for a bout of selection pressure themselves as the new ecology
126
sweeps through policy."
Professor Wiener notes that the new ecology approach "is
evident in several strands of our evolving environmental law,"127 and
thus the deeper-level question also is beginning to be posed-whether
the legal framework for regulating environmental protection itself
exhibits the nonequilibrium evolutionary qualities of its subject
matter. Professor William Rodgers believes, for example, that "laws
will have life histories, which means attention should be paid to how
they are likely to change over time; and laws seek to influence human
behavior, which means that lawmakers invariably must speculate
about what people will do."128 Professor Rodgers points to the many
maladaptations and other misfirings that occur when lawmakers
29
attempt to play in this legal ecosystem.
Perhaps, as Edward 0. Wilson observes with respect to evolutionary biology, the theory of sociolegal evolution has focused too long
on the "genetics" of law and not enough on the "ecology" of law.
Darwinism, it seems, is back on our jurisprudential minds, with all
the old and the many new questions that remain to be answered in
evolutionary biology. It may be too soon to announce the emergence of
a "Legal Ecologism" school of jurisprudence to address those questions; the nascent theories of law embrace the ecosystem as a metaphor for the sociolegal community, but lack a coherent metaphor for
describing sociolegal change. Complexity Theory provides that missing element. Indeed, the example of environmental law-where law
(same); Rodgers, 65 U. Colo. L. Rev. at 25 (cited in note 9) (same); A. Dan Tarlock, The
Nonequilibrium Paradigm in Ecology and the Partial Unraveling of Environmental Law, 27
Loyola L.A. L. Rev. 1121 (1994) (same); Jonathan B. Wiener, Law and the New Ecology:
Evolution, Categories,and Consequences, 22 Ecol. L. Q. 325 (1995) (same).
125. Bosselman and Tarlock, 69 Chi. Kent. L. Rev. at 847 (cited in note 124).
126. Wiener, 22 Ecol. L. Q. at 354 (cited in note 124). For a discussion of how the "new
ecology" already is sweeping through policy, see J.B. Ruhl, Biodiversity Conservation and the
Ever-Expanding Web of Federal Laws Regulating Non Federal Lands: Time for Something
Completely Different?, 66 U. Colo. L. Rev. 555 (1995).
127. Wiener, 22 Ecol. L. Q. at 355 (cited in note 124).
128. Rodgers, 65 U. Colo. L. Rev. at 56 (cited in note 9).
129. Id. at 57-75. See also William H. Rodgers, The Lesson of the Owl and the Crows: The
Role of Deception in the Evolution of Environmental Statutes, 4 J. Land Use & Envir. L. 377,
387-88 (1989) (discussing the insights evolutionary biology holds for increasing specialization in
law); William H. Rodgers, 1 EnvironmentalLaw: Air & Water v-vii (West, 1986) (same).
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and biology intersect-provides the medium for my study of what
Complexity Theory says about the sociolegal community and its evolution.

Ill. COMPLEXITY THEORY AND THE NAVIGATION OF EVOLUTIONARY
FITNESS LANDSCAPES IN LAW AND SOCIETY-A CASE STUDY OF
CHANGE IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ECOSYSTEM
Edward 0. Wilson emphasizes that "[t]he unpredictability of
ecosystems is a consequence of the particularity of the species that
compose them. Each species is an entity with a unique evolutionary
history and set of genes, and so each species responds to the rest of
the community in a special way.130 Understanding biological evolution, therefore, requires an understanding of the process by which
each species responds to the rest of its community, and how the
community as a whole evolves as a result of all species responding to
each other.
Jurisprudence, I have shown, has long searched for a metaphor
to explain legal evolution, and in doing so has traced the developments in evolutionary biology with uncanny parallels. Thus far, however, the evolutionary biology metaphor has failed to provide the full
grasp of evolution in the sociolegal system, and so the questions that
are suggested by the metaphor remain to be answered: If we liken the
sociolegal system to an ecosystem, and laws to species, how will each
law, with its unique historical origins and set of legal genes, respond
to and be affected by the rest of the sociolegal community, and how
will the sociolegal community as a whole evolve as a result of all or
any of the laws doing so? Those are precisely the kinds of questions
Complexity Theory has endeavored to solve.
A. Complex Adaptive Systems and Their Surprises-Orderand
Indeterminacy in EnvironmentalLaw
Complexity Theory attempts to explain why some systems
work and others don't. That is, of course, far too simplified a mission
statement for the discipline, but it captures the bare essence of the

130. Wilson, Diversity of Life at 182 (cited in note 11). See also Gell-Mann, The Quark and
the Jaguar at 237 (cited in note 5) ('An ecological community consists... of a great many
species all evolving models of other species' habits and how to cope with them.").

1438

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:1407

subject matter under study. More precisely, Complexity Theory studies nonlinear dynamical systems-collective interactions occurring
with nonproportionate relationships of change-and the factors leading to their sustainability and demise.
The great puzzle of the past millennium of scientific inquiry
has been to explain why physical and biological systems such as ecosystems and weather are sustainable notwithstanding that they appear to be in constant flux. Human nature being what it is, we have
attempted through the centuries to understand these dynamical systems and predict their behavior, by reducing them to their irreducible
components, so as to convince ourselves that we know their "laws" of
motion and change. Isaac Newton provided this service for the fields
of optics and mechanics, and is considered by many to be the greatest
and most influential scientist who ever lived.' 31 As powerful as
reductionist-bred scientific inquiry can be, however, it has failed, even
in the age of high-speed computers, to crack the code of many
dynamical systems. Ecosystems and the weather continue to defy our
predictions.
The first great feat of Complexity Theory has been to develop a
"science of surprises" to explain why classical reductionism cannot
fulfill its mission of producing predictive certainty when faced with
such dynamical systems. 3 2 The properties of snowflakes, snow, and
avalanches are useful in summarizing the Complexity Theory doctrine
and lexicon on this subject. 33 First, snowflakes form according to
fixed rules of physics and chemistry, yet no two look alike. The reason no two look alike is because no two undergo the exact same conditions of formation, so that even though the same rules of formation
apply, the results are often very different. This is the chaos property-sensitive dependence on conditions in a system based on deter-

131. See Michael H. Hart, The 100: A Ranking of the Most Influential Persons in History
41-46 (1987) (ranking Isaac Newton second of all persons, behind Muhammad and ahead of
Jesus Christ).
132. John Casti uses the metaphor of surprise as a means of explaining the subject matter
of Complexity Theory. See Casti, Complexification at 260-78 (cited in note 5). The surprises
result from the fact that reductionism leads to "models of reality departing in noticeably
important ways from reality itself." Id. at 268. Hence one objective of Complexity Theory "is to
get a handle on the limits of reductionism as a universal problem-solving approach." Id. at 273.
133. This Article sets forth only a brief explanation of how Complexity Theory doctrine can
be used to describe the behavior, as opposed to the evolutionary mechanics, of the sociolegal
system. A more detailed explanation is provided elsewhere. See Ruhl, 45 Duke L. J. at 875-80
(cited in note 6). The discussion of nonlinear dynamical systems that follows in the text is
derived largely from Casti's work in Complexity Theory. See Casti, Complexification at 43-115,
212-60 (cited in note 5).
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ministic rules produces what appears to be random behavior.134 Now
consider snow, the accumulation of many snowflakes. Whatever we
might be able to deduce from a reductionist examination of a snowflake, we could not possibly predict all there is to know about snow.
Snow packs, drifts, hardens, flows, and behaves in other ways not
readily apparent from the examination of a single snowflake. This is
the emergence property-the appearance of unforeseen qualities from
the self-organizing interaction of large numbers of objects, which
cannot be understood by studying any one of the objects.135 Finally,
the fate of some snow is the avalanche. Avalanches give little warning. The moment before an avalanche all is calm, but one last snowflake of mass, or one extra tenth of a degree rise in temperature, and
the snow moves quickly to a new resting spot. That last snowflake or
incremental rise in temperature was the proverbial straw that broke
the camel's back. This is the catastropheeffect-a sudden qualitative
134. Chaos behavior thus has been described as "order masquerading as randomness"
Gleick, Chaos at 22 (cited in note 28). Classic examples of chaos in physical systems run by
deterministic rules are the erratic dripping patterns from water faucets, see Tom Mullin,
Turbulent Times for Fluids, in Nina Hall, ed., Exploring Chaos: A Guide to the New Science of
Disorder 59 (Norton, 1993), and the motion of a pinball, see Ian Percival, Chaos: A Science for
the Real World, in Nina Hall, eds., Exploring Chaos: A Guide to the New Science of Disorder 11
(Norton, 1993). Although the rules determining the presence of chaos in such systems may be
simple and rigid, the randomness of the system's behavior prevents easy interpretation of the
rules by mere observation. Thus, chaotic behavior "only looks complicated because you don't
know what the rule is." Cohen and Stewart, Collapseof Chaos at 197 (cited in note 5).
135. A definition of emergence would be "a process that leads to the appearance of structure not directly described by the defining constraints and instantaneous forces that control a
system." James P. Crutchfield, Is Anything Ever New?: Considering Emergence, in George
Cowan, David Pines, and David Meltzer, eds., Complexity: Metaphors,Models, and Reality 516
(Addison.Wesley, 1994). Jack Cohen and Ian Stewart explain that the key to understanding
why emergence occurs lies in the number of system components and their interaction: with
increasing numbers of system components (snowflakes), eventually the sum effect of the
interactions between the components becomes a dominating characteristic of the system.
Collapse of Chaos at 182 (cited in note 5). For example, a system consisting of 10 components
has 45 possible one-to-one pair combinations; a system of 1,000 components has almost
5,000,000 such combinations; and a system of 1 million components has almost 5 billion such
pairings. Id. In large systems, therefore, "if the effect of any particular interaction is tiny, we
may not be able to work out what it is. We can not study it on its own, in a reductionist
manner, because ies too small; but we can't study it as part of the overall system, because we
can't separate it from all the other interactions." Id. Hence, the multitude of genetic pair
combinations in sexual reproduction, for example, can lead to biological evolution because
"influential hereditary traits are emergent propertiesof species ... translated upwards into the
species-level patterns we call macroevolution." Wilson, Diversity of Life at 90 (cited in note 11)
(emphasis added). A more observable example in biology is offered by Brian Goodwin's report of
Brian Cole's lab studies of ant colonies: when ant population densities were held low, their
individual behavior was erratic, but "[a]s the density of the colony was increased by adding more
ants to the defined territory, Cole observed a sudden transition to dynamic order [as] patterns of
activity and rest over the colony as a whole ... suddenly changed from chaotic to rhythmic... .
Goodwin, How the Leopard Changed Its Spots at 66 (cited in note 5).
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change in a dynamical system brought about by an arbitrarily small
increment of continuous change in a system variable.136
It takes little imagination to think of physical, biological, and
social systems that experience behavior resembling one or more of
these surprise-inducing qualities. Complexity Theory uses the concept of "attractors" to represent the behaviors that flow from forces of
order and disorder that might exist within a system, and which thus
regulate the surprise generators of chaos, emergence, and catastrophe.13 7 Some relationships of change within a system are ordered;
they could be charted with a fixed point or repetitive cycle. 138 These
"fixed attractors" lend stability and predictability to the system, but
they are brittle and can crumble when faced with external forces of
disruption. 139 Other relationships of change in the system are more
susceptible to forces of chaos, emergence, and catastrophe and are
136. See Casti, Complexification at 43-85 (cited in note 5); Cohen and Stewart, Collapse of
Chaos at 209-12 (cited in note 5). The unpredictability of catastrophe stems from the fact that
"it may take only the tiniest of changes to trigger the switch." Id. at 212. The result of such an
arbitrarily small change in the system parameter, however, can be an arbitrarily large and
irreversible, shift in the system position.
137. An attractor is simply a model representation of the behavioral results of a system.
See Coveney and Highfield, Arrow of Time at 360 (cited in note 4). The attractor is not a force of
attraction or a goal-oriented presence in the system, but simply depicts where the system is
headed based on the rules of motion in the system. See Cohen and Stewart, Collapse of Chaos
at 206-07 (cited in note 5). The distinction is illustrated by a lake draining a watershed. The
rainfall landing in the watershed moves according to forces of attraction such as gravity; the
lake is the result of the collective interactions of rain with gravity with geography, and so on,
but is not itself a force of attraction for the rainfall. See Kauffman, At Home in the Universe at
78 (cited in note 5).
138. Systems such as a ball dropping from a wall are described as stable steady states
defined by fixed point attractors, meaning simply that they move towards a fixed point then
achieve a stable state when they reach the point. Systems such as a clock, which repeat a cyclic
trajectory around a fixed point, are described as stable periodic cycle states defined by limit
cycle attractors. See Casti, Complexification at 28-33 (cited in note 5). As John Casti says,
"these are both pretty simple kinds of behavior from what, in essence, is a very simple system."
Id. at 32.
139. John Casti describes simple system characteristics as: (1) predictable behavior; (2) few
interactions and feedbacklfeedforward loops; (3) centralized decisionmaking; and (4) decomposable. Id. at 271-72. Thus,
[t]here are no surprises in simple systems; simple systems give rise to behaviors that
are easy to deduce if we know the inputs... acting upon the system and the
environment. If we drop a stone, it falls; if we stretch a spring and let it go, it oscillates
in a fixed pattern; if we put money in a fixed-interest bank account, it grows to a
predictable sum in accordance with an easily understood and computable rule.
Id. at 271. On the other hand, if we bat the stone before it hits the ground, or stretch the spring
twice as far, or change the interest rate in a bank account, the system embarks on a new path
with no hope of returning to its original path. Simple systems have difficulty adapting, because
they consist of few variables, and thus few interactions. By contrast, the feedback loops made
possible by complex system interactions "enable the system to restructure, or at least modify,
the interaction pattern among its variables, thereby opening up the possibility for a wider range
of behaviors." Id. The absence of such forces of adaptation in simple systems "threatens their
ability to absorb shocks." Id. at 272.
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thus subject to arbitrarily large fluctuations in a response to arbitrarily small perturbations; any attempt to map them would look like a
ball of yarn or bowl of spaghetti. 140 These "strange attractors" lend
flexibility and resilience to the system, but they are inherently unpredictable given their susceptibility to surprise behavior.14, Examples of
complex systems and organizations exhibiting a variety of different
attractors abound in nature and human society, including proteins, 142 immune
systems,143 brain circuits, 44 economies, 145 cultures,

46 and

ecosystems. 147

140. See id. at 29 (cited in note 5). The presence of chaos, emergence, and catastrophe in
the system means that small perturbations can result in large system changes, thus tending to
"amplify tiny differences hidden far along the decimal tail, well below any error threshold you
may care to set." Cohen and Stewart, Collapse of Chaos at 191 (cited in note 5). Classic
examples of strange attractor systems include weather and predator-prey food webs. See id. at
184-93; Casti, Complexification at 93-98 (cited in note 5); Coveney and Highfield, Frontiersof
Complexity at 243-49 (cited in note 5).
141. To illustrate the unpredictability of strange attractor systems flowing from their
sensitivity to environmental conditions, consider what would happen to two raisins dropped
close together on a bread dough being mixed in a bread making machine. Although the bread
kneading procedure follows deterministic rules of motion, it would be very difficult to predict
where the two raisins would be relative to one another after, say, five minutes of kneading.
Moreover, if we had a map of the raisins' motions, it would be very difficult for someone unaware of the machine used for the exercise to divine the rules of motion that produced the map.
See Casti, Complexification at 91-92 (cited in note 5) (using the example of a taffy pulling
machine). Hence, "strange attractors show incredible sensitivity to the initial conditions:
unless the system is started out with initial conditions of literally infinite precision, it will end
up being completely unpredictable." Coveney and Highfield, Arrow of Time at 206 (cited in note
4).
142. See Hans Frauenfelder, Proteins as Adaptive Complex Systems, in George Cowan,
David Pines, and David Meltzer, eds., Complexity: Metaphors, Models, and Reality 179
(Addison-Wesley, 1994).
143. See Alan S. Perelson, Two Theoretical Problems in Immunology: AIDS and Epitopes,
in George Cowan, David Pines, and David Meltzer, eds., Complexity: Metaphors,Models, and
Reality 185 (Addison-Wesley, 1994).
144. See Charles F. Stevens, Complexity of Brain Circuits, in George Cowan, David Pines,
and David Meltzer, eds., Complexity: Metaphors, Models, and Reality 245 (Addison-Wesley,
1994).
145. See W. Brian Arthur, On the Evolution of Complexity, in George Cowan, David Pines,
and David Meltzer, eds., Complexity: Metaphors, Models, and Reality 65 (Addison-Wesley,
1994). For the story of Professor Arthur's struggle to gain recognition of his ideas among
classical economists, see Waldrop, Complexity: The Emerging Science (cited in note 28). Today
Professor Arthur's revolutionary economic concepts on "increasing returns" and the nature of
global economies are widely accepted. See, for example, Phillip W. Anderson, Kenneth J.
Arrow, and David Pines, eds., The Economy as an Evolving Complex System (Wesley, 1988);
Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Apple Obituaries May Be Premature,Wall St. J. A15 (Feb. 6, 1996);
Chaos Under a Cloud, The Economist 69 (Jan. 13, 1996); Amanda Bennett, SugarscapeModel
Shows Flaws in Textbook Economies, Wall St. J. B1 (Nov. 21, 1994).
146. See Marcus W. Feldman, Luigi L. Cavalli-Sforza, and Lev A. Zhivotovsky, On the
Complexity of Cultural Transmission and Evolution, in George Cowan, David Pines, and David
Meltzer, eds., Complexity: Metaphors,Models, and Reality 47 (Addison-Wesley, 1994).
147. See James H. Brown, Complex EcologicalSystems, in George Cowan, David Pines, and
David Meltzer, eds., Complexity: Metaphors,Models, and Reality 419 (Addison-Wesley, 1994).
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Indeed, the prevalence of strange attractor systems in nature
suggests something which classical science, because of its reductionist
premises, could not accept, but which Complexity Theory fully embraces: chaos, emergence, and catastrophe are inevitable components
of sustainable dynamical systems.'4 To be sure, a system defined by
nothing but these qualities of randomness would spiral out of control.
But rigid, immovable, perfectly ordered structure would allow no
adaptation at all. Somewhere between total order and total chaos,
therefore, is a regime of sustainable system behavior. Complexity
Theory aptly names that regime the region of complexity, and a key
proposition of Complexity Theory is that at least some chaos, emergence, and catastrophe must be experienced in the system in order to
keep the system in that region.149 If contained and controlled by some
counter-measure of order and repetition, the right doses of chaos,
emergence, and catastrophe become the forces of environmental adaptation within a dynamical system. 150 When a "community" of fixed
and strange attractors is assembled in the proper balance, therefore,
the forces of order and disorder combine to allow the system to operate at optimal adaptability, that is, to operate as what is known as a
Complex Adaptive System.' 5'
As has been the case with its application to economics, see note 145, classical ecology has not
embraced Complexity Theory without some struggle. See Dennis Farney, Natural Questions,
Wall St. J. Al (July 11, 1994); Janet Stites, Ecological Complexity Takes Rootk Profile of Jim
Brown, Bull. of the Santa Fe Inst. 10 (Spring 1995).
148. The whole point of describing and studying chaos, emergence, and catastrophe is to
explain why it is that dynamical systems are unpredictable. The reductionist foundations of
Classical Science "focused on a description in terms of deterministic, time-reversible laws" in
order to fulfill the goal of perfect predictability. Coveney and Highfield, Arrow of Time at 16
(cited in note 4). By showing that deterministic rules can lead to random behavior, Complexity
Theory "demolishes the centuries-old myth of predictability and [time-symmetric] determinism."
Id. at 37.
149. See Kauffman, Originsof Order at 31 (cited in note 5).
150. Adaptation is associated with the feedback and feedforward loops made possible by
multiple paths of interactions between system components, see note 139, and thus "is an emergent property which spontaneously arises through the interaction of simple components."
Gleick, Chaosat 339 (cited in note 28). Adaptation allows the system to "restructure, or at least
modify, the interaction pattern." Casti, Complexification at 271 (cited in note 5). Similarly,
evolutionary biologists define adaptation as "the evolutionary modification of a character under
selection for efficient or advantageous (fitness-enhancing) functioning in a context or set of
contexts." Mary Jane West-Eberhard, Adaptation- Current Usages, in Evelyn Fox Keller and
Elisabeth A. Lloyd, eds., Keywords of EvolutionaryBiology 13 (Harvard U., 1992).
151. Complexity Theory reveals that there is a "completely decisive property of complexity:
that there exists a critical size [of a system] below which the process of synthesis [between
components] is degenerative, but above which the phenomenon of synthesis.., can be explosive." Steven Levy, Artificial Life: A Report from the Frontier Where Computer Meets Biology
100 (1992). Thus, "complex systems constructed such that they are poised on the boundary
between order and chaos are the ones best able to adapt by mutation and selection. Such poised
systems appear to be best able to coordinate complex, flexible behavior and best able to respond
to changes in their environment." Kauffman, Origins of Order at 29 (cited in note 5). See also
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I have used ecosystems and the weather as examples of
Complex Adaptive Systems for two reasons. First, it is almost intui2
tively obvious that they contain forces both of disorder and order.15
Second, they are components of the environment, and humans, after
centuries of perfecting ways to exploit the environment, now are very
much in the business of trying to protect the environment from the
destructive forces of human activity. Although the history of environmental protection regulation is replete with narrowly focused
"command-and-contror' legislation, 153 more recent policies have relied
on new regulatory paradigms centered around "market approaches"
and fluid notions of "biodiversity conservation" and "sustainable development."154 These new models of regulation explicitly recognize the
breadth, flux, and complexity of the subject matter. Recognizing the
shift in ecological understanding and the desire to shape legal structures accordingly, a number of commentators have raised the important question of how such laws should approach a regulatory target
that is inherently chaotic.155 I raise a more fundamental jurispruden-

Goodwin, How the Leopard Changed Its Spots at 183 (cited in note 5) ("In this partially ordered
regime the system is dynamic and changeable, neither chaotic nor 'frozen' but richly patterned
with activity that extends across the whole space in which the [system] operates."). Complexity
Theory refers to these systems as Complex Adaptive Systems or CAS. See Holland, Hidden
Order at 4 (cited in note 5). It is the discovery and explanation of the similar patterns of complex adaptive activities that surface in systems differing greatly in composition and components
that is the central focus of Complexity Theory. See Goodwin, How the Leopard Changed Its
Spots at 77-78 (cited in note 5).
152. Edward 0. Wilson describes this reality for ecological sciences:
Before us now is the overwhelmingly important problem of how biodiversity is assembled in the creation of ecosystems. We can address it by recognizing two extreme possibilities. One is that a community of organisms ... is in total disorder .... The second
possibility is perfect order .... Ecologists dismiss the possibility of either extreme.
They envision an intermediate form of community organization, something like this:
whether a particular species occurs in a given suitable habitat is largely due to chance,
but for most organisms the chance is strongly affected-the dice are loaded-by the
identity of the species already present.
Wilson, Diversity of Life at 164 (cited in note 11). It is no exaggeration to say that "Itihe complexity of ecological systems is rivaled only by such systems as the brain and the global economy." Brown, Complex Ecological Systems, in Cowan, Pines, and Meltzer, eds., Complexity at
419 (cited in note 147). The same balance of order and disorder in complex, adaptive
applications is found at the microbiologic level as well. For example, researchers attempting to
synthesize spider dragline silk, which is lighter than cotton but ounce for ounce stronger than
steel, have found that "dragline silk's strength and elasticity derive from a blend of ordered and
disordered components.
The silk's amorphous polymer, resembling a 'tangle of cooked
spaghetti,' makes the fiber elastic, while... two types of protein give it toughness." Richard
Lipkin, Artificial Spider Silk, 149 Sci. News 152, 152 (March 9, 1996).
153. See text accompanying notes 206-12.
154. See text accompanying notes 223-24.
155. See text accompanying notes 124-29.
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tial question, one that I believe must be raised if Complexity Theory is
on the mark in its description of surprise behavior in dynamical systems: Can any system of laws designed to protect the environment (or
accomplish any other objective) avoid encountering the qualities of
chaos, emergence, and catastrophe in itself?
I posit that the answer to that question is an emphatic negative, at least not if the system of laws is expected to exist for very
long, and that it is precisely because we have approached the regulation of the environment (and almost everything else) in the reductionist manner of Classical Science that we have encountered more surprises than the legal system can bear in the long run. It is more difficult than we realize to construct a coherent macro-legal system by
applying a micro-legal focus. 156 For example, when we set our sights

on controlling water pollution, we often generate more air or land
pollution (and vice versa);157 when we set out to clean up contaminated properties, we condemn some properties to protracted toxic
oblivion;'5s and when we attempt to stem the tide of land
156. This follows from the presence of emergent properties in complex systems. "The
ascending levels of hierarchy of complexity demonstrate emergent properties at each level which
appear to be nonpredictable from the properties of the component parts. Thus the commonly
held expectation that we should be able to derive macroeconomics from microeconomics is
probably unrealistic." George A. Cowan, Conference Opening Remarks, in George Cowan, David
Pines, and David Meltzer, eds., Complexity: Metaphors, Models, and Reality 4 (Addison-Wesley,
1994).
157. For example, in weighing the need for land disposal regulation, Congress observed
that water and air pollution control laws had led to "the federal government spending billions of
dollars to remove pollutants from the air and water, only to dispose of such pollutants on the
land in an environmentally unsound manner." Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of
1976, H.R. Rep. 94-1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1976). More broadly, "[t]he history of
environmental law is filled with examples of air pollution being 'solved' by dumping the residue
into the water, water pollution 'eliminated' by diverting the residues to the land, and land
William H. Rodgers,
pollution 'cleaned up' by incineration or underground injection."
EnvironmentalLaw § 1.4 at 59 (West, 2d ed. 1994). In its 1978 study of the issue, the United
States General Accounting Office concluded that "[pollution control produces pollutants which
must be disposed of in the air, in water, or on land. Unfortunately, environmental protection
laws and programs have such single rigid control requirements that pollution control tradeoffs
are not usually considered." U.S. G.A.O., Pub. No. GAO/RCED-78-148B, 16 Air and Water
Pollution Issues Facing the Nation 89 (1978). See generally Lakshman Guruswamy, The Case
for IntegratedPollution Control, 54 L. & Contemp. Probs. 41, 42 (Autumn 1991).
158. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
('CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 et seq. (1994 ed.), generally imposes strict liability on the
present owner of a contaminated property regardless of the owner's lack of involvement in
causing the risk to human health or the environment. See Alfred R. Light, CERCLA Law and
Procedure § 4.5.1 (BNA Books, 1991) (discussing the imposition of strict liability under
CERCLA); Mehron Azarmehr, Status of Joint and Several Liability Under CERCLA After Bell
Petroleum, 24 Envir. L. Rptr. 10250 (1994). The Environmental Protection Agency's regulations
implementing CERCLA, see 40 C.F.R. pt. 300, involve a complicated and lengthy process of site
investigation, remedy selection, and negotiation between the government and responsible
parties. See Light, CERCLA Law and Procedure §§ 3.2.5 to 3.3.6 (cited in this note). The
average cost of completing an investigation and remedy selection at a CERCLA site is $1.3
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development in sensitive ecosystems, we actually promote
more development. 159
These and other backfirings of blunt command-and-control
regulatory approaches bear uncanny resemblance to the forces of
chaos, emergence, and catastrophe at play in physical dynamical systems, thus strengthening the analogical power of Complexity Theory
in sociolegal application.160 I believe these backfirings occur in excess
million, and the average cost of implementing the remedy is around $30 million. Jerry L.
Anderson, The HazardousWaste Land, 13 Va. Envir. L. J. 1, 10-11 (1993). These factors create
the conditions under which "financiers are frequently not supportive of industrial
redevelopment projects. The fear of becoming involved with these properties has left historical
industrial and commercial centers-often associated with industrial and port areas-with a
decreasing number of sites in which new businesses can flourish, and an eroding tax base."
Bernard A. Weintraub and Sy Gruza, The Redevelopment of Brownsites, Nat. Resources &
Envir. 57 (Spring 1995). See generally E. Lynn Grayson and Stephen A. K. Palmer, The
Brownfields Phenomewn" An Analysis of Environmental,Economic, and Community Concerns,
25 Envir. L. Rptr. 10337 (1995); Julia A. Solo, Urban Decay and the Role of Superfund; Legal
Barriersto Redevelopment and Prospectsfor Change, 43 Buff. L. Rev. 285 (1995) (asserting that
CERCLA is detrimental to the economy); R. Michael Sweeny, Brownfields Restoration and
Voluntary Cleanup Legislation, 2 Envir. L. 101 (1995). The Environmental Protection Agency
recently issued a "Brownfields initiative" to combat the problem by reducing uncertainty in
liability exposure at appropriate sites, see 60 Fed. Reg. 9684 (1995), and has identified pilot
projects for examining how to address the issue. See 11 New "Brownfield" Pilot Projects
Announced, 26 Envir. Rptr. (BNA) 1884 (1996). See generally President Calls for 'Brownfield"
Incentives, Stronger Laws on Communities' Right to Know, 26 Envir. Rptr. (BNA) 1796 (1996);
Clinton Unveils Tax Incentive Plan to Restore 30,000 "Brownfields"Sites, 26 Envir. Rptr. (BNA)
2140 (1996). Congress has sought to address the issue as well through measures designed to
ameliorate the risks faced by redevelopment projects under CERCLA. See, for example, H.R.
2178, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). See generally Amendment to PendingHouse Superfund Bill
Would Set Grants,Loans for "Brownfields" 26 Envir. Rptr. (BNA) 1882 (1996).
159. Professor David Dana describes the "race to develop" that occurs when environmental
preservation regulations impose nonretroactive land development restrictions without hope of
compensation for the landowner. Landowners respond by seeking to develop before additional
restrictions are imposed, which in turn prompts more regulation, which in turn prompts more
development, and so on. The system-wide effect of not compensating landowners for the effects
of environmental regulation, therefore, is to risk promoting the very behavior we intend to
restrict, perhaps thereby imposing social costs in the form of diminished resources that are far
in excess of the costs of providing landowner compensation. See David A. Dana, Natural
Preservationand the Race to Develop, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 655 (1995) (discussing the social costs
associated with accelerated development).
160. See Ruhl, 45 Duke L. J. at 880-86 (cited in note 6). The presence of unanticipated
emergent behavior in environmental law has not gone unnoticed. For example, Professor
Rodgers has written extensively about what he calls statutory "sleepers (provisions with
consequences not anticipated at the time of enactment)," which he asserts "have played an
important role in the history of environmental law." Rodgers, EnvironmentalLaw § 1.3 at 43
(cited in note 157). Professor Rodgers provides many other examples of surprise behavior in the
sociolegal community, though using his lexicon of "sleepers" and "maladaptations" in law. See
Rodgers, 65 U. Colo. L. Rev. at 56-74 (cited in note 9). See also Cass R. Sunstein, Congress,
Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit State, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 247, 261-62 (1996)
(providing examples of "unintended consequences" that result when regulations are based on
"partial perspectives that emerge from close attention to mere pieces of complex problems"). To
be sure, sometimes the unexpected result is beneficial in the sense of promoting a desirable goal
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under the traditional environmental law culture because we are
committed to achieving predictive Nirvanalel through the use of
reductionist tools of regulation.162

The regulatory apparatus is

premised on the belief that it can isolate a problem of environmental
degradation, say water pollution, make it disappear by imposing
coercive regulatory decrees, and depend on all else remaining
constant. Even putting aside the probability that the environment

of environmental protection. The point is, however, that so long as the results are
unanticipated and unpredictable, we cannot be sure the result will be beneficial and thus cannot
weed out the adverse results ahead of time.
161. For example, William Futrell has identified predictivist goals as the reason for our
ironic cascade ever deeper into command-and-control regulation in environmental law:
In each session of Congress, the environmental laws are criticized for excessive reliance
on command-and-control regulation. With all the criticism, why does the United States
hesitate from creating an integrated environmental law--one that uses appropriate instruments in the appropriate circumstances? The major players in environmental administration, including affected industries, tend to prefer command-and-control regulation over the alternatives [such as tort law] because it is a known evil.
J. William Futrell, The Transition to Sustainable Development Law 14 (Environmental Law
Institute, 1994). It goes too far, of course, to say that the entire regulated community favors
this approach. Newspapers and journals are filled with "horror story" complaints by industry
about the irrationality of many of the outcomes of this hyper-regulatory condition. See, for
example, Norman J. Wiener, Clifford B. Olsen, and Jerry B. Hodson, Clear the Air: A Case
History of EPA Overkill, 25 Envir. L. 1327 (1995) (relaying story of massive penalties sought for
apparently harmless, good faith actions that violated regulations); Review & Outlook: The
EmotionalSpecies Act, Wall St. J. A22 (Nov. 2, 1993) (tiny snail shuts down Idaho farming); Ike
C. Sugg, California Fires-LosingHouses, Saving Rats, Wall St. J. A20 (Nov. 10, 1993)
(preservation of small rat causes fires in California); Leslie Spencer, No Dream House for Mr.
Burris,Forbes Magazine 78 (July 18, 1994) (small songbird shuts down home building in central
Texas); A Fairy Shrimp Tale, Wall St. J. A14 (Oct. 21, 1994) (tiny shrimp brings California
irrigation to halt).
162. Reductionism permeates our legal system down to its structural approach of dividing
the administration function into many discrete agencies with specific missions. In the environmental law field, for example, there are over fifteen congressional committees, over fifty
executive branch agencies, and at least eight independent agencies, each with some jurisdiction
over a defined set of environmental issues. National Wildlife Federation, 1996 Conservation
Directory (41st ed. 1996). As Professor Jerry Anderson has observed:
[E]nvironmental law is hopelessly muddled because Congress focused on individual environmental problems rather than the environment as a whole. The piecemeal approach-responding to each separate crisis and treating distinct resources separately
and differently-simply has not worked very well. Environmental law cries out for coordination and integration in order to be more effective.
Jerry L. Anderson, The Environmental Revolution at Twenty-Five, 26 Rutgers L. J. 395, 410
(1995). See also Futrell, The Transition to Sustainable Development Law at 17 (cited in note
161) ('This 'piecemealism' has resulted in a checkerboard pattern of conflicting, confused
overregulation for some activities and gaps where major environmental insults go unchecked by
the law."). Recently, serious proposals to overhaul federal environmental law through a unified,
comprehensive statute have begun to reemerge. See PanelistsDebate Merits of Unified Statute
in Reforming Environmental Management System, 27 Envir. Rptr. (BNA) 228 (1996);
Recommendations on Unified Environmental Law Expected Before End of 1996, EPA Official
Says, 26 Envir. Rptr. (BNA) 1125 (1995) (discussing progress of an EPA task force on the topic);
Robert D. Sussman, An "Integrating"Statute, Envir. Forum 16 (Mar./Apr. 1996) (former EPA
official outlines the likely components of a unified statute).
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itself, as the paradigm of nonlinear dynamical systems, is usually not
amenable to such overt manipulation, the misguided basis of that
approach is that the entire sociolegal system can be manipulated
without concern that the "all else remains equal" premise will fail.
The reductionist environmental law machine, stuck on its fixed
attractor of regulation, became a prolific source of regulation that
6
often exhibits the indeterminancy characteristic of chaotic behavior.1 1
To be sure, it also has succeeded in significantly reducing air, water,
164
and land pollution, as well as protecting many sensitive species.
Most of those accomplishments, however, reflect the fact that the
targets were easy and the marginal benefits of regulation were large,
whereas now the returns on investment are fast diminishing 65 and
163. See Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integration in the Evolution of
Environmental Law: Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 Geo. L. J.2407, 2431 (1995)
(indeterminacy is "a description that fits many of environmental law's key provisions, especially
the jurisdictional terms of art that determine the scope of the laws's applicability"). The statistics in this regard are astounding. Professor Jerry Anderson reports, presumably based on firsthand experimentation, that "[i]f you stack on the floor the volumes of the Code of Federal
Regulations that contain environmental regulations, they measure over three and a half feet
high." 26 Rutgers L. J. at 413 (cited in note 162). He reports further that "EPA alone published
almost 3500 pages of proposed and final regulations in the Federal Register during the first six
months of 1994" and that the many federal agencies with some environmental jurisdiction
combined "churn out over 35 pages of new or proposed regulations every working day" Id.
Similarly, Professor Redgers reports that EPA's RCRA program fills 697 pages of the Code of
Federal Regulations and 19,500 pages of informal guidance. See William H. Rodgers, Jr.,
Environmental Law Trivia Test No. 2, 22 B.C. Envir. Affairs L. Rev. 807, 812, 816 (1995). The
paperwork burden estimated to be imposed on the regulated community by the environmental
law maze is 55 million hours annually at a cost of nearly $3 billion each year. 23 Percent
Increase in Industry Paperwork Reported in Chemical Manufacturers' Study, 26 Envir. Rptr.
(BNA) 2339 (1996). The burgeoning administrative state is by no means limited to environmental law. For example, Professor Epstein reports that, largely as a result of the
expansion of administrative powers and rules, the annual pages of the Federal Register have
grown in number from 2,411 in 1936 to 67,716 in 1991. See Richard Epstein, Simple Rules for a
Complex World 7 (Harvard U., 1995). And Professor Schwartz notes that in 1989, "to check all
the federal regulations, one had to search the Code of Federal Regulations, with its 196
paperback volumes, containing 122,090 pages. The C.F.R. now contains over 60 million
words--about seventy times as many as in the Bible and sixty times as many as in a complete
Shakespeare." Bernard Schwartz, Administrative Law 168 (Little, Brown, 3d ed. 1991).
164. For example, companies subject to the toxic release reporting provisions of the
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11023 (1994 ed.), reported
the total release of 10.4 billion pounds of specified toxic chemicals into the environment in
1987-including 3.9 billion to landfills, 3.3 billion to other treatment and disposal facilities, 2.7
billion into the ambient air, and 550 million to surface waters. See Robert V. Percival,
Environmental Regulation: Law Science and Policy 464 (2d ed. 1996). For 1993, the total
reported had fallen to 2.8 billion pounds-including 1.7 billion to the air, 289 million disposed on
land, and 271 million into surface waters. Id. at 465.
165. There is a growing body of research indicating that the costs of regulating toxins in
the environment and occupational settings has outstripped the benefits to human and environmental welfare by several orders of magnitude in many cases, and that the marginal benefits of
additional regulation in such cases is often infinitesimal compared to the marginal costs. See,
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the problems growing more complex. 16 Thus, we must achieve a far
broader and much deeper understanding of how laws affect and are
affected by their subject matter in order to manage environmental
protection and other complex social issues through legal mechanisms.
In short, although we appear to have made strides in the appreciation
of the flux and complexity of the environment, we seem to have little
comprehension of the flux and complexity of law itself. Without a
better grasp of those qualities, we cannot be sure of landing and
remaining in the region of complexity where a Complex Adaptive
System must stay poised.
B. Schemata, Conflicting Constraints,and the Peaks and Valleys of
FitnessLandscapes-The Evolving Fitnessof Common Law in
Environmental Policy
To say our legal system is tumbling out of the region of complexity, if we have not already fallen out altogether, leads to the ques-

for example, Center for Risk Analysis, Reform of Risk Regulation: Achieving More Protectionat
Less Cost (Harvard School of Public Health, Mar. 1995); John D. Graham, Reform of Risk
Regulation: Achieving More Protection at Less Cost, 1 Hum. and Ecological Risk Assessment
183 (1995); John D. Graham, National Center for Policy Analysis, ComparingOpportunities to
Reduce Health Risks: Toxic Control, Medicine and Injury Prevention, Policy Rep. No. 192
(1995). These studies have opened a vigorous policy debate with many contrasting views
represented over the role risk-benefit analysis should play in environmental and public health
law and policy. See Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk
Regulation (Harvard U., 1993); John D. Graham and Jonathan Baert Wiener, eds., Risk v. Risk:
Tradeoffs in ProtectingHealth and the Environment (1995); Kenneth J. Arrow, Is There a Role
for Benefit.Cost Analysis in Environmental,Health, and Safety Regulation?, 272 Sci. 221 (1996),
Symposium, Risk Assessment in the Federal Government, 3 N.Y.U. Envir. L. J. 251 (1995);
Sunstein, 48 Stan. L. Rev. at 257-60 (cited in note 160); Symposium, Risk Symposium, 63 U.
Cin. L. Rev. 1533 (1995).
166. For example, federal regulation of air and water pollution in the 1970s and 1980s
focused on so-called "end-of-the-pipe" controls on stationary, discrete "point sources," largely
because "pollution control technology emphasized end-of-the-pipe solutions," but also because
such sources were "easier to control, both politically and administratively." Percival,
Environmental Regulation at 893 (cited in note 164). Today, however, the majority of carbon
monoxide and a significant portion of the volatile organic compounds and nitrogen oxide emitted
into the ambient air are from mobile sources such as automobiles, the regulation of which poses
much thornier administrative and political challenges. See id. at 766-68. Similarly, nonpoint
sources of water pollution, which include diffuse runoff from streets, farms, mines, and other
areas, "are the most important sources of the nation's remaining water quality problems." Id. at
880. Estimates are that such nonpoint pollution accounts for 65 percent of the contamination in
polluted rivers, 76 percent in impaired lakes, and 45 percent in damaged estuaries. Id.
Controlling the diffuse and numerous sources of nonpoint source water pollution has proven
difficult at both the federal and state levels. See id. at 969-70, 993-95. See generally
Environmental Protection Agency, National Water Quality Inventory: 1994 Report to Congress
(1995); David Zaring, Federal Legislative Solutions to Agricultural Nonpoint Source Pollution,
26 Envir. L. Rptr. 10128 (1996); John G. Mitchell, Our Polluted Runoff- Widespread as Rain
and Deadly as Poison, National Geographic 106 (Feb. 1996).
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tion of how we head back in that direction. That, of course, is a question about the mechanics of evolution of the sociolegal system.
Complexity Theory uses the metaphor of a topographic landscape to describe the mechanics of dynamical system evolution and
the resulting fitness of a species relative to its environment. 167 Most
biological definitions of species fitness involve some measure of a
species' propensity to contribute offspring.168 The whole point of evo-

lutionary theory is determining whether such fitness changes with
variations in the behavior and structure of the organism, and if so, in
what direction and to what degree.
Two factors suggest that a species' fitness level will change in
both direction and amplitude with behavioral and structural changes
in the organism. First, each organism must construct a schema of its
environment that includes a description of the other species in the
organism's environment and how they are likely to react to different
forms of the organism's behavior. 69 A species' fitness may be fundamentally altered if its schema is inaccurate and remains unchanged,
or if changes to its schema are misguided. Second, the species' biological structure generally is not entirely discretionary, and the benefits of changes to one trait may be limited by conflicting constraints of
other traits. 70 In considering how it should be structured, therefore,
167. The metaphor of a topographic landscape to describe relative fitness levels has been

used in evolutionary biology for some time. See note 27. Complexity Theory uses the fitness
landscape as a model not only for representing biological fitness levels, but also for explaining
the evolutionary and coevolutionary processes within all physical, biological, and social nonlinear dynamical systems. For more complete descriptions of fitness landscape models discussed in
the text that follows, see Kauffman, At Home in the Universe (cited in note 5); Gell-Mann, The
Quark and the Jaguar(cited in note 5).
168. See Beatty, Fitness: Theoretical Contexts, in Keller and Lloyd, eds., Keywords at 11619 (cited in note 18). Alternative postulations are that fitness depends on the species' actual
success in producing offspring, id. at 115-16, or the species' expected time to extinction, id. at
119.
169. Gell-Mann, The Quark and the Jaguarat 237 (cited in note 5). Murray Gell-Mann
elaborates that "[a]n ecological community consists, then, of a great many species all evolving
models of other species' habits and how to cope with them." Id. Gell-Mann posits that an
organism "gathers information about its surroundings and about itself and its own behavior,"
then "identifies perceived regularities of certain kinds in the experience," and then "the
perceived regularities are compressed into a schema ....Each schema provides, in its own
way, some combination of description, prediction, and (where behavior is concerned)
prescriptions for action." Murray Gell-Mann, Complex Adaptive Systems, in George Cowan,
David Pines, and David Meltzer, eds., Complexity: Metaphors, Models, and Reality 17, 18
(Addison-Wesley, 1994). The use of the term schema dates back to Plato, who used it to report a
discussion between Socrates and Galaucon concerning the nature of appearance and reality.
See Ben Martin, The Schema, in George Cowan, David Pines, and David Meltzer, eds.,
Complexity: Metaphors, Models, and Reality 263, 264 (Addison-Wesley, 1994).
170. As Professor Kauffman explains:
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the organism has to evaluate the effects of changing one trait based
on the overall effects on fitness taking all other traits into consideration.171 Thus we can envision a landscape of varying fitness level potentials for the organism in a given environment, with the peaks,
valleys, and planes of the landscape representing the fitness potential
of different combinations of behavioral schemata and biological organism structures. Indeed, we can construct such a landscape for any
system of connected interactions, or couplings, and it is the presence
of such conflicting constraints that makes the "coupled" landscape
rugged and multipeaked. When many constraints are in conflict, the
landscape exhibits a large number of rather modest peaks rather than
an obvious superb solution.172

Of course, no organism has a God's eye view of its entire fitness landscape.173 Species do not have menus of behavioral schemata
and biological structures from which to choose at will, and certainly

Here is the problem: in a fixed environment, the contribution of one trait-say, short
versus long nose-to the organism's fitness might depend on other traits-for example,
bowed versus straight legs. Perhaps having a short nose is very useful if one is also
bowlegged, but a short nose is harmful if one is straight legged ....In short, the contribution to overall fitness of the organism of one state of one trait may depend in very
complex ways on the states of many other traits.
Kauffman, At Home in the Universe at 170 (cited in note 5).
171. Evolutionary biologists call the phenomenon, which occurs at the genetic level since
that is where traits are determined, "genes epistasis or epistatic coupling, meaning that genes
at other places on the chromosomes affect the fitness contribution of a gene at a given
place ....We can think of this phenomenon of genes affecting the fitness contributions of other
genes as a network of epistatic interactions." Id. at 170.
172. The study of interconnected systems is a major research focus of Complexity Theory.
The general model is of so-called NK systems, where N is the number of system components and
K is the degree of coupling-the number of inputs from other components that each individual
component needs in order to know what to do next in the system. By constructing computer
models of NK systems, Complexity Theory researchers can study the effects of altering N and K
in different combinations. The conclusion, consistent with the empirical evidence from evolutionary biology, is that "increasing K increases conflicting constraints" and thus "as K increases,
the heights of [fitness] peaks decrease, their numbers increase, and evolving over the landscape
becomes more difficult." Id. at 173. As coupling increases, in other words, life becomes more
chaotic.
173. See id. at 154. It is this point that many treatments of evolution of law miss. For
example, in his second study of evolution of law, Professor Sinclair notes that while biological
selection is based only on locally available information, "[llegal decision makers can, if they
choose, look beyond the local context to geographically or politically distant, hypothetical, or any
other source of information they deem relevant. These differences are of such consequence as to
draw into question the usefulness of any analogy between legal and biological evolution."
M.B.W. Sinclair, Evolution In Law: Second Thoughts, 71 U. Detroit Mercy L. Rev. 31, 54 (1993).
Sinclair's point, which is made in the context of an overall analysis containing many useful
insights on evolution of law, overstates the degree to which legal policy makers can actually
know how their decisions will turn out. Hence, while the choice of schemata may be more
varied for law, and the decisions about legal structure are more deliberate than could be
possible in the biological evolution of, say, guppies, we are nonetheless limited in setting our
course of sociolegal evolution in much the same way as are species in their biological evolution.
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do not know ahead of time what fitness level is associated with particular combinations. By contrast, human beings, in making laws, do
have choices available to them. There are for example, menus of different targets of regulation, bases of regulation, and standards of
regulation, such that we can construct a law around a certain preferred "organism" structure. 74 We also develop a statement of findings and purposes for many laws, thus expressing our schema for the
social behavior we intend to induce or repel by enacting the law.175
Fitness of laws, just as for species, is measured in terms of how
successful the law is in meeting its goals.176 The goals of laws are
those expressed as the motivation for legislative enactment or judicial
decision-what we might call the law's policy.' 77 A law is fit if it

achieves its policy.
Evaluating fitness in that sense does not permit normative
evaluations for laws any more than it does for species. Biologists do
not ask whether a species has been "good" for its ecosystem when
evaluating the single species' fitness. Similarly, questions of morality
and overall public policy have no place in measuring the fitness of a
particular law, although the policies underlying laws certainly are
normatively designed. Indeed, it is crucial that we disaggregate questions of fitness from questions of desirability in law, for it is important
to know as an independent matter whether a law is or is not
successful in fulfilling its goals on a sustainable basis. The point, of
course, is that the fitness of a normatively undesirable law-a law the
policy for which no longer is (or perhaps never was) one we wish to

174. See Percival, Environmental Regulation at 148-58 (cited in note 164) (discussing the
menus of regulatory targets, bases of controls, and types of regulation used in environmental
laws); Office of Technology Assessment, Congress of the United States, Environmental Policy
Tools (1995) (describing the "environmental policy toolboe').
175. For example, most environmental regulation statutes contain statements of findings,
goals, purposes, and policies that help guide implementation of the law's structural provisions.
See, for example, Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1994 ed.); Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1994 ed.); National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 432122 (1994 ed.); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1994 ed.). Courts often use those schemata in
deciding how the law is supposed to behave in the sociolegal system. See, for example,
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 179-80 (1978) (using the stated findings and
purposes of the Endangered Species Act as the starting point for defining the scope and effect of
the regulatory structure).
176. For example, Professor Richard Lazarus posits that the "evolutionary pattern" of
environmental law is one of a "process of transformation in response to the public's desire to
have a legal system that better reflects the public's environmental protection goals." Lazarus,
83 Geo. L. J. at 2419 (cited in note 163).
177. See Beckstrom, EvolutionaryJurisprudenceat 28 (cited in note 14) ("Goals emerge, in
the American legal system, from the process called policy-making.").
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pursue in the sociolegal system-may lead us to consider the need for
modifying or repealing the law more immediately and more thoroughly than if the law were relatively unfit.
The problem is that when designing a law or legal principle
seldom can we know how fit it will be in terms of meeting its
objectives and surviving in the sociolegal community. Indeed, in this
respect it is apparent that our choices of schemata and structures of
laws often are limited by significant, and often unanticipated,
conflicting constraints posed by other sociolegal realities.1 8 We
cannot import the successful "gene" of one law-the structural
approach that has led to its fitness as a law-into other laws and
expect necessarily to duplicate the experience of the former. The
different combinations of schemata and structures of laws, therefore,
produce different fitness levels, which can be envisioned as a fitness
landscape of law. But we do not have a God's eye view of that fitness
landscape of law. Despite the promises of policy consultants, we
cannot feed different combinations of regulatory goals, targets, bases
of control, and types of regulation into a computer model to test their
relative fitness levels, at least not with any degree of predictive
reliability. Hence we find law in the same boat as species-having to
grope around on the fitness landscape searching for higher peaks and
trying to avoid the valleys.

178. A classic statement of such a confficting constraint pitting one legal structure against
another is the so-called "regulatory takings" doctrine under the Fifth Amendment's requirement
that private property not be taken for public use without just compensation-that is, "if
[governmental] regulation [of private property] goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). Constraints on legal structure
choices might also be posed by social and political forces. For example, I believe most observers
would agree that the enforcement of the Endangered Species Act has bumped up against a
significant conflicting constraint in the form of increased concerns about the effect of species
protection regulation on the use and value of private property. See Ruhl, 66 U. Colo. L. Rev. at
582-601, 632-42 (cited in note 126) (discussing the property rights motivated backlash against
the Endangered Species Act); J.B. Ruhl, Section 7(aX1) of the "New" Endangered Species Actk
Rediscovering and Redefining the Untapped Power of Federal Agencies' Duty to Conserve
Species, 25 Envir. L. 1107, 1137-43 (1995) (same). Even though such regulation poses no
realistic chance of being held a regulatory taking, see Glenn P. Sugameli, Takings Issues in
Light ofLucas v. South Carolina Coastal CounciL A Decision Full of Sound and Fury Signifying
Nothing, 12 Va. Envir. L. J. 439 (1993), today's political reality is that it is highly unlikely that
any law relying on increased and more coercive command-and-control forms of species protection on private lands would be a "fitter" legal structure in the long run than the present structure or a structure relying on alternative methods of regulation. Indeed, many legislative
initiatives at the federal and state level are overt efforts to retract environmental regulation,
especially species protection laws, where such regulation is perceived as having "gone too far"
with respect to private property rights. See David Coursen, Property Rights Legislation; A
Survey of Federal and State Assessment and Compensation Measures, 26 Envir. L. Rptr. 10239
(1996).
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Complexity Theory explores how an organism-used here
broadly to mean laws, species, or components of any system-moves
around on its fitness landscape. One mode of travel across the landscape of biological evolution is the gradual walk-uphill, downhill, or
across planes-brought about as natural selection sifts through species mutations. 7 9 The neo-Darwinian model, particularly the normative model prevalent in Social Darwinism, was of a gradual slope that
allows only uphill travel.5 0 On a fitness landscape, however, such an
uphill march comes to a halt at the top of whichever peak on which
the species finds itself, and there may be higher peaks in the
landscape which are then missed opportunities. 18 , The only place to go
from the top of the peak, when limited to walking, is downhill.
Indeed, the historical record of randomized genetic drift in species
selection suggests that two-way traffic is a reality of evolution.1s2
Hence, the fitness landscape model of Complexity Theory, by
unifying the uphill march of natural selection with the downhill error
catastrophe made possible by species selection, begins to adjust the
neo-Darwinian theoretical features to the reality of evolution. The
real point, however, is that whether the species is on the way up or
down a peak, marching across a fitness landscape is a pretty inefficient way of searching for higher fitness peaks.5 3 It may be a deadly

179. The rules of the "adaptive walk" are simple: starting from wherever the species is on
its fitness landscape, consider the fitness level that results when a randomly chosen gene is
altered. If it is a fitter level, go there; if it is not a fitter level, try again. See Kauffman, At
Home in the Universe at 166 (cited in note 5).
180. See id. at 151-52, 167-68. See also text accompanying notes 69-76.
181. Professor Kauffman explains that adaptive walks
proceed uphill until a local peak is reached. Like a hilltop in a mountainous area, such a
local peak is higher than any point in its immediate vicinity, but may be far lower than
the highest peak, the global maximum.
Adaptive walks stop on such local
peaks ....
[They are trapped, with no way to get to the distant high summits.
At Home in the Universe at 167 (cited in note 5). The more rugged the local landscape, the more
likely the species will be trapped on a lower peak. Id.
182. Downhill travel is the result of mutation continuing at a rate "so high that it causes
the population to 'diffuse' away from the peak faster than selective differences between less fit
and more fit variants can return the population to the peak." Id. at 184. This phenomenon, a
result of rapid genetic drift, is known as an "error catastrophe," in that "the adapting population
cannot assemble useful genetic variants into a working whole." Id. Such a melting of the
species' fitness level is particularly likely on smoother landscapes, where the distinctions in fitness are less evident. Id.
183. As Professor Kauffnan explains, the adaptive walk of natural selection "confronts
twin limitations: it is trapped or frozen into local regions of very rugged landscapes, and, on
smooth landscapes, it suffers the error catastrophe and melts off peaks, so the genotype becomes
less fit." Id. at 184-85. In his discussion of the related field of path dependence theory,
Professor Roe offers a look at how sociolegal systems evolve over time in light of their
dynamical, dissipative qualities and get "trapped" in the same sense that Professor Kauffman
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game also, as the time spent in fitness valleys wandering between
peaks is when a species risks extinction.184
Laws, like biological species restricted to walking their way
from peaks to higher peaks, must be pretty lucky to start out on
Mount Everest. Consider, for example, the initial success, but eventual failure, of tort law as a means for regulating environmental protection. The earliest examples of using any sort of law to protect the
environment relied on common law tort remedies, particularly nuisance. 185 It is no exaggeration to say that "[n]uisance theory and case
law is the common law backbone of modern environmental law."186 To
means. See Roe, 109 Harv. L. Rev. at 641 (cited in note 9). Path dependence theory examines
how decisions made in the past commit a system to certain paths, thus limiting other options,
perhaps even irreversibly. As Professor Roe explains using the metaphor of a winding present
day road that tracks a fur traders' trail from the past, "[t]oday's road, dependent on the path
taken by the trader decades ago, is not the one that the authorities would lay down if they were
choosing their road today. But society, having invested in the path itself and in the resources
alongside the path, is better off keeping the winding road on its current path than paying to
build another." Id. at 643. Professor Roe blends path dependence theory, chaos theory, and
evolutionary theory to develop a model that closely resembles the peaks and valleys of Professor
Kauffman's adaptive walk. Id. at 644. The difference is that Professor Kauffman also focuses
on how and why the landscape forms the way it does, thus shaping the paths taken, and how
the landscape itself evolves over time.
184. See Kauffman, At Home in the Universe at 211-19 (cited in note 5).
185. A non-trespassory nuisance is the invasion of another's interest in the private use and
enjoyment of land. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821D (1979). For comprehensive
histories of environmental law, including examination of the early role of nuisance law, see J.
William Futrell, The History of Environmental Law, in Environmental Law Institute,
SustainableEnvironmental Law ch. 1 (1993); Percival, Environmental Regulation at ch. 2 (cited
in note 164); Arnold Reitze, Air PollutionLaw § 1.1(a) (1995); Rodgers, Environmental Law at
ch. 2 (cited in note 157); Frank F. Skillern, Environmental Protection Deskbook ch. 1 (2d ed.
1995). Some nuisance cases dating from as far back as the sixteenth century address what
today would be considered appropriate targets of environmental regulation. See, for example,
William Alred's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (1611) (holding that stench from pig sty was a nuisance).
See generally Rodgers, EnvironmentalLaw § 2.1 at 113 (cited in note 157); Reitze, Air Pollution
Law § 1-1(a) n.1 (cited in this note).
186. Rodgers, Environmental Law § 1.1 at 2 (cited in note 157). Most comprehensive
treatments of the evolution of environmental law begin with nuisance law as the first
meaningful stage of development. See, for example, E. Donald Elliott, et al.,
Toward a Theory of
Statutory Evolution: The Federalizationof Environmental Law, 1 J. L. Econ. & Org. 313, 315
(1985) (the first period of environmental law evolution is "the period of common law
ascendancy"). Within common law the nuisance doctrine developed into a powerful means of
regulating the environment, so much so that
[t]here is no common law doctrine that approaches nuisance in comprehensiveness or
detail as a regulator of land use and technological abuse. Nuisance actions reach pollution of all physical media-air, water, land, groundwater-by a wide variety of means.
Nuisance actions have challenged virtually every major industrial and municipal activity that today is the subject of comprehensive environmental regulation.
Rodgers, Environmental Law § 2.1 at 112-13 (cited in note 157). Through the nuisance doctrine,
for example, courts have enjoined operation of industry found to cause pollution of agricultural
land, Whalen v. Union Bag and PaperCo., 208 N.Y. 1, 101 N.E. 805 (1913); enjoined operation of
a municipal sewage disposal plant because of its emission of noxious odors, Costas v. City of
FondDu Lac, 24 Wis. 2d 409, 129 N.W.2d 217 (1964); enjoined operation of a municipal landfill
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the extent nuisance law is still that backbone, however, it is quite
evident that the whole organism of environmental law no longer resembles its first form.
Not long into the history of nuisance as the legal mechanism of
environmental protection, its deficiencies became apparent. The
hurdles plaintiffs faced in proof of causation, fault, injury, and damages posed significant barriers to suit. Courts became reluctant to
enjoin prosperous businesses to spare relatively insignificant economic factors from the effects of nuisance; multiple sources of pollution and their distant, sometimes latent effects made identification of
defendants difficult; the requirement of injury to private property
8 7
interests left pollution of public resources often without a plaintiff.
In other words, the very nature of nuisance as a common law remedy
imposed inherent conflicting constraints on just how far nuisance law
could go in addressing the full range of environmental protection
problems. Its schema of protecting private property interests and its
structure as a common law cause of action became increasingly
maladapted to the growing industrialization of society and the corresponding problem of pollution.
To be sure, nuisance law evolved, but only slowly, through a
landscape walk to nearby peaks. For example, the use of public nuisance causes of action allowed consolidation of widespread injuries
into one lawsuit and improved the chances of obtaining an injunction
against the offensive activity. 1' The development of strict liability
principles relieved some of the proof of fault problems.8 9 The problem
because of fires and odors, Steifer v. Kansas City, 175 Kan. 794, 267 P.2d 474 (1954); and
awarded damages caused by municipal pollution of a stream, Harrisonvillev. W.S. Dickey Clay
ManufacturingCo., 289 U.S. 334 (1933).
187. See Percival, Environmental Regulation at 72-102 (cited in note 164); Reitze, Air
Pollution Law § 1-1(a)(1) to (3) (cited in note 185); Skillern, EnvironmentalProtection Deskbook
§ 1.07 (cited in note 185).
188. A classic example of this evolution to higher fitness is illustrated by two cases discussed in Percival, EnvironmentalRegulation at 77-80, 96-101 (cited in note 164). In Madison v.
Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 113 Tenn. 331, 83 S.W. 658 (1904), several farmers
brought suit to enjoin a smelter from damaging their timber and crops. Although the court
found the smelter unquestionably had caused a nuisance with respect to the plaintiffs, it
declined to enjoin the pollution to any degree. Id. at 667. Three years later, in Georgia v.
Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907), the State of Georgia brought an action in public
nuisance against the same smelter on behalf of its citizens, and the Supreme Court eventually
issued an injunction restricting the level of pollution discharge. See Georgia v. Tennessee
Copper Co., 237 U.S. 474 (1915).
189. The genesis of this evolutionary event is traced to the decision to apply strict liability
to "nonnatural uses" of land. Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 H.L. 330 (1868) (construction of reservoir,

allowing water to enter and flood plaintiffs mine, held to be strictly liable in tort). This
application of strict liability has since evolved in the United States to form the principle that
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of transboundary pollution between states, which could complicate the
rights of injured parties in the downwind or downstream receiving
state, was combated through the development of federal common law
remedies.190 Through such judicial refinements, nuisance law became
an increasingly potent weapon of environmental protection. 191
In the long run, however, to resolve all of the factors that made
nuisance law deficient in the regulation of environmental pollution
would result in the formation of something other than nuisance law.
We would have created, in essence, an entirely new species of environmental law. As Complexity Theory demonstrates, however, that
degree of evolution is hard to attain when the species is limited to
walking from peak to peak. A faster way to new and higher fitness
peaks was needed.
C. Niches, CorrelatedLandscapes,Peak Jumping,and Gateway
Events-EnvironmentalLaw's Rapid TransitionFrom Common Law
to the FederalRegulatory State
We have seen that a fitness landscape for any one species is
not a random set of peaks and valleys. Rather, it is defined by the
schema that the species uses to cope with its environment and by the
conflicting constraints posed by structural limitations, other species,
environmental conditions, and the like. What is "fittest" for a species
is not determined independent of these environmental forces-forces
that define the species' "niche. 19 So long as the species stays within
the boundaries of its niche, it is unlikely that minor incremental
changes in the species' schema and structure will dramatically alter
its fitness. The niche occupied by a species thus can be represented
by an area of landscape roughly correlated in terms of ruggedness and
altitude. If there are higher peaks nearby, in other words, they are
probably not much higher, and the chances of finding one higher than

any "abnormally dangerous" activity is subject to strict tort liability. See Restatement (Second)
of Torts §§ 519-20 (1977).
190. See Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and
ContemporaryModels, 54 Md. L. Rev. 1141, 1152-55 (1995).
191. See Rodgers, EnvironmentalLaw § 2.1 at 113 (cited in note 157).
192. Evolutionary biologists define niche as "the place occupied by a species in its ecosystem-where it lives, what it eats, its foraging route, the season of its activity, and so on. In a
more abstract sense, a niche is a potential place or role within a given ecosystem into which a
species may or may not have evolved." Wilson, Diversity of Life at 403 (cited in note 11). See
also James R. Griesemer, Niche: Historical Perspectives,in Evelyn Fox Keller and Elisabeth A.
Lloyd, eds., Keywords of EvolutionaryBiology 231 (Harvard U., 1992); Robert K. Colwell, Niche:
A Bifurcation in the Conceptual Language of the Term, in Evelyn Fox Keller and Elisabeth A.
Lloyd, eds., Keywords of Evolutionary Biology 241 (Harvard U., 1992).
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the one on which the species already finds itself diminishes as fitness
increases. 193 A species might "feel around" its correlated landscape
through long natural selection walks, but can expect no dramatic long
term changes in its relation to its niche through that marching
process.
Beyond the correlated landscape, however, may lie much
higher peaks, much deeper valleys, vast plateaus, and so on. Hence,
the degree to which a species can significantly alter its chances of
hitting the Mt. Everest (or Death Valley) of fitness levels depends on
how far out of its environmental niche it can travel. We have seen
that the adaptive walk mode of natural selection travel offers a very
poor way of testing faraway prospects. 94 Another mode of travel is
necessary to test those horizons.
That other mode of travel across fitness landscapes, jumping,
allows movement outside the confines of natural selection by mutation. Jumps across fitness landscapes happen through environmental
accidents, such as happened to the first bird blown off course to the
newly formed Hawaiian Islands, 19 5 and through sex-that is, through
genetic recombination. Biological mates, each of which has attained
some altitude on a fitness peak, combine their genes and parachute
their offspring onto different (but not necessarily better) drop zones. 196
193. This is an inherent feature of an adaptive walk across a correlated fitness landscape,
in that "with every step uphill, the number of directions leading higher is cut by a constant
fraction ... so it becomes harder to keep improving." Kauffman, At Home in the Universe at 178
(cited in note 5).
194. See notes 179-85 and accompanying text.
195. For a discussion of the role of accidents in the evolutionary history of the biota of the
Hawaiian Islands, see Wilson, Diversity of Life at 94-100 (cited in note 11). See generally text
accompanying notes 117-122. The power of accident-of the chaos, emergence, and catastrophe
that small accidents can unleash-should not be underestimated. Starting at the small level
and working up, it seems clear that "the space of possible molecules is vaster than the number
of atoms in the universe. If this is true, it is evident that the actual molecules in the biosphere
are a tiny fraction of the space of the possible. Almost certainly, then, the molecules we see are
to some extent the results of historical accidents in the history of life." Kauffman, At Home in
the Universe at 186 (cited in note 5).
196. Many evolutionary biologists believe that "sex has evolved... to permit genetic recombination. And recombination provides a kind of approximation to a God's eye view
of... large-scale features of fitness landscapes." Kauffman, At Home in the Universe at 180
(cited in note 5). Indeed, sex is counterintuitive, in that it requires two parents and involves
each parent's sacrifice of gene structures that allowed it to live long enough to reproduce. In
contrast, a haploid organism can simply pass its genes intact along to its offspring, and they to
theirs, with only the possibility of mutation to upset (or improve) the design. See id. See also
Gell-Mann, The Quark and the Jaguar at 253 (cited in note 5) CWhat are males really good
forT'). There must be some benefit, therefore, to genetic recombination that outweighs the
benefit of genetic stasis. That benefit, according to Complexity Theory, is the ability it offers
species to jump across landscapes.
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Now and then, the offspring land very far away, and, if they are
lucky, on a higher fitness peak, allowing a longer march up the natu197
ral selection hill.
Hence, when a species makes a long jump outside the correlated landscape and lands in an area of higher peaks, the species can
experience a quantum leap in fitness advancement. Additional long
jumps, however, present diminishing chances of finding yet higher
peaks. 198 Thus, after a fortuitous landing on a much higher peak, the
species' evolution risks less by favoring shorter jumps, or even walks,
to search for only slightly higher peaks in the (new) nearby correlated
landscape. 199 The long term record should be, in other words, one of
20 0
punctuated equilibrium.
The description of Complexity Theory's model of evolution thus
far has focused on descriptive qualities of a coherent model of fitness
landscapes and how species travel across them. That model permits a
synthesis of what heretofore have been ostensibly conflicting theories
of how natural selection works. In the landscape model, we see that
punctuated equilibriums can occur without contradicting any premise
20
of natural selection in the neo-Darwinian model. '

197. This is precisely the effect that is occurring with respect to hybrids of the Galapagos
finches, which often appear to attain fitness levels exceeding the parent species. By hybridizing
their genes, the finches "make combinations that could take off that could be the starting point
of a new evolutionary direction not easily within reach of either species." Weiner, The Beak of
the Finch at 209 (cited in note 11).
198. Professor Kauffman explains that "[a] very simple law governs such long-jump
adaptations. The result, exactly mimicking adaptive walks via fitter single-mutant variants on
random landscapes is this: every time one finds a fitter long-jump variant, the expected number
of tries to find a still better long-jump variant doubles." Kauffman, At Home in the Universe at
193 (cited in note 5). Professor Arnold Reitze has insightfully captured the impact of this
diminishing returns effect in his study of the continuing effectiveness of existing environmental
policy structures. See Arnold Reitze, Environmental Policy It Is Time for a New Beginning, 14
Colum. J. Envir. L. 111 (1989). His work is a perfect example of how many commentators have
already "seen" and described the effects for which Complexity Theory now provides a theoretical
context and foundation for explanation.
199. Thus, "[a]s this exponential slowing of the ease and rate of finding distant fitter
variants occurs, then it becomes easier to find fitter variants on the local hills nearby."
Kauffman, At Home in the Universe at 195 (cited in note 5). The rule of thumb, therefore, is
that "[a]s fitness increases, search closer to home. On a correlated landscape, nearby positions
have similar fitness. Distant positions can have fitnesses very much higher and very much
lower. Thus optimal search distance is high when fitness is low and decreases as fitness
increases." Id. at 196.
200. See id. at 195-201. Thus, as we see from the historical record, the Cambrian period
saw incredible asymmetric expansion of phyla, the taxonomic level below animal and plant
orders; followed by a long period of gradual, symmetric speciation filling out the phyla; followed
by the Permian period of massive refinement through extinction; and so on. See text accompanying notes 86-90.
201. Indeed, Edward 0. Wilson takes the position that "the possibility of swift evolution
was already a cornerstone of traditional evolutionary theory and therefore in no sense a
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Complexity Theory brings far more to the table in terms of
theoretical advancement of evolutionary mechanics, however, through
its insight into chaos, emergence, and catastrophe behaviors in dynamical systems as a means of explaining how punctuated equilibriums occur. Species have no control over environmental accidents and
mutations, nor do they have any control over the genetic recombinations brought about by their sexual reproduction. Those events, however, can be the source of dramatic change within both a species and
its environment. Complexity Theory demonstrates why even minor
perturbations in dynamical systems can lead to arbitrarily large alterations of system trajectory. Not every environmental accident,
mutation, or act of reproduction will do so, but some will. These perturbations are the "gateway events" allowing jumps to new fitness
landscape horizons. 20 2 Thus, when the first finches were blown onto
the Galapagos Islands, they landed far outside the correlated landscape of their prior finch world. And eons ago, after eons before that
of gradual change in environment and species, the right mix of
environmental conditions and species development came together in
the Cambrian period to allow an explosion of long jumps. When
Complexity Theory's model of chaos, emergence, and catastrophe is
overlaid upon the model of fitness landscapes in this manner, we
understand why natural selection must lead to punctuated
equilibriums rather than uniform gradual change. It is not only
possible for species to make long jumps across fitness landscapes, it is
inevitable that they will so long as accidents and sex continue to
happen.
That being said, it still remains true that long jumps in biological evolution are a chance event, not a deliberate plan of a particular species. By contrast, the sociolegal system can attempt to experience gateway events setting the stage for a long jump deliberately.
Few instances of legal transformation illustrate this point better than
the environmental law revolution of the 1970s. As I have shown,
nuisance law is fairly well confined in its niche, defined by a schema
based on protection of private property and by a structure based on
the common law model.20 3 Prior to 1960, the federal legislative role in
challenge to it ....The [neo-Darwinian] models also allow for stasis, or long periods with little
or no evolution of a kind detectable in fossils." Diversity of Life at 89 (cited in note 11).
202. See Gell-Mann, The Quark and the Jaguar at 240 (cited in note 5) ("[G]ateway
events ... open up whole new realms of possibility, sometimes involving higher levels of
organization or higher types of function.").
203. See text accompanying notes 186-92.
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pollution control had been largely passive, 2 4 and state and local governments restricted their legislative efforts principally to smoke
ordinances and other local impact regulatory programs.0 5 By the
1960s, however, pollution had taken on a national, transboundary
dimension, and it was apparent for the reasons already discussed that
none of the peaks in its correlated landscape of nuisance law was high
enough to allow an effective response to those challenges. Something
more was needed.
That something more came in the form of a long jump that
landed environmental law in the realm of federal command-and-control legislation. During a period described as the "explosion of
environmental law,"26 from 1970 through 1976, Congress newly
enacted or substantially amended ten major environmental regulation
statutes covering air, water, and land pollution, project planning,
workplace safety, manufacturing, species protection, and public
drinking water. 207 That record was nearly duplicated during the same
period in the field of natural resources protection.208 In six years, a
mere drop in the bucket compared to the centuries-long history of
nuisance law, environmental protection law had been transformed
into nothing less than a new species-a punctuated equilibrium if
ever there was one. Nuisance law was still a part of this new
creature, but anyone mistaking the new species for nuisance law
would have been rudely awakened.
What triggered this disequilibrium of legal evolution-what
was its gateway event? Many commentators point to the synthesis of
two major sociolegal developments. First, beginning in the 1960s
environmentalism swelled because of a change in public perception, so
that what had previously been treated as environmental amenities

204. Except for a few narrowly targeted pollution control programs, federal legislative
activity prior to 1960 relied principally on establishing planning and coordination programs in

the states, in the hope that the states would pick up and run with the ball. See Percival, 54 Md.
L. Rev. at 1149-52, 1155-59 (cited in note 190).
205. See id. at 1148. See, for example, Huron PortlandCement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440
(1960) (holding that application of a local smoke ordinance to federally licensed river barges did
not unconstitutionally interfere with interstate commerce).
206. Futrell, History of Environmental Law, in Environmental Law Institute, Sustainable
EnvironmentalLaw § 1.2(I)(1) at 43 (cited in note 185) (collecting statutes); Percival, 54 Md. L.
Rev. at 1160-63 (cited in note 190) (same).
207. Futrell, History of EnvironmentalLaw, in Environmental Law Institute, Sustainable
EnvironemntalLaw § 1.2(I)(1) at 44-45 (cited in note 185).
208. Id. § 1.2(1)(3) at 48 (collecting statutes). The process continued into the 1980s, albeit
at a slower pace. See Percival, 54 Md. L. Rev. at 1163 (cited in note 190) (collecting statutes).
Some laws were changed more than once, each time boosting the degree of federal dominance.
See John P. Dwyer, The Practiceof Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 Md. L. Rev. 1183,
1183-85 (tracing changes to federal air pollution control legislation).
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came to be perceived as highly desired property rights. 209 Second, the
desire to promote civil rights legislation in the 1960s prompted the
judicial expansion of Congress's commerce power, thus opening the
door to federal expansion into other areas of regulation formerly held
as a sacred ground for the states. 210 The triggering event, several
commentators have posited, was President Nixon's laying down of the
gauntlet to his Democratic rivals in Congress.
In July 1970,
President Nixon issued an executive order creating the
Environmental Protection Agency as a challenge to see which political
party would take command of the environmental protection agenda in
a way that placated public demand.21, To be sure, many other factors
must have contributed to the paradigm shift in approach, but it is
unlikely the new species of environmental law would have emerged
when it did, in the form it did, and as rapidly as it did had these
22
critical developments not come together simultaneously. 1

209. Futrell, History of EnvironmentalLaw, in Environmental Law Institute, Sustainable
EnvironmentalLaw § 1.2(H)(2) at 40 (cited in note 185). See, for example, Peter Cleary Yeager,
The Limits of Law: The Public Regulation of Private Pollution 98-110 (Cambridge U., 1991)
(tracing the surge in public mood and concluding that "the growing environmental movement
was to stimulate relatively radical changes in law, most notably at the federal level"); Dinah
Bear, The National Environmental Policy Act. Its Origins and Evolutions, Nat. Resources &
Envir. 3, 3-4 (Fall 1992) (describing public mood as a critical factor in the enactment of the
National Environmental Policy Act); C. Peter Gopelrud III, Water Pollution Law: Milestones
From the Past and Anticipation of the Future, Nat. Resources & Envir. 7, 8 (Fall 1995)
(describing public mood as a critical factor in the enactment of the Clean Water Act).
210. As William Futrell describes this factor, prior to 1970
Congress used creeping federalism rather than direct regulation in the environmental
area because it was unclear whether the federal government could constitutionally operate air and water pollution programs. The expansion of the commerce clause in support of federal regulatory power was a long process and was not completed until the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 .... The Supreme Coures vindication of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act opened the door for sweeping environmental health and safety regulation.
Futrell, History of Environmental Law, in Environmental Law Institute, Sustainable
EnvironmentalLaw § 1.2(G)(1) at 38 (cited in note 185).
211. Elliott, 1 J. L. Econ. & Org. at 326-38 (cited in note 186) (describing in detail the
"competitive credit-claiming" behavior of presidential aspirants as being the central force that
opened the door to the statutory revolution of environmental law); Yeager, Limits ofLaw at 11418 (cited in note 209) ("Nixon was also eager to show both leadership on and responsiveness to
the elevated environmental expectations."); Futrell, History of Environmental Law, in
Environmental Law Institute, Sustainable Environmental Law § 1.2(1)(2) at 44 (cited in note
185); Rosemary O'Leary, EnvironmentalChange: Federal Courts and the EPA 4-14 (Temple U.,
1993); Bear, Nat. Resources & Envir. at 4 (cited in note 209).
212. The notion that there are profound gateway periods in legal reform has been advanced
before.
For example, Professor Bruce Ackerman has outlined the characteristics of
"constitutional moments" that act as gateways to foundational change in constitutional theory
and structure. Bruce Ackerman, 1 We the People.- Foundations 6 (Cambridge U., 1991).
Clearly, the 1970s were environmental laws "statutory moment."
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The new species looked and acted very different from nuisance
law: it carved up environmental protection policy into different media, manufacturing sectors, and groups of chemicals; it established
administrative agencies and gave them power to impose direct regulations on polluters and other sources of environmental degradation; it
initiated preventive regulation rather than waiting to respond to past
injury; it disaggregated injury to private property from the basis for
regulatory action. 213 And this new kid on the block wasted no time
flexing its muscles-setting policy, issuing regulatory commands,
pursuing enforcement actions, and so on-with substantial results to
show for its efforts.2 14 To be sure, the environmental regime evolved
from roots in nuisance law, but it quickly demonstrated that it was
far more fit than nuisance law could ever have hoped to become. The
long jump appeared to have landed environmental law in the
Himalayas.

213. In other words, the command-and-control environmental law regime was born. See
Percival, Environmental Regulation at 102-14 (cited in note 164); Futrell, History of
Environmental Law, in Environmental Law Institute, Sustainable Environmental Law §
1.2(1)(2) at 45 (cited in note 185). Some commentators appear to suggest that because legal
transformations of this magnitude are not born out of accident or sex, as in the natural setting,
evolutionary models of sociolegal change are not valid. For example, in his examination of path
dependence theory, chaos theory, and evolutionary theory as models of legal change, Professor
Roe contends that "[b]ecause we can consciously move ourselves from one mountain to another,
pure analogies to natural selection are inapt." Roe, 109 Harv. L. Rev. at 665 (cited in note 9).
See also note 183. To be sure, our ability consciously to attempt to jump across our sociolegal
system landscape distinguishes sociolegal evolution from evolution of the Galapagos finches, but
that distinction does not make the analogy to natural selection as inapt as Professor Roe
suggests. The point of Complexity Theory is that a component of any dynamical system,
sentient or not, has very little idea what its landscape looks like beyond the nearby peaks, and
has very little control over how that landscape will evolve over time in response to evolution of
other components and outside environmental forces. Hence, even we the sentient cannot, in
Professor Roe's words, "consciously re-engineer our.., system ... by returning to a branch
node and going down another path." 109 Harv. L. Rev. at 665 (cited in note 9). For example, it
would be impossible to unravel present day environmental laws to take us back to the gateway
events of the late 1960s that primed society for a turn from nuisance law to command-andcontrol legislation. That "branch node" simply doesn't exist anymore, and, as the path of a
strange attractor system never intersects with itself, we can never recreate that decision node.
Even if we could recreate that point in terms of system dynamics, we would have absolutely no
idea of the long term consequences of choosing, say, market-based approaches to environmental
law instead of the command-and-control approach we took. The best we can hope for-and on
this point I agree with Professor Roe-is that sometimes we can sense when we are trapped on
an unfit local peak and then try consciously to get off of it. We also can establish a sociolegal
system that improves our chances of identifying unfit positions and of reaching higher peaks,
which is the focus of the remainder of this Article.
214. See note 164.
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D. Competition, Cooperation,and Coevolution Towards the Edge of
Chaos-Long-JumpingBeyond the Regulatory State to New
Approaches of EnvironmentalLaw and Policy
Complexity Theory accommodates the last piece of the evolutionary biology puzzle-ecosystem nonequilibrium dynamics-by the
recognition that as one species evolves through either mode of travel
across its landscape, it necessarily changes the landscapes of other
species with which it interacts and prompts them to make the jumps
necessary to search for higher peaks. It turns out, in other words,
that the metaphor of a fitness landscape, because of the static image a
landscape implies, does not present the whole picture. 215 As one species travels across its seemingly static landscape, its travels necessarily alter the landscapes of other species in the relevant ecosystem.
Time, therefore, adds a new dimension to the fitness question which
Complexity Theory refers to as coupling. Fitness landscapes of various species in the ecosystem are coupled by their temporal interactions, requiring that all species reconstruct their schemata and struc216
tures continually-a sort of perpetual exercise in game theory.
The two predominant models of how species cope with other
species' evolutions are competition and cooperation. Competition is
"predicated upon the collective demand for a common resource when
215. As Professor Kauffman explains, "[t]he idealization we have used [thus far] that
fitness landscapes are fixed and unchanging is false. Fitness landscapes change because the
environment changes. And the fitness landscape of one species changes because the other
species that form its niche themselves adapt on their own fitness landscapes. Bat and frog,
predator and prey, coevolve. Each adaptive move by the bats deforms the landscape of the
frogs." Kauffman, At Home in the Universe at 208 (cited in note 5). When taking the level of
analysis from a single system component to the full system, therefore, it is necessary to modify
the NK landscape model, see note 172, to take into account the number of connection inputs
between the landscapes of different system components, which we can designate C. The
landscape for each species in the ecosystem, then, is an NKC function coupled (by C) to the
landscapes of other species. When C is low, for example, landscapes of coupled species in the
ecosystem do not deform much when one species' landscape evolves, but when C is high, the
coevolution process becomes chaotic. See Kauffman, At Home in the Universe at 224-27 (cited in
note 5).
216. See Kauffman, At Home in the Universe at 217-21 (cited in note 5). Professor
Kauffman notes that in a single game of the famous "Prisoners Dilemma," the rational strategy
of the two independent agents is defect-defect, but that in a repeated game different strategies
emerge as the independent agents come to understand the coordinated nature of their choices.
This effect, posits Professor Kauffman, provides an analogy to the coevolution of fitness
landscapes, though coevolution in biological organisms takes place without conscious
predecision. See id. For an excellent discussion of how game theory can be used to explain the
evolution of environmental law in the 1970s, when competing presidential aspirants contributed
to a statutory frenzy none would have selected as his outcome if acting individually, see Elliott,
1 J. L. Econ. & Org. at 321-26 (cited in note 186).
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the available supply is inadequate for all of the organisms," 17 and can
lead to character displacement-the evolution of two species away
from one another ' 5-- or full competitive exclusion-the "extinction of
one species by another in a habitat through competition.219 Species in
collision need not always resort to an arms race, however, as compromises may assure two competing species' mutual survival rather than
each risking its demise in all-out warfare. Through ecological displacement-species yielding part of an environment to competitors-more species can be accommodated, the overall biodiversity of
the ecosystem rises, and the ecosystem as a whole approaches the
region of dynamical complexity.220 Some shifting blend of competitive
and cooperative behaviors, therefore, can be expected in evolving
221
dynamical systems.

217. Robert McIntosh, Competition: Historical Perspectives, in Evelyn Fox Keller and
Elisabeth A. Lloyd, eds., Keywords of Evolutionary Biology 67 (Harvard U., 1992). Competition,
of course, does not require that two species combat over the same morsel of food. "Even if [two
species] never actually jostle and joust, never once collide physically over a... seed or a nesting
site... natural selection will gradually magnify their differences." Weiner, The Beak of the
Finch at 142 (cited in note 11).
218. As the species move apart, "[a]t last the two varieties will move so far apart that
competition will slack off. It will slack off when the two varieties have evolved in new directions: when they have diverged." Weiner, The Beak of the Finch at 142 (cited in note 11). This
is what leads to character displacement and ultimately, to adaptive radiation of new species.
See id. at 142-56.
219. Wilson, Diversity of Life at 394 (cited in note 11).
220. Id. at 172-73. Edward 0. Wilson explains that an ecological
community shifts continuously, and by an unconscious trial and error, through
innumerable fits and starts, its biodiversity slowly rises. Species excluded earlier at last
find room, symbiotic pairs and trios are fitted together, the forest grows deeper and
richer, new niches are prepared. The community thus approaches a mature state,
actually a dynamic equilibrium with species forever arising and disappearing and the
total species numbers bobbing up and down inside narrow limits.
Id. Wilson's model of ecosystems is precisely the Complexity Theory model of a dynamical
system's coevolutionary transition towards the region of complexity. Wilson, for example,
describes "assembly rules" dictating how the species of an ecosystem wind up there. See note
122. Similarly, Professor Kauffman explores the issue of "community assembly" as one of
coevolution of fitness landscapes which produces a" 'community landscape', in which each point
of the terrain represents a different combination of species [and] the peaks will represent points
of high fitness--combinations that are stable." At Home in the Universe at 211-14 (cited in note

5).
221. Murray Gell-Mann posits that "[a]lthough competition among schemata is a
characteristic of complex adaptive systems, the systems themselves may indulge in a mixture of
competition and cooperation in their interactions with one another. It is often beneficial for
complex adaptive systems to join together to form a collective entity that also functions as a
complex adaptive system." The Quark and the Jqguarat 242 (cited in note 5). Ecosystems are
an example, see Weiner, The Beak of the Finch at 200-02 (cited in note 11), and another might
be "when individuals and firms in an economy operate under a government that regulates their
behavior in order to promote values important to the community as a whole." Gell-Mann, The
Quark and the Jaguarat 242 (cited in note 5). See generally John L. Casti and Anders
Karlqvist, eds., Cooperationand Conflict in GeneralEvolutionaryProcesses (Wiley, 1995).
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The fittest species in a particular ecosystem does not necessarily remain so indefinitely and may need to jump out of its niche in
order to survive in its ever-dynamic environment.2 22 Some long jumps
fail, and species go extinct, but others succeed. The point is, however,
that whatever one species does necessarily alters the landscapes of
other species in the ecosystem, and hence the entire ecosystem of
species experiences dynamic coevolutionary change through which it
adds and deletes species as needed to continue to exist at the edge of
chaos.
well.

223

It behooves each species in that game to remain elastic as

2 24

This reality should be ignored no more in law than it has been
in biology. Nuisance law, for example, seemed a fit response to the
pollution problem in the seventeenth century. Time was the enemy of
nuisance law, however, as the ever-evolving sociolegal system gradually outpaced the ability of nuisance to adapt to its deforming fitness
222. The Galapagos finches have been recorded as experiencing this flip-flop in what constitutes the fittest organism, as environmental change from drought to deluge favored opposite
schemata and structures within the finches. See Weiner, The Beak of the Finchat 104-06 (cited
in note 11).
223. When Professor Kauffman and fellow researchers studied the coevolving interactions
of complex genetic nets over time, they found an "ordered regime near the phase transition
between order and chaos, the edge-of-chaos 'complex regime.' In the ordered regime near the
phase transition, complex but nonchaotic cascades of activities can propagate across a network,
allowing coordination of complex sequences of events." Kauffman, At Home in the Universe at
223 (cited in note 5). Thus, "highest average fitness occurs precisely at the transition from order
to chaos. Deep in the ordered regime, fitness peaks are low because of conflicting constraints.
Deep in the chaotic regime, fitness peaks are high, but are too few and move too rapidly to be
climbed ....
So the transition between order and chaos appears to be the regime that optimizes
average fitness for the whole ecosystem." Id. at 230. See also Stuart A. Kauffman, Whispers
from Carnot" The Origins of Order and Principles of Adaptation in Complex Nonequilibrium
Systems, in George Cowan, David Pines, and David Meltzer, eds., Complexity: Metaphors,
Models, and Reality 83 (Addison-Wesley, 1994).
224. As Wilson says, "closely similar species [in an ecosystem] can fit together when their
requirements are elastic." Diversity of Life at 173 (cited in note 11). The elasticity of whole
ecosystems is tested by severe perturbations such as the introduction of new species that
disrupt the "fit' of the ecosystem, otherwise known as an "exotic introduction" or "bioinvasion."
See Chris Bright, Understandingthe Threat of Bioinvasions, in Worldwatch Institute, State of
the World 95, 101 (Norton, 1996) ("The effects of an invasion can ripple through an ecosystem,
upsetting relationships that would appear to be far removed from the invader itself."). Amy J.
Benson, The Exotic Zebra Mussel, Endangered Species Bull. 14 (Mar./Apr. 1996) (tracing the
history of the zebra mussers phenomenal invasion of the Great Lakes). The term used in
Complexity Theory to describe the elasticity of system components, and of whole systems, is
self-organized criticality, meaning that a mature Complex Adaptive System evolves towards a
critical state-the edge of chaos-and once there devises ways to avoid experiencing so many big
avalanches by integrating numerous smaller avalanches as release valves. Such elasticity has
been observed in the distribution of avalanches in sand piles and the distribution of earthquakes
in fault zones. See Kauffman, At Home in the Universe at 235-43 (cited in note 5); Per Bak, SelfOrganized Criticality: A Holistic View of Nature, in George Cowan, David Pines, and David
Meltzer, eds., Complexity: Metaphors,Models, and Reality 477 (Addison-Wesley, 1994).

1466

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:1407

landscape. Nuisance in environmental law did not go extinct, but its
niche has certainly shrunk and been contained.
A similar fate appears to be awaiting the command-and-control
environmental law regime as well, if it does not adapt more rapidly to
its changing fitness landscape. The rest of the sociolegal system did
not simply sit still as the environmental regulation organism grew to
leviathan proportions. Through competition, cooperation, and coevolution, some components retreated, some were extinguished, but some
adapted to new fitness peaks. As that process unfolded, the fitness
landscape of the federal regulatory program itself deformed. Thus, it
would have been naive and foolish for anyone to assume that environmental law would not itself need to evolve from its command-andcontrol roots in order to stay in the game.
The more recent history of environmental law bears witness to
that reality for the sociolegal system. The environmental law
Himalayas of the 1970s have eroded, and may no longer be the highest peaks for tackling the environmental protection challenges of the
day and future. The rest of the sociolegal system, in its newly evolved
forms, is demanding accountability of the command-and-control environmental regulation regime-accountability in the form of attention
to economic rationality, attention to risk-benefit results, attention to
private property rights, and so on. 225 The question is, can the com-

mand-and-control structure compete successfully with those new
demands, or will it have to evolve. We have already seen the regulatory state attempting to evolve through walks to new peaks. The
program under the Clean Air Act for trading of sulphur dioxide emission rights, for example, has successfully integrated market dynamics
within a regulatory program. 226 The species is evolving, but is it

225. The recent literature is replete with commentary addressing the degree of sensitivity

of the present environmental law regulatory system to matters of economic efficiency, risk
allocation, and private property rights. For a sampling, see the materials cited in notes 165
(risk allocation), 178 (private property rights), and note 226 (economic efficiency). For a current
and comprehensive overview of the thrust of reform proposals on these fronts, see Robert L.
Glicksman and Stephen B. Chapman, Regulatory Reform and (Breach of) the Contract with
America. Improving Environmental Policy or Destroying EnvironmentalProtection?,5 Kan. J.
L. & Pub. Policy at 9 (1996). Professor Sunstein has examined whether the 104th Congress
represents the crescendo of a gateway into a new constitutional structure, arguing that such a
conclusion would be premature at this point. See Sunstein, 48 Stan. L. Rev. at 251-57 (cited in
note 160).
226. See Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 401, 104 Stat. 2399, 2584 (1990), codified at 42 U.S.C. §
7651 (1994 ed.). The Clean Air Act sulfur dioxide emissions trading program is widely regarded
as the most successful example of integration of market efficiencies into the regulatory
structure. See, for example, Percival, EnvironmentalRegulation at 824-29 (cited in note 164);
Timothy A. Wilkins and Terrell E. Hunt, Agency Discretion and Advances in Regulatory Theory:
Flexible Agency Approaches Toward the Regulated Community as a Model for the Congress-
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evolving fast enough? Is a long jump of the proportion that transformed nuisance law into the regulatory state now in order for the
regulatory state? If so, how do we bring that about?
IV. THE PRACTICAL MEANING OF EVOLUTIONARY FITNESS FOR AN
OPERATING DEMOCRACY-DESIGNING SOCIOLEGAL
ECOSYSTEMS THAT LAST
It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments.221 7

If it is time for a long jump in environmental law, and possibly
in many other fields of regulation, the question is how to do it. More
broadly, how do we structure the sociolegal system to make long
jumps possible, particularly when the landscape is changing below
our feet? The answer is sex, that is, the sociolegal version of sexual
reproduction--democracy.
Agency Relationship, 63 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 479, 491 (1995) (discussing the Clean Air Act's
permit system); Timothy N. Cason and Charles R. Plott, EPA's New Emissions Trading
Mechanism: A LaboratoryEvaluation, 30 J. Envir. Econ. & Mgmt. 133 (1996). The need for
greater reliance on market forces to bring about more efficient protection of environmental
factors has been forcefully argued by many commentators. See, for example, David Malin
Roodman, Harnessing the Market for the Environment, in Worldwatch Institute, State of the
World 168 (Norton, 1996); Sunstein, 48 Stan. L. Rev. at 260-61, 303-05 (cited in note 160);
Daniel J. Dudek, Richard B. Stewart, and Jonathan B. Wiener, Environmental Policy for
Eastern Europe: Technology-Based Versus Market-BasedApproaches, 17 Colum. J. Envir. L. 1
(1992); Robert W. Hahn and Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental Regulation: A
New Era from an Old Idea?, 18 Ecol. L. Q. 1 (1991); Richard B. Stewart, Reconstitutive Law, 46
Md. L. Rev. 86 (1986); Bruce A. Ackerman and Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental
Law: The Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 Colum. J. Envir. L. 171 (1988); Robert W.
Hahn and Gordon L. Hester, Marketable Permits: Lessons for Theory and Practice,16 Ecol. L.
Q. 361 (1989). The EPA has responded recently with initiatives that extend the pollution credit
trading concept of the Clean Air Act program to other arenas. See, for example, Effluent
Trading in Watersheds Policy Statement, 61 Fed. Reg. 4994 (1996); Effluent TradingDocument
to Discuss Various Possible Schemes, Official Says, 27 Envir. Rptr. (BNA) 362 (1996). See
generally Glenn L. Unterberger, Let's Make a Deal: Structuring the Transaction to Transfer
Pollution Reduction Credits, Nat. Resources & Envir. 26 (Spring 1996). As evidence of a
potential conflicting constraint to this trend, however, some groups contend that market-based
emission trading programs will concentrate pollutants in minority and low income areas and
thus should be restrained. See Environmental Protection Agency, National Environmental
Justice Advisory Council, Achieving Environmental Protection: Compliance, Enforcement, and
Environmental Justice (1996); Percival, Environmental Regulation at 188 (cited in note 164)
("[Ilt is necessary to consider not only how efficient [environmental] policies are, but also how
equitable.").
227. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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Sexual reproduction and democracy are both high stakes
games. Biological parents endure the trials of mating, and then cast
perfectly good genes off into the uncertainty of genetic recombination.
Why? As Professor Glenn Reynolds notes, "[t]he answer that evolutionary biologists have developed is that sex offers the primary advantage of increasing resistance to parasites." 228 This is simply another
way of saying, in Complexity Theory terms, that as parasites and
other environmental hazards continue to deform a species' fitness
landscape, sexual reproduction keeps a species moving across its
evolving landscape to continually test new fitness peaks.2 29 Likening
special interest groups to "parasites of the body politic," 230 Professor

Reynolds observes that "just as the fitness of an organism has a lot to
do with its ability to resist biological parasites, the 'fitness' of a
political system stems in no small part from its ability to resist these
political parasites." 23 1 So, "democracy is like sex, insofar as electoral
turnover, properly structured, can help limit the influence of special
interests in much the same fashion that sex is believed to reduce the
2
viability of parasites." 23
Professor Reynolds's parasite theory is intriguing, not only
because of where it leads him with respect to the role of democracy in
politics, but also because it invokes the concept of fitness, which is
central to Complexity Theory. 233 For purposes of his essay, Professor
Reynolds takes the role of sex in promoting parasite resistance, and
the correlation of parasite resistance as one factor contributing to
fitness, as givens. He does not purport comprehensively to explore
the underlying dynamical coevolutionary forces at play in either
respect.23 As I have shown, Complexity Theory has a lot to say about

why and how that coevolutionary process unfolds, that is, about why
sexual reproduction leads to evolutionary fitness in species. That
democracy might lead to political parasite resistance suggests that an
analogous coevolutionary process unfolds in the sociolegal system, a
process in which parasite resistance is just one component of fitness.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Is Democracy Like Sex?, 48 Vand. L. Rev. 1635, 1639 (1995).
See note 197.
Reynolds, 48 Vand. L. Rev. at 1642 (cited in note 228).
Id. at 1643.
Id. at 1660.
That connection is certainly no accident, as Professor Reynolds confesses, like me, to

harboring an "ongoing interest in applying what is variously called 'complexity theory'... to the
complex, dynamic, and sometimes chaotic behavior of legal and political institutions." Id. at
1637 n.7.
234. I do not point this out as a flaw in Professor Reynold's work by any means, as he is
quite up front about not covering these topics (no doubt to allow him to get to his point in a
mercifully short essay style). See id. at 1641.
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Professor Reynolds's insightful commentary thus sets the stage for
what I wish to explore in the remainder of this Article-where
Complexity Theory leads when contemplating the why and how of the
coevolution of law and society.
A. The Common Law, the Constitution,and the Joy of Sex in
Democracy
Stuart Kauffman's work in Complexity Theory suggests a
counterintuitive quality about the prospect of adaptive behavior in
law and politics: "flatter, decentralized organizations-business, political, and otherwise-might actually be more flexible and carry an
overall competitive advantage."235 By flatness Professor Kauffman
means an organization designed around a relatively flat fitness
landscape-one without many jagged peaks and valleys, but not a
pool table either. By decentralized Professor Kauffman means an
organization broken "into 'patches' where each party attempts to
optimize for its own selfish benefit, even if that is harmful to the
whole." 238 Such a structure "can lead, as if by an invisible hand, to the
237
welfare of the whole organization."
That theme, of course, is nothing new-it dates back at least
as far back as Adam Smith-but the underlying explanation for why
flatness and patches work in an organizational context offers a new
238
paradigm. Professor Kauffman's work with coupled systems models
has suggested that the basic idea of patch procedure is simple: take a
hard, conflict-laden task in which many parts interact, and divide it
into a quilt of nonoverlapping patches. Try to optimize within each
patch. As this occurs, the couplings between parts in two patches
across patch boundaries will mean that finding a "good" solution in
one patch will change the problem to be solved by the parts in
adjacent patches. Because changes in each patch will alter the
problems confronted by neighboring patches, and the adaptive moves
by those patches in turn will alter the problem faced by yet other
patches, the system is just like our model of coevolving ecosystems. 239

235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

Kauffman, At Home in the Universe at 246 (cited in note 5).
Id. at 247.
Id.
See notes 172, 215.
Kauffinan, At Home in the Universe at 252-53 (cited in note 5).
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We then must ask what patch sizes and what degree of coupling define the highest average fitness across the system. 240
Professor Kauffman finds that the answer lies again in the region
between order and chaos-the complex region-where patch size is
intermediate and coupling is just low enough to prevent the spiral
into chaos. 241 Most interestingly, however, Professor Kauffman finds
that as coupling increases and thus drives the system towards chaos,
an ameliorating effect is derived by slicing the system up into smaller
patches. 242 In other words, "[h]ard problems with many linked
variables and loads of conflicting constraints can be well solved by
breaking the entire problem into nonoverlapping domains.
Further,... as the conflicting constraints become worse, patches
become ever more helpful.243

One might accuse Professor Kauffman's theory of "patches" of
falling into the trap of reductionism, as it relies on dividing the
system into parts. What Professor Kauffman has in mind, however, is
not reductionist, but rather just the opposite. In ecological terms, for
example, Professor Kauffman's notion of patches corresponds to what
Edward 0. Wilson refers to as biological diversity-that is, the
diversity of the components of an ecosystem. 244 A monoculture-based
ecosystem has only one patch, and thus must confront the challenges
of its environment based on the strength of that patch alone. A highly

240. See id. at 247-52.
241. See id. at 252-62. The choice of the term "coupling" to describe this phenomenon is
perhaps unfortunate, as to the lay person coupling may suggest a tying down, in which case

more coupling could be perceived as leading to overall system rigidity. A better analogy may be
an index of the "signals" each system component must receive in order to know what to do next.
To a point, overall system behavior becomes more dynamic as the number of signals required
increases. The following model illustrates this property: Take a grid of 100 squares (patches)
each of which can be black or white. In the simplest model, on each system "move" each square
will choose the color of the square to its left, directly below it if there is no square to the left, or
directly above it if there is no square to the left or below. It is easy to envision how quickly such
a loosely-coupled model will "freeze" into a fixed pattern after any square's color is flipped. Now
alter the model so that each square's color depends on the dominant color of the three squares to
its left, of the three below it if there are not three to the left, or of the three above it if neither
previous rule can apply. When any square's color is flipped in this model, the result can be a
cascade of effects throughout the grid reverberating back and forth with each system "move."
As we increase the coupling the number of squares used to determine each square's color the
system eventually will exhibit utterly chaotic behavior following the flip of a square. Thus, low
coupling leads to rigidity, high coupling leads to chaos, and somewhere in between is the
optimal degree for fostering adaptive behavior.
242. See id. at 262-64.
243. Id. at 264.
244. See Wilson, Diversity of Life at 393 (cited in note 11) (defining biodiversity as "[t]he
variety of organisms considered at all levels... includ[ing] the variety of ecosystems, which
comprise both the communities of organisms within particular habitats and the physical conditions under which they live").
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diverse ecosystem, by contrast, is composed of many patches, and
thus inherits the resilience of each patch plus the adaptive forces
created by the interaction of patches. The number of system patches
thus is a relevant factor in understanding how the system operates,
but neither Professor Kauffman nor Edward 0. Wilson is saying that
we can understand an ecosystem, or any system, by studying each
245
patch in isolation of the system, as a reductionist would do.
So what do Professor Kauffman's findings mean for the
sociolegal system? I believe they lead inexorably to the conclusion
that the common law and the Constitution, when melded as they were
in the United States, created a sociolegal system that allowed for
Neither of these
unusually high levels of system-wide fitness.
observations escapes Professor Kauffman. He names the British
common law system as one of his prime examples of a Complex
Adaptive System, 24 and he posits with respect to our patchwork
constitutional system that "the apparently disjointed, opportunistic,
fractured, argumentative, pork-barrel, swap, cheat, steal-a-vote,
cluttered system may actually work pretty well because it is a wellevolved system to solve hard, conflict-laden problems and find, on
average, pretty good compromises." 247 And, I will add, the common
law flourishes in that patchwork system. About all else I can add to
Professor Kauffnan's insightful statements is some legal "proof' of his
thesis.
As for the common law, it would be difficult to conceive of a
system for making law that more closely corresponds to Professor
Kauffman's "coupled patches" model of adaptive organizations. The
common law inherently is a patchwork of nonoverlapping and
overlapping jurisdictions. Couplings between the patches-such as
through the hierarchy of courts, the principle of stare decisis, and
sensitivity to persuasive authority from other courts-are diffuse but
present in sufficient quantity to prevent rigidity. Through this

245. The fact of coevolution in dynamical systems is the ultimate demise of reductionism.
No one component can be extracted from the system, studied in isolation of the system, altered
to fit whatever ideal is in operation for the system, and then inserted back into the system with
the expectation that we can predict the subsequent behavior of either the component or the
system. The alterations of the one components schema and structure will reverberate through
the system, causing other components to alter their schemata and structures, with who knows
what as the end result.
246. Kauffman, At Home in the Universe at 169 (cited in note 5).
247. Id. at 270. In short, the "United States Constitution and Bill of Rights create a federal
system, where the whole is broken into parts, or patches, called states. States themselves are
composed of patches-counties, municipalities." Id.

1472

VANDERBILTLAWREVIEW

[Vol. 49:1407

design, as Professor Lon Fuller put it, the common law "mirrors the
variety of human experience; it offers an honest reflection of the
complexities and perplexities of life itself."24s In a similar vein,
Professor Richard Epstein has posited that "traditional judge-made
conceptions of common law are, if anything, more attuned to a
complex world than to the simpler bygone age in which they were
formulated."249 In other words, the common law tends to expand and
contract with the breathing of its subject matter. 250
The common law can do so because it is in essence a system of
simultaneous processes--of patches, the various jurisdictions, seeking
to optimize their individual bodies of law-not of a pile of inflexible
rules.51 These qualities have led some legal commentators to posit an
"analogy between pure Chaos Theory and the common law."252 For

example, case outcomes are generated by the application of relatively
simple legal principles to a given set of facts and yet are unpredictable. The importance of facts to this process of deterministic randomness, therefore, "can be analogized to initial conditions to which chaotic systems have extreme sensitivity."253 Hence, through its system

of patched jurisdictions and various loose and strong couplings, the
common law offers reasonable expectations of evolving towards the
region of complexity-to the edge of chaos.

254

248. Lon L. Fuller, Anatomy of the Law 106 (Praeger, 1968).
249. Epstein, Simple Rules for a Complex World at 16 (cited in note 163).
250. In the context of environmental law, for example, "[a] striking aspect of nuisance law
is its stasis (long term stability), recorded in familiar modes of judicial expression, common
analytical techniques, and custom-bred indicators of decision ....
The key to nuisance law, one
might suppose, is found in the empirical lessons of its application recorded over time, less so in
the articulated rules of decision:' Rodgers, Environmental Law § 2.1 at 113-14 (cited in note
157).
251. See Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules 177 (Clarendon, 1991). Frederick
Schauer explains:
What is central to the common law is the way in which what had previously been
thought to be a rule is a rule only in a very peculiar sense, for it will be applied to new
cases if and only if that application is consistent with the full array of policies and principles that, in a more complex rule system, occupy the same place that justifications occup[y] .... The common law appears consequently to be decision according to justification rather than decision according to rule. It abounds with rules of thumb, but avoids
the use of rules in a strong and constraining sense.
Id. at 178.
252. Geu, 61 Tenn. L. Rev. at 941 (cited in note 9).
253. Id. at 942.
254. In his first study of legal evolution, Professor Sinclair takes the opposite view of the
common law, arguing that it "works in an evolutionary fashion to produce states of law that
achieve most of what is required, but in an indirect and less than perfect fashion" as compared
to the legislative process. 64 U. Detroit L. Rev. at 472 (cited in note 3). Sinclair's thesis,
however, depends on the depiction of evolution in a classically neo-Darwinian framework that
fails to accommodate "revolutionary" change as part of evolution. Id. at 455, 477. Based on that
premise, he posits that legislation can take revolutionary turns and the common law cannot.
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As for the Constitution, Professor Reynolds's political parasite
theory corresponds closely with Professor Kauffman's adaptive
organization model. He posits that democracy's "reshuffling" of
lawmakers leads to the unpredictability, irrationality, and
inconsistency of decisionmaking that "disrupts the sort of cozy backscratching relationships between politicians and interest groups that
favor special interests."

255

And Professor Reynolds also recognizes

that too much of a good thing can mean falling all the way into chaos,
and thus tempering forces must be a part of the system as well. He
observes that the obvious solution to the problem of special
interests-more democracy-does not necessarily hold up when taken
to the extreme, 256 just as Professor Kauffman would tell us that
coupling of patches increases adaptiveness only to a point before
collapsing the system into chaos.

Using this premise, he argues that legislation is a fitter system and evolutionary theories of
legal change suffer from the defects of the common law in that regard. His thesis suffers in
three respects. First, as Complexity Theory plainly shows, the forces of chaos, emergence, and
catastrophe-revolutionary forces-are an integral part of adaptive, evolving systems. The
historical record of punctuated equilibrium in biological evolution demonstrates that reality.
Evolution and revolution thus are not mutually exclusive; indeed, evolution requires revolution.
Second, the common law does contain revolutionary potential. Professor Sinclair contends that
"the common-law courts have only the old form of action to work with and cannot design a new,
perfectly adapted one [and thus] will tend to carry with them extraneous maladaptive features"
Id. at 477. But evidence of revolutionary transformation in common law is provided by the
massive overhaul of nuisance law that transpired from the sixteenth to twentieth centuries.
See text accompanying notes 186-191. The fact that legislation eventually was needed to
supplement common law in the pollution context does not mean that common law is no longer
relevant. For example, common law continues to be a primary force of regulation regarding the
standards of liability for personal injury in the tobacco and health care industries. Finally,
Professor Sinclair is unduly enamored of the legislative process as capable of producing a
"perfectly adapted" sociolegal outcome. The primary examples Professor Rodgers and I offer of
maladaptation in environmental law are legislatively (and, by delegation, administratively)
originated, see text accompanying notes 157-60, and Complexity Theory teaches us in general
that whatever we believe today to be perfectly adapted will most likely prove us wrong sooner or

later.
255. Reynolds, 48 Vand. L. Rev. at 1648 (cited in note 228).
256. As Professor Reynolds observes, "'more democracy' only plays an anti-parasitic role
when it is aimed at expanding the role of democracy in selecting decisionmakers. When it aims
at expanding the ability of constituents to influence the decisions that those elected officials will
make, a more democratic approach may actually make thing worse. After all, it is primarily
speci4l interests-parasites-who will make use of those new points of contact." Id. at 1649.
With respect to the way in which the constitutional design balanced this property, Professor
John McGinnis observes that "blust as part of the Constitution was structured to facilitate the
gains from trade that could result from the operation of self-interest in the private sphere, much
of the rest was designed to restrain the bad effects of the operation of self-interest in the public
sphere." John 0. McGinnis, The OriginalConstitution and Our Origins, 19 Harv. J. L. & Pub.
Pol. 251, 254 (1996).
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And why is that democratic component so effective at controlling parasitism? Professor Kauffman, I expect, would say that the
patchiness of our representational government, which spreads power
out between separate federal branches, and then between them and
the states, combined with the flexible couplings that exist between the
federal branches and federal and state sovereigns, keeps the system
flat and decentralized. That system, therefore, is able to respond
quickly to the evolving behaviors of other sociolegal components, like
special interest parasites, and keep its own fitness at a high level.
The common law and the Constitution thus combine to form a
sociolegal ecosystem-a system of making rules-which is remarkably
adaptive. It is within this system that democracy acts as a force of
change. Professor Reynolds focuses on democracy's ability to promote
parasite resistance, but its adaptive qualities run far deeper.
Democracy is the means by which we can motivate long jumps in the
system towards higher fitness levels, or away from peaks that are
dissolving into valleys as the fitness landscape deforms in response to
external threats. Simply put, democracy, as an agent of change from
within, allows the system to adapt to change from without. In that
sense, democracy is like sex.
B. The ContraceptiveEffects of the FederalAdministrative State
Based on Complexity Theory, I have identified the two key
variables for designing a sociolegal ecosystem-patchiness and coupling. Patchiness refers to the degree of dispersal of lawmaking
power, and coupling refers to the degree of interrelatedness between
the units into which that power is dispersed. I have also posited that
the reason the common law and the Constitution form such an adaptive system of lawmaking is that they achieve optimum levels of
patchiness and coupling, thereby allowing the agent of
chaos-democracy-to operate at a sort of "controlled burn" level of
change. The result is a sociolegal system poised on the edge of chaos,
able to roll with the punches, adapt to change, and achieve high average fitness across the system.
To be sure, not every outcome in such a system is the best
possible outcome. We may need to sacrifice optimizing each individual decision taken in isolation in order to optimize system-wide average fitness. Of course, this is where our reductionist tendencies return to haunt us. Reductionism blinds our eyes to the fact that as we
make individual decisions, we deform the fitness levels of other individual decisions. Reductionist legal institutions treat sociolegal deci-

1996]

COMPLEXITY THEORY

1475

sions as if each were made in isolation rather than as if each is a part
of a system of decisions, which Complexity Theory shows us will only
increase the likelihood of system-wide disruption from chaos, emergence, and catastrophe. In other words, as we plug one hole, others
begin to appear as a result, thus reinforcing our urge to continue
plugging holes.
The reductionism that permeates our legal theory and institutions in this manner has led us to alter the sociolegal ecosystem drastically, by centralizing power in the federal government and reducing
the interrelatedness of what remains as the lawmaking units. That
is, we have set the levels of patchiness and coupling too low, stifling
the system into an ordered regime where it is incapable of taking
advantage of the adaptive qualities of democracy. The two most
visible mechanisms for this campaign of contraception are the expansion of the federal power to regulate interstate commerce 257 and the
erosion of the so-called nondelegation doctrine. 258

The expanded

federal commerce power has set the stage for gradual but unmistakable centralization of lawmaking power in the federal government at
the expense both of the common law and of lawmaking by state and
local governments. 259 In other words, the patchiness of the system is

257. Virtually the entire body of federal pollution control legislation, for example, is based
on the power of Congress to "regulate Commerce ...among the several States" U.S. Const.,
Art. I, § 8,cl. 3. For an extremely thorough, current description of the original intent of that
provision of authority, its history, its current doctrine, and its possible future, see Donald H.
Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce Power and Incidentally Rewrite United
States v. Lopez, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 554 (1995).
258. Based on the fiction of "Congress... obtaining the assistance of its coordinate
branches," Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989), delegation of legislative power
from Congress to agencies has been upheld consistently so long as not done with "an absence of
standards for the guidance of the [agency's] action, so that it would be impossible in a proper
proceeding to ascertain whether the will of Congress has been obeyed." Yakus v. United States,
321 U.S. 414, 426 (1944). The standard of what is required thus is also known as the
"intelligible principles" test. See J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409
(1928) (stating that Congress must "lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which
the person or body authorized to [exercise the delegated authority] is directed to conform"). See
generally Richard A. Epstein, The ProperScope of the Commerce Power, 73 Va. L. Rev. 1387
(1987).
259. For example, Professor Robert Beck summarizes where the jurisprudence of the
Commerce Clause has led by suggesting that the provision could be rewritten as follows:
The Congress shall have Power... To regulate Commerce, articles in commerce, and
anything that substantially affects Commerce, and to prohibit commerce in certain articles.., among the several States.
Robert E. Beck, Setting the Course for the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977,
Nat. Resources & Envir. 24, 25 (Fall 1995). He observes that "the actual wording of the
Commerce Clause has become so unimportant that most courts applying it do not bother to
quote it any more." Id.
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collapsing. The elimination of the nondelegation doctrine in all but
name has allowed Congress, flush with its power grab, to shift decision making authority out of its adaptive forum and into unelected,
bureaucratic administrative agencies. 260 The system has become
decoupled by the proliferation of power from Congress into the
executive and independent agencies which, in turn, have expanded
their regulatory influence outward as far as they can reach. 261 In
particular, Congress routinely provides agencies virtually unfettered
discretion to control the scope of their own power by leaving it largely
to the agencies to define key jurisdictional terms found in regulatory
statutes. 262 Instances of "micro-management" by Congress, in which
260. The courts have supported a finding of proper delegation based on legislative directives as abstract and compassless as the "public interest, convenience, or necessity." See, for
example, National BroadcastingCo. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943). In Justice Scalia's
words, therefore, "[w]hat legislative standard, one must wonder, can possibly be too vague to
survive judicial scrutiny, when we have repeatedly upheld, in various contexts, a 'public
interest' standard?" Mistretta,488 U.S. at 416 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
261. The present-day reality is thus much as Professor Bernard Schwartz has described:
When the twentieth-century administrative state arrived, its appetite for legislation was
of a magnitude of which neither Bentham nor the Founding Fathers could have
dreamed. The legislature itself could not directly perform its new tasks of regulation
and guardianship. Rulemaking came into its own as a potent weapon in the government
arsenal. If it has become trite to point out how we have become a society that is
regulated from the cradle to the grave, that is true because so much of our life has come
to be supervised by administrative rules and regulations. By now, administrative
legislation completely dwarfs the primary legislation of Congress and the state
legislatures.
Schwartz, Administrative Law at 168 (cited in note 163). Timothy Wilkins and Terrell Hunt
argue that "the popular notion of unconfined delegation is a myth and that Congress virtually
always prescribes the policy structures in sufficient detail so that agency choice of regulatory
method is narrowed significantly." 63 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 518 (cited in note 226). Their
thesis is that Congress usually prescribes the method of regulation-say, "the choice between
food stamps and money vouchers, the choice between public housing and subsidies, the choice
between mandatory pollution control technologies and an emissions tax," id. at 481 n.6-and
thus it is inaccurate to allege that the nondelegation doctrine is an empty principle. To be sure,
Congress usually does describe the schema and structure of a regulatory program, thus
preventing the agency from transforming it into something else. By doing so, however,
Congress can hardly be said to have resisted the practice of unconfined delegation, as
tremendous discretion often is embedded in the agency to define the organism's final form and
behavior. See, for example, notes 262-63. Congress's practice after creation of the agency is
more one of deism than close supervision, at least in terms of laying down the regulatory
implementation standards in statutory text.
262. For example: Congress has left it to the Corps of Engineers and the Environmental
Protection Agency to define "wetlands" for purposes of implementing section 404 of the Clean
Water Act. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994 ed.); 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(t) (providing agency definition).
Congress has left it to the Fish and Wildlife Service to define what constitutes "harm" of
endangered species. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1994 ed.); 15 C.F.R. § 17.3 (providing agency
definition). Congress has left it to the Environmental Protection Agency to define many of the
components of "solid waste" for purposes of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. See
42 U.S.C. § 6903(27); 40 C.F.R. pt. 261 (agency definition). Because of the broad deference
courts give to agencies in establishing those regulations, see Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), agencies thus are empowered to expand
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statutory text tightly constrains agency regulatory discretion in that
or any other regard, are few and far between. 263 In Complexity Theory
terms, both patchiness and coupling in our system are on the wane,
which can only lead to rigidity.
As the system erodes further into this consolidated, simplified
state of being, democracy loses its adaptive qualities. Indeed, if anything, the chaotic forces inherent in democracy may pose a serious
threat to the ossified, brittle administrative state. The reaction by
the administrative state and its followers to, of all things, a change in
power in Congress in 1994, was not uniformly cozy. Consider what
one of the great voices of reason in environmental policy, William
Ruckelshaus, twice former EPA Administrator and currently CEO of
a major waste disposal company, has to say about the Republican
takeover of environmental policy in the current Congress:
[T]he current rhetorical excess is yet another phase in a dismaying pattern.
The anti-environmental push of the nineties is prompted by the pro-environmental push of the late eighties, which was promoted by the anti-environmental excess of the early eighties, which was prompted by the pro-environmental excess of the seventies, which was prompted by the.... So what is
wrong with this picture? Aren't such changes in emphasis part of the fabric of
democracy? Yes, but in the case of environmental policy, these violent swings
have had an unusually devastating-perhaps uniquely devastating--effect on
the executive agency entrusted to carry out whatever environmental policy the
264
nation says it wants.

He is right, of course, that as the pendulum of democracy swings it
generates some chaos along its path, but is that so bad? Complexity
Theory demonstrates that the adaptive qualities of democracy cannot
be retained if the unpredictable forces that make it adaptive are removed. When the pendulum of democracy stops swinging, in other

their regulatory scope tremendously simply by refining their definitions of statutory terms. See,
for example, United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985) (approving
Corps of Engineers's regulation defining "wetlands" to include areas adjacent to wetlands);
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapterof Communities for a Great Oregon, 115 S. Ct. 2407, 132 L. Ed.
2d 597 (1995) (approving Fish and Wildlife Service's definition of what constitutes "take" of
endangered species as including modifications of habitat).
263. For example, following many years of the Environmental Protection Agency's failure
to designate hazardous air pollutants under section 112 of the Clean Air Act, in 1990 Congress
amended the statute so as to specifically designate 189 chemicals as such. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b).
Even so, Congress allowed the agency to add to and delete from the list depending on whether
the agency finds the chemical is "reasonably anticipated to cause adverse health effects to
humans or adverse environmental effects." 42 U.S.C. §§ 7412(b)(3)(B) and (C). Congress has
not defined what is meant by that standard.
264. William H. Ruckelshaus, Stopping the Pendulum, Envir. Forum 25 (Nov./Dec. 1995).
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words, you do not have democracy anymore. Another perspective on
the situation Ruckelshaus describes would be that the administrative
state, now that it has reached an advanced, mature state of power, is
simply too rigid and thus not equipped to work hand in hand with a
dynamic, adapting democracy. Democracy in the administrative
state, it seems, is something to be feared, not savored. Which will
prevail?
There is no question, fortunately, that public sentiment still
favors a strong environmental protection policy.65 The issue is not
the policy, however, it is the fitness of the means we use to achieve
that policy. Ruckelshaus and other leading thinkers can say all they
want about "reinventing" regulatory behemoths like the EPA,266 but
265. Even following the election of a Republican Party-led Congress in November 1994,
which was expected to soften the command-and-control blow of federal environmental law,
public opinion has remained decidedly in favor of a strong environmental protection policy. See
Mark Wexler, Americans Speak Out, National Wildlife 34 (Apr. 1995); George Pettinico, The
Public Opinion Paradox: Most of Us Are Environmentalists-UntilWe Get in the Voting Booth,
Sierra 28 (Nov. 1995); Environment Called "ImportantPriority"by 71 Percent, Clean Air Trust
Says, 26 Envir. Rptr. (BNA) 1965 (1996); Survey Says Majority of Voters Support Laws to
Protect Environment, Resources, 26 Envir. Rptr. (BNA) 1692 (1996). That sentiment also
appears to remain strong at the international level. See David Bloom, International Public
Opinionon the Environment, 269 Sci. 354 (1995). Many polls confirming this trend can be found
in the POLL-C database of the Westlaw electronic research service.
266. William Ruckelshaus is leading a private initiative to do just that. See Ruckelshaus to
Head Initiative on New Statutory Mission for Agency, 26 Envir. Rptr. (BNA) 2093 (1996). The
theme of "reinvention" has begun to permeate reform rhetoric throughout the federal agencies.
See Jerry L. Mashaw, Reinventing Government and Regulatory Reform: Studies in Neglect and
Abuse of Administrative Law, 57 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 405 (1996). For example, the Environmental
Protection Agency "is committed to reinventing environmental regulation to provide greater
protection at less cost." 60 Fed. Reg. 60604 (1995). See generally Notice of Availability of
Permits Improvement Team Concept Paper on Environmental Permitting and Task Force
Recommendations, 61 Fed. Reg. 21856 (May 10, 1996); James R. L. Jones, Beyond the Beltway
Buzzwords, Envir. Forum 33 (Sept./Oct. 1995); Push to Streamline EPA Rules Reflects
"Reinvention" Effort of Administration, 26 Envir. Rptr. (BNA) 1369 (1995). The EPA has
focused these efforts through "Project XL," which is designed to allow the regulated community
and local communities access to alternatives to command-and-control regulatory mechanisms.
See 60 Fed. Reg. 55569 (1995). See generally Daniel J. Fiorino, Toward a New System of
EnvironmentalRegulation: The Case for an Industry Sector Approach, 26 Envir. L. 457 (1996);
William H. Freedman and Karen A. Caffee, EPA's Project XL: Regulatory Flexibility, Nat.
Resources & Envir. 59 (Spring 1996); Project XL Launched with Announcement by President of
First Eight Participants, 26 Envir. Rptr. (BNA) 1179 (1995); Communities Sought for
Participationin ProjectXL for StreamliningRules, 26 Envir. Rptr. (BNA) 1155 (1995); EPA Lets
FloridaCompany Combine Permits, 26 Envir. Rptr. (BNA) 2146 (1996) (Project XL case). EPA
has also launched the "Common Sense Initiative," which will examine "performance and
market-based regulation, setting regulatory priorities based on sound science, cutting the
paperwork burden on industry, moving environmental decisions and accountability to state or
local governments, and flexible enforcement approaches and compliance incentives." Budget
Uncertainty Underlies EPA Regulatory Activity in 1996, 26 Envir. Rptr. (BNA) 1888, 1889
(1996). See, for example, Instrument Panel Suppliers for Autos Sought by EPA for Common
Sense Initiative, 27 Envir. Rptr. (BNA) 10 (1996). Nonetheless, the agency's agenda of recently
finalized and proposed regulatory measures could not be mistaken for anything but a commandand-control program. See 60 Fed. Reg. 60604, 60605-717 (1995) (semi-annual regulatory
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there is no evidence that the administrative state is apt to part
willingly from its underlying sources of power. The theme heard
throughout the environmental regulation community, for example, is
that "with some fine-tuning, current laws can form the basis for a
system capable of meeting the challenges of the 21st century."267 But
"fine-tuning" suggests no fundamental reexamination of the premises
upon which the administrative state was based. Rather, fine-tuning
suggests only a walk around the nearby fitness landscape to find a
somewhat higher peak.
Indeed, the expansive commerce power and contracted nondelegation doctrine have become such sacred cows of the federal administrative state, even the most feeble of objections from the courts
are met with hyperbolic rhetoric. For example, the Supreme Court's
recent suggestion in United States v. Lopez 268 that there may actually
be a limit to the federal commerce power has been severely
criticized. 269 The recent appellate court decision in South Dakota v.
United States Department of the Interior27 finding a statute to
constitute an excessive delegation of administrative authority has
been cast as out of touch. 271 It is quite apparent that most of legal
agenda). There is discussion in Congress of legislation which would allow the EPA to waive
strict adherence to the regulations upon a demonstration that alternative approaches would
protect the environment as much. See Congress Said to ConsiderLegislation to Let EPA Enter
Alternative Agreements, 26 Envir. Rptr. (ENA) 1581 (1996).
267. Adam Babich, What Next?, Envir. Forum 48 (Nov./Dec. 1994).
268. 115 S. Ct. 1624, 131 L. Ed. 2d 626 (1995). In Lopez the Court struck down a federal
law prohibiting the possession of guns in designated school zones as beyond the commerce
power, the first such invalidation of a federal law on commerce power grounds in over sixty
years. See, Regan, 94 Mich. L. Rev. at 663-72 (cited in note 257). The decision has triggered a
"Lopez-watch" in the legal community to see where the decision will lead, but in general the
Court and lower courts have taken it nowhere. See, for example, Cargill,Inc. v. United States,
116 S. Ct. 407, 133 L. Ed. 2d 325 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (lower court allowed assertion
of federal regulation over isolated wetlands based on the possibility that migratory birds
traveling across state boundaries could land there to rest or feed). See generally News from the
Circuits, Admin. and Reg. News 4 (Fall 1995) (collecting cases decided since Lopez refusing to
strike down federal legislation on commerce power grounds). But see United States v. Olin
Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1502 (S.D. Ala. 1996) (ruling that application of Superfund in specific
context of case was beyond federal interstate commerce power).
269. See Tom Stacy, What's Wrong with Lopez, 44 U. Kan. L. Rev. 243, 244-45 (Lopez is
"profoundly unsatisfying" and "remarkably insensitive to" Federalism values); Richard Lazarus,
Environment Protectedfrom Lopez, Envir. Forum 8 (Jan./Feb. 1996).
270. 69 F.3d 878 (8th Cir. 1995). The South Dakota court found that a provision allowing
the Secretary of the Department of the Interior to "acquire ...any interest in lands.., within
or without existing reservations ...for the purpose of providing lands for Indians7 was an
excessive delegation of legislative authority. Id. at 882. The court noted that the provision
"would permit the Secretary to purchase the Empire State Building in trust for a tribal chieftain
as a wedding present." Id.
271. See Lazarus, Envir. Forum at 8 (cited in note 269).
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academia believes there is no limit to the federal commerce power and
there is no such thing as an excessive delegation of legislative power,
period.27 2

Those views can only lead to suppression of the very

dynamical qualities for which the common law and the Constitution
are so often revered.
I find some comfort that I am not alone in my heresy on this
point, as a growing body of commentary joins me in identifying these
two doctrines as the culprits of the paralysis of democracy. 73 With
272. Professor Donald Regan observes, for example, that "[i]t is a common view among
constitutional law scholars that we should abandon the idea of limits on federal power. We have
become a unitary nation with an omricompetent central government, and we should just admit
it." Regan, 94 Mich. L. Rev. at 558 (cited in note 257). Similarly, Professor John McGinnis
notes that "[w]ith the demise of any restraints on Congress's power under the Commerce
These enormous changes in the constitutional archiClause, federalism has passed away ....
tecture in turn gave rise to the success of noninterpretivist theories of the Constitution, because
Court decisions could no longer be justified on any plausible originalist grounds." McGinnis, 19
Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol. at 256 (cited in note 256).
273. Professor Reynolds, for example, posits that "Itihe abandonment of commerce-clause
limitations on federal power has led to greater special interest pressure, in no small part,
because it has made the federal government more attractive to lobby" and that "delegation
moves decisionmaking from elected lawmakers, subject to the electoral turnover effects outlined
above, to unelected bureaucrats (or congressional staff) who are much more insulated from such
effects." Reynolds, 48 Vand. L. Rev. at 1653 (cited in note 228). For Professor Reynolds,
therefore, the commerce power and nondelegation doctrines are the chief contributors to the
erosion of democracy in the United States, meaning that "to reestablish the necessary
immunity" from political parasites, we must "restor[e] the very constitutional safeguards whose
removal has led to the current problem." Id. at 1653-54. Professor Reynolds demonstrates that
one objective of the constitutional design was to provide "structural means for dealing with the
problem of 'factions' through federalism." Id. at 1644 n.30. Professor Reynolds's themes are
echoed by environmental law commentators such as Bill Futrell, who observes that "It]his focus
on Washington fuels the proliferation of interest groups and increases the power of federal
It does not have to be this way." Futrell, History of Environmental Law, in
agencies ....
Environmental Law Institute, Sustainable Environmental Law at 15 (cited in note 185).
Similarly, Chief Justice Rehnquist has opined that the courts "ought not to shy away from our
judicial duty to invalidate unconstitutional delegations of legislative authority solely out of
concern that we should thereby reinvigorate discredited constitutional doctrines of the pre-New
Deal era." Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 686 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring). See also id. at 646 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion) (observing that
the statutory requirement that the agency establish worker chemical exposure standards which
reduce harm "to the extent feasible," if not interpreted by the Court to require the agency first
to make a finding of significant risk, "might be unconstitutional"); American Textile
ManufacturersInst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 547-48 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (finding
that the authority to decide how much chemical exposure risk to allow in the workplace is a
"'quintessential legislative' choice" which was "unconstitutionally delegated.., to the Executive
Branch").
Professor Keith Werhan offers a compelling discussion of the way in which
changes in the practices of federal courts with respect to their review of agency action
have reinforced [a] transformation of the administrative process from the legal to the
political ....
These revisions... challenge the traditional model of administrative law
by compromising the role of the judiciary as guarantor of the legality and legitimacy of
agency action.
Keith Werhan, DelegalizingAdministrative Law, 1996 Ill. L. Rev. 423, 424-25. And Professor
David Schoenbrod has proposed that "[]awmakers should take direct responsibility for laws by
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each further reduction in the number of patches of power, and with
each disconnection of couplings between those patches, we draw
ourselves further from the edge of chaos and closer to a brittle,
nonresilient order. While we may find comfort in the apparent
predictability of that state, we will face an increasingly ominous
threat of a major catastrophe.
C. Making the Long Jump to New Landscapesof Democracy
If it is too late to reverse the constitutional law doctrine and
require a turnaround in this respect-a question which constitutional
scholars no doubt will argue roundly after Lopez and South
Dakota-itis certainly not too late for the federal government voluntarily to loosen its grip around democracy. Critics of the policy underlying Lopez and South Dakota decisions appear to believe, however,
that a restricted commerce power and reinvigorated nondelegation
doctrine threaten the formulation of effective policy, and hence they
are unlikely to support a federally-induced relaxation of the status
quo. But these criticisms fail to make the important distinction between the fitness of law and the policy of law. There is no inherent
policy outcome embedded in the commerce power and nondelegation
doctrine questions. Rather, those doctrines merely shape the environment of lawmaking. To be sure, as the commerce power and nondelegation doctrine expand and contract in scope, different political
entities will play larger or smaller roles in setting policy, and the dose
of democracy allowed to enter into that process will be different as the
patchiness and coupling variables of the lawmaking environment
change. But those effects do not necessarily dictate which policies

274
will be chosen.

enacting them themselves. If they aren't sure what regulations to enact, they can tell the
agency bureaucrats to hold hearings and make proposals."
David Schoenbrod, On
Environmental Law, Congress Keeps Passing the Buck, Wall St. J. A15 (Mar. 29, 1995). In
short, it is no longer heresy to observe that the most potent force of adaptive, evolutionary
change in the sociolegal system is put squarely at risk by our incessant reliance on more and
more concentration of power in the federal administrative state.
274. Professor Richard Lazarus states the issue correctly when he explains that Lopez may
affect "the vulnerabilityof laws, like the Clean Water Act, that have long enjoyed an expansive
reading of Commerce Clause authority." See Lazarus, Envir. Forum at 8 (cited in note 269).
Such laws may become vulnerable in the sense that their schemata and structure are based on a
fitness landscape that no longer exists. Indeed, although polls overwhelmingly show broad
support for the environment, see note 265, polls also show substnatial support for having state
and local governments be primarily responsible for implementing that policy objective. See
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So, what motivates the intense fear of a patchier, more coupled
lawmaking environment-one in which democracy's force of change
reigns with more potency? The mantra heard time and again in response to that question is that the states-presumably the beneficiaries of a patchier, more coupled context of federalism-will inherently
compete with one another for economic domination, and thus will
make poorer choices than will the federal administrative organism on
questions of national policy significance. For example, the arguments
given in the 1970s-and they were probably accurate at the time-in
support of the statutory revolution in environmental law were that
this so-called "race to the bottom" between the states would subvert
any coherent environmental protection program for the nation, and
hence federal domination of environmental protection policy is
needed.275 In order to make that federal domination possible, the
argument goes, the commerce power must be interpreted expansively,
and the nondelegation doctrine must be pushed aside to allow transfer of substantive policymaking authority to administrative agen276

cies.

The conclusion to this chain of reasoning for today's purposes
is that because the administrative state has achieved measurable
success in environmental protection, none of the mechanisms that
brought it into being should be tinkered with, lest we spiral back into
environmental Armageddon. The result is that today, "[slo much
political power has been reallocated to the federal government that, at
times, the states could be mistaken for vassals of the federal govern2

ment." 77

Jonathan H. Adler and Kellyanne Fitzpatrick, For the Environment, Against Overregulation,
Wall St. J. A12 (July 29, 1996).
275. See Richard L. Revesz, RehabilitatingInterstate Competition: Rethinking the 'Race-tothe-Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1210 (1992);
Jerome M. Organ, Limitations on State Agency Authority to Adopt Environmental Standards
More Stringent than Federal Standards: Policy Considerationsand Interpretive Problems, 54
Md. L. Rev. 1373, 1388-93 (1995). There is plenty of reason to conclude that, "l]ike civil rights
law, environmental law became federalized only after a long history of state failure to protect
what had come to be viewed as nationally important interests." Percival, 54 Md. L. Rev. at 1144
(cited in note 190). See also Dwyer, 54 Md. L. Rev. at 1221 (cited in note 208) ("It is
probably.., true that in 1970 most states could not be relied upon to establish an adequate
environmental policy."). Anderson, 26 Rutgers L. J. at 418 (cited in note 162) ("Federally
mandated controls worked better than state discretionary controls because they were not
subject to the competitive economic pressures facing states."). What was true then, however,
may not necessarily be true today.
276. See Dwyer, 54 Md. L. Rev. at 1188-90 (cited in note 208).
277. Id. at 1185. This sentiment surfaced most pointedly in the 104th Congress under the
banner of unfunded federal mandates. See, for example, Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of
1995, Pub. L. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48, to be codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C. See generally
Jerome L. Wilson, States Need a Simple Guaranteeof Rights, Nal L. J. A21 (Feb. 13, 1995);
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To be sure, the federal administrative state in the past has
adopted measures that substantially improved the quality of life in
many ways, 78 but the question is whether it remains the "fittest"
sociolegal system for taking on the challenges of the future.
Complexity Theory demonstrates that the schemata and structure
that lift a species to the title of "fittest" in an ecosystem are temporal.
Other species will respond, and evolve, and thus deform the former
species' fitness landscape. In other words, the premises upon which
the fittest species' schema and structure were based do not remain
valid forever, and unless that species adapts to changes it causes in
other species, it will be passed by eventually.
Even accepting, therefore, that the administrative state was at
one time the "fittest" system for tackling the sociolegal problems of its
day, there is every reason to believe that the premises upon which it
was designed are no longer true. Through competition, cooperation,
and coevolution, the other species in the sociolegal ecosystem have
adapted to the federal administrative state: they have absorbed its
policies, dealt with its problems, suffered at its hands, and prospered
where opportunities arose. In other words, they have evolved.
Indeed, the centralization of power in the federal government and
coercion of state policy through that process--disguised as the socalled "delegation" of authority-may very well have facilitated an
improvement in state environmental awareness and expertise. 279
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, The Role of Federal Mandates in
IntergovernmentalRelations (1996). As much as that perception may prevail with respect to the
relation between the federal and state governments in the United States, the degree of central
control in environmental regulation is potentially far more pronounced in the relationship
between the European Union and its member nations, where central "directives" encroach upon
member nations' authority in ways which have been flatly declared unconstitutional in the
United States. See James Pfander, EnvironmentalFederalismin Europe and the United States:
A Comparative Assessment of Regulation Through the Agency of Member States, in
Environmental Policy with Politicaland Economic Integration 59 (1994).
278. See, for example, note 164.
279. See Dwyer, 54 Md. L. Rev. at 1223-24 (cited in note 208) (describing how federal legislation served as a template for innovative state programs, and how federal funding helped jumpstart that process). This "education" of the states was promoted by the delegation feature of
many of the federal environmental laws, under which implementation of the federal program
could be assumed by a state if it agreed to a morass of conditions, restrictions, and oversight.
See, for example, Adam Babich, Our Federalism, Our HazardousWaste, and Our Good Fortune,
54 Md. L. Rev. 1516 (1995) (describing delegation under hazardous waste laws). I expect those
who favor the federal dominance scheme may point to the delegation program as evidence that
federal domination has not subverted state involvement to the degree I allege, but rather
defines an aura of "cooperative federalism." See Percival, 54 Md. L. Rev. at 1174-75 (cited in
note 190). As much as the delegation program has inculcated the states to environmental
protection policies, however, the strings attached to delegation appear to stand in the way of
them doing very much with that education. See Babich, 54 Md. L. Rev. at 1540 (cited in this
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Thus, as the assembly rule principle of evolutionary biology would tell
us, the evolution of state policy may not have been possible without
the previous federal regulatory state phase. But perhaps now it is
time the federal government let its children fly from the nest.
For example, today it is the case that the states with the
strongest economies are those with the strongest environmental protection programs, which is contrary to the premise of the federal
environmental regulation program. 280 In general, the states are
widely regarded as the source of some of the most innovative, progressive, and effective environmental policies. 281 The states are far out in

note) ("For states, [the] cooperative federalism program is part of a pattern of complexity that
has generally prevented them from attempting significant innovation."); Organ, 54 Md. L. Rev.
at 1376-93 (cited in note 275) (explaining that many states, partially in response to the
complexity of the federal program, simply adopt the federal standards as the maximum state
standard and leave it at that, thus suppressing any impetus to innovate); Oliver Houck and
Michael Rolland, Federalism in Wetlands Regulation: A Considerationof Delegation of Clean
Water Act Section 404 and Related Programs to the States, 54 Md. L. Rev. 1242 (1995)
(explaining why the costs and complexity of delegation of federal wetlands protection programs
have deterred states from assuming such authority, and calling for revisions that would provide
the states greater jurisdictional authority).
280. See California Senate Office of Research, Myths of Jobs vs. Resources: Environmental
Protections and Economic Growth (1996); Analysis by California Research Unit Says Strong
Rules Benefit Economy, Jobs, 26 Envir. Rptr. (BNA) 2338 (1996); MIT Project on Environmental
Politics and Policy, Environmentalism and Economic Prosperity: Testing the Environmental
Impact Hypothesis (1992); Study of Pacific Northwest Concludes Economy Aided by
Environmental Protection, 26 Envir. Rptr. (BNA) 1615 (1996); Regulatory Reform: Analysis of
Studies Says Strong Rules Benefit Economy, Jobs, Daily Envir. Rptr. (BNA) D5 (Apr. 8, 1996).
281. One leading environmental law commentator goes so far as to say that "[o]ne need
only look to America's own states-its environmental test tubes--for signs of important
environmental goings on." Bud Ward, The Train Moves On, Envir. Forum 41, 46 (Nov./Dec.
1994). See also Henry N. Butler and Jonathan R. Macey, Using Federalism to Improve
Environmental Policy 64 (1996) (arguing that states "will compete to offer residents better
environmental quality"); John Pendergrass, You Say You Want a Devolution, Envir. Forum 8
(Nov./Dec. 1995) C'[M]any, if not most, of the best and most innovative ideas in environmental
and natural resources protection have come from the states."); John Pendergrass, A Rich
History of State Innovation, Envir. Forum 12 (Nov.Dec. 1995) (describing several of the ideas
emanating from states which eventually became embedded in federal requirements applicable
to all states); Robert L. Rhodes, Jr., Where Do We Go from Here? Reforming U.S. Environmental
Laws in Congress,26 Envir. Rptr. (BNA) 991 (contending that "state governments are more able
to take on a large role in protecting the environment"); State Cleanup Systems More Effective
than Federal Superfund Program,Report Says, 26 Envir. Rptr. (BNA) 982 (1995) (former EPA
official contends "[s]tates are cleaning up contaminated waste sites 'at a fraction of the time and
cos of the federal superfund program"). Recently, in order to share with each other their
innovations and successes, the states formed the Environmental Council of the States CECOS").
Mary E. Gade, the director of the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency and first president
of ECOS, contends that "the environmental system that has given us unprecedented and
extraordinary environmental progress to date, is now outmoded and unable to meet the
challenges ahead. And that is where the states come marching in-somewhat brazenly and
clearly in lockstep." See Mary E. Gade, When the States Come Marching in, Nat. Resources &
Envir. 3 (Winter 1996). Another step down the chain lies the role of citizens in enforcing and
shaping environmental policy directly, which has been a powerful force under the citizen suit
provisions found in many federal environmental laws. See David R. Hodas, Enforcement of
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front of the federal government in programs dealing innovatively and

8
effectively with such thorny issues as ecosystem protection policy,2 2

2
growth management, 2 3 and nonpoint source water pollution. 8
Indeed, states often find the federal policies to be the source of the
problems they must confront and of restrictions on their innovative
solutions, as has been the case with remediation and redevelopment

of contaminated lands. 2 5 And these themes are by no means limited

to environmental law, as they are being played out today in a wide
variety of fields that have come to be characterized under the federal
dominance scheme. 28 The so-called race to the bottom has been
Environmental Law In A TriangularFederal System: Can Three Not Be A Crowd When
Enforcement Authority Is Shared By the United States, the States, and Their Citizens?, 54 Md.
L. Rev. 1552 (1995).
282. See Douglas P. Wheeler, An Ecosystem Approach to Species Protection,Nat. Resources
& Envir. 7 (Winter 1993); Sara Parker, The CRM Approach. Protecting Missouri's Natural
Heritage,Nat. Resources & Envir. 10 (Winter 1993).
283. See George E.H. Gay, State Solutions to Growth Management. Vermont, Oregon, and
a Synthesis, Nat. Resources & Envir. 13 (Winter 1993).
284. See M. Allison Hamm, The Massachusetts Experience with Nonpoint Sources:
Regulators Beware!, Nat. Resources & Envir. 47 (Winter 1993).
285. See Mark D. Anderson, The State Voluntary Cleanup Program Alternative, Nat.
Resources & Envir. 22 (Winter 1993); Anne Slaughter Andrew, Brownfield Redevelopment: A
State-Led Reform of Superfund Liability, Nat. Resources & Envir. 27 (Winter 1993); Karen
Hansen, Minnesota's Landfill Cleanup Program: A New Superfund Paradigm,Nat. Resources
& Envir. 32 (Winter 1993); Elizabeth Glass Geltman, Recycling Lan& Encouraging the
Redevelopment of Contaminated Property, Nat. Resources & Envir. 3 (Spring 1996); John
Pendergrass, The Maturing of Cleanup Programs,Envir. Forum 6 (May/June 1996); Mayors
Release Proposal on Brownfields; President Urges Support for Tax Incentives, 26 Envir. Rptr.
(BNA) 1871 (1996); State Brownfields Redevelopment Law Scraps Strict, Joint and Several
Liability, 26 Envir. Rptr. (BNA) 1587 (1996) (discussing Illinois law). See generally Office of
Technology Assessment, The State of the"States on Brownfields: Programs for Cleanup and
Reuse of ContaminatedSites (1995).
286. See Marshall J. Breger, Government Accountability in the Twenty-First Century, 57 U.
Pitt. L. Rev. 423, 432 (1996) ("Recent years have shown innumerable examples of how
devolution to the states and privatization have created not only more efficient government but
one far more accountable to the public."). Project, Federaland State Coordination. A Survey of
Administrative Law Schemes, 46 Admin. L. Rev. 391 (1994) (examining proposals for altering
the federalism balance in fields such as aviation, housing, wetlands, job training, Medicaid,
occupational health and safety, child support enforcement, disaster relief, and education of
disabled persons); Dana Milbank and Laurie McGinley, While Washington Fiddles, Many States
Devise Solutions to Problems of Welfare and Health Care, Wall St. J. A12 (May 31, 1996).
Notwithstanding these numerous examples, the "race to the bottom" rhetoric, see note 175, has
resurfaced as the principal response of entrenched federal and environmental interests against
calls for devolution of environmental regulation authority to states, largely on the basis that the
states' record falls short of perfection. See, for example, Vickie Patton, A Balanced Partnership,
Envir. Forum 16, 17 (May/June 1996) (EPA official contends that "[s]tates have made
tremendous progress over the past quarter century in developing enhanced capabilities to
protect local environmental quality. Nevertheless, there are still shortcomings"); Robert
Housman, The Devil Is in the Exogenous Variables, Envir. Forum 32, 33 (May/June 1996)
(attorney for environmental group says "Is]tate and local governments can serve as laboratories
for finding and testing ways to achieve greater environmental protection while spending
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replaced by a race to the top, with the federal government not only
being left behind, but holding back the other competitors.
That being so, we should reexamine the schemata and structures of our laws. To the extent they are premised on the need for
centralized federal administrative control and that need has been
reduced or eliminated, laws based on those premises may not be fit for
much longer. We have seen that the environmental quality problems
facing us in the future are different than those we tackled through the
federal regulatory scheme.2s7 They are more ubiquitous and complex.
They will cost more to solve at the margin. Solutions not permitted in
the federal domination scheme may prove more fit, but we are
hindered from reaching them while stuck in the local landscape of the
administrative state and trying as hard as we might to keep it from
changing below our feet. We need, in other words, to evolve, and to do
so expeditiously through long jumps to new schemata and structures.
I hope it is understood that my point is not that we should
return to some eighteenth century ideal of total state primacy-a
strange attractor never intersects with its past. Indeed, it is interesting that at the same time calls for devolution of power back to the
states are on the rise, the European Union countries, which started
from an organizational structure much patchier than ever experienced
in the United States, have gravitated towards increased centralization of environmental regulation.288 There appears to be something to
Professor Kauffman's thesis that the intermediate point between
order and chaos, between patchiness and homogeneity, is where
adaptiveness is optimized and we are naturally drawn. 289
less ....However, bear in mind that the overall record of the states in this area is mixed").
Presumably, these commentators expect us to agree that the record of the federal government is
blemish free, or at least so much superior to that of the states that any talk of devolution as the
course of evolution is folly. In any event, the question is a choice about the future and the long
run, and which system will prove most adaptive. It should say something about the states'
potential in that regard that they have proven so adaptive and innovative in the past decade
even in the face of daunting federal domination.
287. See notes 166-67.
288. See Cliona J.M. Kimber, A Comparisonof Environmental Federalism in the United
States and the European Union, 54 Md. L. Rev. 1658 (1995).
289. In Bill Futrell's words, for example, there is every reason to believe that the sociolegal
system's response to new challenges that face environmental law (and other areas of sociolegal
policy)
is actually aided by the American political system of divided powers, shifting interest
groups, and private sector preference. Indeed, unexpected advantages in environmental
protection accrue from our system of dispersed authority. Changing coalitions of interest groups will form around different issues in different sectors. While we have a government of separated powers prone to gridlock, we have a society of shared powers
seeking consensus and renewal. Even when Congress and the Executive Branch are at
a stalemate on a specific issue, the political mobilization of passionate new recruits, the
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Hence, we need to shed our preconceived premises and devise
completely new premises of federalism and democracy, redefining290the
roles of the various patches to fit the challenges of the future.

I

believe simply that we will have a better chance of that evolution
unfolding if we return to greater reliance on common law mechanisms
of lawmaking and if we show greater respect for the original constitutional design when achieving policy goals requires more than the
common law.
The difficulty in fulfilling that vision is that it will take more
than just a wave of the wand-there is more to it than, say, having
the Supreme Court overturn the decisions that led to the bloated
commerce power and the puny nondelegation doctrine. Those measures are necessary, but not sufficient. I place great emphasis, for
example, on the legislative creature being fitter than the administrative state, but I am not so naive as to believe that Congress in its
present form is such a creature. Congress has decayed to a shell of its
constitutional potential because it has fallen deeply into the reductionist trap of lawmaking and thus has devised rules of politics that
perpetuate that structure. Congress is a part-some might say the
source-of the problem. Reform measures dealing with campaign
financing, committee structure, term limits, third party access, and
the like need to be given serious consideration if we expect Congress
to take back some of the responsibilities it has frittered away to agencies and exercise them adaptively. Similarly, the states, used to being
vassals of the federal government and competing with one another for
the scraps of federal entitlement and grant programs, must relearn
pace of experimentation in the states, and the search for new engineering solutions by
industry work to erode the gridlock and assist the transition.
Futrell, History of Environmental Law, in Environmental Law Institute, Sustainable
EnvironmentalLaw at 17 (cited in note 185).
290. Elsewhere I have argued, for example, that the complex problems associated with the
protection of ecological biodiversity cannot be solved either through a federal domination or a
state domination model. Rather, a system of shared power, with federal resources devoted to
data gathering, goal setting, and performance measuring, and state authorities charged with
the design and implementation of local regulatory standards, will work much more effectively in
the long run. See Ruhl, 66 U. Colo. L. Rev. at 555 (cited in note 126). What I am proposing is
far different from the "partnership" rhetoric prevailing at the EPA and other federal
environmental agencies, which boils down to having the federal regulators take care to be more
"sensitive" to the states' frustrations, but which does not include any fundamental redistribution
of decision making power in its agenda. See, for example, Patton, Envir. Forum (cited in note
286) (EPA official); Partnershipswith State, Local Governments Envisioned By EPA, Regional
Administrator Says, 27 Envir. Rptr. (BNA) 364 (1996); Ira Michael Heyman, Property Rights
and the EndangeredSpecies Act. A Renascent Assault on Land Use Regulation,25 Pac. L. J. 157
(1994) (Department of the Interior official).
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what it means to behave as meaningful, responsible patches in a system, sometimes cooperating and sometimes competing. States must
be willing, if they wish to avoid falling back into the race to the bottom that led to federal dominance in the first place, cooperatively to
shed some sovereignty in order to address cross-cutting transboundary issues. Whereas now our options are national versus state politics, greater reliance on interstate compacts and other forms of regional organizations of states will be necessary in order to adjust the
levels of patchiness and coupledness that are available for responding
to each challenge.291
Reform of the scale I suggest may seem extreme, but it is not
rocket science. We know how to do it, the question is whether we
have the will to do it after so much investment in the "the system" as
we know it. While leaving discussion of the exact scope and structure
of these reform measures for another day, I have attempted in this
Article to provide a nonideological, nonnormative basis in the form of
Complexity Theory for recognizing that these kinds of reforms are
necessary in order to achieve a fitter, more adaptive sociolegal system.

291. One of the difficulties posed by the federal versus state dichotomy of environmental
regulation is that those two levels of patchiness often prove ineffective for dealing with intraregional pollution issues. For example, recent efforts by the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission to deregulate the electric power generation industry have met resistance from
northeastern states concerned that increased power generation will result in increased transboundary air pollution into their territories. See State Officials Call for Federal Control of Air
Impacts from Utility Deregulation,26 Envir. Rptr. (BNA) 2052 (1996); FERCRule Deregulating
Electric Utilities Sent to White House Council on Environmental Quality, 27 Envir. Rptr. (BNA)
259 (1996). For similar reasons New England states have opposed the EPA's relaxation of
nitrogen dioxide emission levels for industrial boilers. See New England Attorneys General
Urge EPA to Impose Stricter NOx limits on Boilers, 26 Envir. Rptr. (BNA) 2183 (1996); New
York Files Seventh Circuit Challenge to NOx Exemption Granted to Midwest States, 26 Envir.
Rptr. (BNA) 2248 (1996). For the evolution of environmental law to lead to significantly higher
peaks, it may be necessary for it to break free of the limited options we perceive are available
for structuring the system dynamics. See J.B. Ruhl, InterstatePollution Control and Resource
Development Planning: Outmoded Approaches or Outmoded Politics, 28 Nat. Resources J. 293
(1988).
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V. CONCLUSION
The law must be stable, but it cannot stand

2 92

still.

What has impressed me most after writing this Article is that
there are so many emerging bodies of thought from diverse disciplines
which seem to be saying the same thing, but which do not appear to
have spent much time discussing the subject among themselves.
Stuart Kauffman, for example, with no legal training, has come to
some strikingly profound conclusions about the American sociolegal
system. Edward 0. Wilson's assembly rules of ecosystems are perfectly suited to Professor Kauffman's model of coevolving dynamical
systems. And after sifting through piles of legal commentary on the
topics of common law, constitutional interpretation, and the changing
environmental law, I have found that a growing body of legal theory is
emerging which coincides uncannily with Wilson's and Kauffman's
ideas without showing much evidence of having ever heard of them.
All of these coalescing galaxies of thinking have been waiting, perhaps, for the organizing principles that Complexity Theory may offer.
The jury is still out on what Complexity Theory will deliver to
science, law, and society. Maybe it offers nothing more than a new
way of looking at familiar problems. 293 Even so, if all Complexity
Theory does is prompt us to ask questions about the sociolegal system
with new vigor, while offering no immediate answers, that is enough.
But Complexity Theory, in my view, does offer answers, though not
packaged in the reductionist boxes with which legal theory and legal
institutions are used to dealing. Through Complexity Theory, we can
gain a deeper appreciation of the need for allowing dynamic, unpredictable processes in the sociolegal system to prosper. Those who say
"Stop the pendulum!" thus have it all wrong. It is the dynamical

292. Roscoe Pound, Interpretationsof Legal History 1 (1967).

293. Horgan contends that Complexity Theory "will not achieve any great insights into
nature certainly none comparable to Darwin's theory of evolution or quantum mechanics.

[It]

will not force any significant revisions in our map of reality or our narrative of creation."
Horgan, The End of Science at 226 (cited in note 11). But he concedes that Complexity Theory
has "slightly extended the borders of knowledge in certain areas, and sharply delineated the

boundaries of knowledge elsewhere." Id. The fact that Horgan devotes an entire chapter of his
dissertation of the present state of science in the world to Complexity Theory suggests he is
hedging his bets and that even he leaves open the possibility for more from Complexity Theory.

I certainly do.
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effect of the pendulum of democracy that allows a sociolegal system to
adapt and evolve to its ever-changing environment.
Even knowing this, it is difficult to resist the power of reductionism inherent in the federal administrative state. It is comfortable, and comforting, to wrap ourselves in the blanket of centrallydictated regulation woven in a simplified, easy-to-predict environment. All that we have learned from Complexity Theory, however,
points in the direction of relaxing the grip of federal administrative
control of the lawmaking process. It is as if Darwin has returned to
remind us of the power of evolution. The question is whether we will
listen before it is too late.

